University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
2-2009

Leviathan’S Rage: State Sovereignty And Crimes Against
Humanity In The Late Twentieth Century
Cecil Bryant Lawson
University of Massachusetts - Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Lawson, Cecil Bryant, "Leviathan’S Rage: State Sovereignty And Crimes Against Humanity In The Late
Twentieth Century" (2009). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 49.
https://doi.org/10.7275/5645858 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/49

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

LEVIATHAN’S RAGE:
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A Dissertation Presented
by
CECIL BRYANT LAWSON

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 2009
Political Science

© Copyright by Cecil Bryant Lawson 2009
All Rights Reserved

LEVIATHAN’S RAGE:
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

A Dissertation Presented
By
CECIL BRYANT LAWSON

Approved as to style and content by:
_____________________________________
Roberto Alejandro, Chair
_____________________________________
M. J. Peterson, Member
_____________________________________
Joan Cocks, Member

______________________________________
John Hird, Chair
Department of Political Science

DEDICATION

To the memory of my wife

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my committee chair, Roberto Alejandro, for his guidance,
patience, and always thoughtful comments along the way. I would also like to thank the
other members of my committee, M. J. Peterson and Joan Cocks, for their equally
important contributions to this dissertation. Thanks are also due to Patricia J. Mills,
Nicholas Xenos, former committee chairs, and to Eric Reeves, former outside reader,
who helped me to figure out the proper direction for this dissertation. This was truly a
team effort.
I want to thank my parents, who believed enough in me to encourage my career in
graduate school and who helped me in numerous ways, financial, emotional, and
spiritual, through the years it took to bring this dissertation to fruition. I also want to
express gratitude for my “other family,” the McGuires, who helped me in the dark time
that I shared with them. A special thanks is due to a good friend, Barbara Elsner, whose
guidance showed me the way out of many dead ends, both in my work and my life.
Finally, I want to thank my late wife, Mary Jo McGuire, whose love, longsuffering, and persistence helped me to see this dissertation through to the end, even after
she was gone. Her spirit lives in these pages.

v

ABSTRACT
LEVIATHAN’S RAGE:
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FEBRUARY 2009
CECIL BRYANT LAWSON, B. A. MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY
M. A., UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Alejandro

This dissertation explores the relationship between state sovereignty and major
instances of crimes against humanity committed in the latter 20th century. In order to
examine this dynamics of this relationship, the author analyzes the history and theory of
the concept of sovereignty and examines five case studies of crimes against humanity:
Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Argentina during the military junta from 1976 to
1983, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda in 1994, and the ongoing conflict in
the Darfur region of Sudan. State sovereign power is shown to be an important
facilitating factor in these atrocities as well as a major source of contention during the
civil conflicts in which these crimes have taken place. International efforts to control or
mitigate the damaging effects of state sovereignty, including humanitarian intervention,
the International Criminal Court, and the promotion of democratization, are shown to be
largely ineffectual and often end up strengthening state sovereignty.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

While it may seem like I am stating the obvious, we need to ponder this: largescale crimes against humanity have become a common occurrence within my own
lifetime (I was born in 1971). Over past few decades, we have witnessed the last
paroxysms of the Cold War – détente, renewed conflict with the “Evil Empire,” the fall
of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its satellite allies; the rise
of a “new world order,” heralding globalization and a new respect for international law;
and another descent into global conflict following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States. While the earlier events might have been a cause for some optimism in world
politics, it instead turned into a period of horror and sadness. Although instances of
crimes against humanity took place all throughout the decades prior to the 1990s, the
ideological conflict of the Cold War did much to obscure the murder that happened; the
global conflict between capitalism and communism seemed to figure at the very least into
the atrocities that took place throughout the 1970s and 1980s in Central and South
America and Southern Asia. With the passing of the Cold War, however, these crimes
continued and were more preeminent in an ever-increasing number of locales around the
world. Western nations and prominent members of the United Nations stood by as
governments openly repressed, tortured and killed millions of their own citizens, in the
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name of national unity or to stifle political dissent. This unwillingness to act, to
intervene, was always followed by condemnations after the face, always too late.
This in itself should tell us something about the nature of these kinds of crimes –
their occurrence transcends ideological conflict, nationalism, or authoritarianism, and
their scale, in fact, is made possible by the modern state. We know that genocide and
atrocities do not take place in a social and political vacuum; at least since the Second
World War, we have learned to see how ethnic individuals’ hatred and authoritarianism
have used the means of the state to carry out crimes against humanity, how those hatreds
are provoked and sustained, and how the control of information in a political regime
distorts public perspectives. The murder of 6 million Jews, Gypsies, Slaves, and other
minorities in World War Two by the Nazis in Germany should have been enough of a
lesson for the people of the world in how genocide gets carried out, or even for a
generation before that, with the slaughter of the Armenians in Turkey during the First
World War.1 The world community proclaimed, “Never again.” It erected the edifice of
the United Nations with a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed a convention
on genocide in 1948 as well as various conventions against torture, the persecution of
minorities, and the ill treatment of women and children.2

1

The Armenian genocide , unlike the Holocaust was reported around the world while it was being
undertaken, although the term “genocide” had yet to be coined. See Arnold Toynbee, ed. The Treatment of
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916 (London, 1916); Arnold Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities: The
Murder of a Nation (London, 1915); Leslie Davis, The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat’s
Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, 1989); Henry
Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (1918); Isreal Charny et al. eds., Encyclopedia of Genocide
(1999).
2
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (1948); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (1965); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1979); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); and Declaration
on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (1992).
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However, the world community’s actions tell a different story. Nonintervention
has been the practice and the rule of international law, and it is a foundation of modern
world politics.3 World leaders may wring their hands while genocide is taking place, but
there is legally4 no course of action at the international level,5 and several centuries of
international custom have made it acceptable to look down on one nation interfering with
the internal affairs of another. Thus, while we may cite motives such as national selfinterest or apathy as reasons why nations generally refuse to intervene in order to stop
genocide, the more fundamental reason, it seems, lies in the structure of modern
international relations, i.e. in the principle of sovereignty.
In this dissertation, I want to explore the degree to which state sovereignty is
implicated in the occurrence of crimes against humanity in the late 20th and early 21st
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In Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter, the principle of non-intervention is
invoked as contrary to the purpose of the United Nations: 2 (4) “All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,”
and 2 (7) “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [which deals with the enforcement of UN Security
Council resolutions in relation to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression against other nations].” The
principle of non-intervention was codified subsequently in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, G. A. Res. 2131/20, 1965; the Declaration on the Principles
of International Law, G. A. Res. 2625/25, 1970; and in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G. A. Res. 36/103, 1981. For the application
of the principle of non-intervention in cases of international law, see the Corfu Channel case (1949), ICJ
Reports, 16 ILR, and the Nicaragua case (1986), ICJ Reports, 76 ILR.
4
Article VIII of the Genocide Convention states that , “Any Contracting Party may call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such actions under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.” In other words,
signatories to the Convention have to take action through the United Nations bureaucracy in order to have
their concerns legally recognized.
5
The idea of “humanitarian intervention” gained a certain hearing in the 1990s with the crises in
Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. However, in order to be acceptable within the legal structure of international
sovereignty, the United Nations had to construct a concept of humanitarian intervention which took into
account the fact that the sovereignty of surrounding nations was being affected by civil conflict and/or
refugee flows. See U. N. Resolutions 713 (1991) in relation to the former Yugoslavia and Resolutions 733
(1992) for Somalia and 688 (1991) in Iraq. This idea of humanitarian intervention has been given a
different footing under the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” which will be explained in Chapter Five.
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centuries. The term “national sovereignty” has had several centuries of usage and has
become a commonplace expression at the beginning of the 21st century. Both
contemporary international law and the United Nations are built upon a respect for
“national sovereignty.” It is recognized that international law and all treaties,
agreements, and alliances are based on the consent of the nations involved; if a nation
chooses to back out of any of the above, it may do so (it may not earn the good will of the
other nations party to them, but that is not the issue here). Today, nations continue to
want to strengthen their sovereignty,6 and ambitious nations want to assert theirs, but the
central concern remains the issue of sovereignty itself. What does sovereignty mean? In
the context of modern political theory, sovereignty means the most powerful legitimate
authority within a political community, that power which has the final word on matters of
law and enforcement. In the context of international relations, it refers to the ability of a
nation-state to determine its own decisions and actions. Taken in its totality, the concept
of sovereignty has two sides: one in relation to other nation-states, and the other in
relation to itself – it is concerned with the boundary between outside and inside. While
international law determines the legal boundaries of a country, it ultimately falls to
sovereign authority to decide what is outside and what is inside, and more importantly,
who is inside and outside.
It is the nexus between political theory and international relations that I am going
to examine in order to more fully understand sovereignty; I am going to bring insights

6

Recent debate on national sovereignty has focused on the “decline” of sovereignty in the era of
globalization; for the most comprehensive treatments of this issue, see Held, David; McGraw, Anthony;
Goldblatt, David; and Perraton, Jonathan, Global Transformations (Stanford, 1999: Stanford University
Press), Gilpin, Robert, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century
(Princeton, 2001: Princeton University Press), and Sassen, Saskia, Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age
of Globaliztion (New York, 1996: Columbia University Press)

4

from political theory regarding the relations between citizens and governments into
international relations and bring insights from international relations regarding the unitary
nature of sovereign power into political theory. Speculation upon this line between
inside and outside shows us that this line is moveable, due to war, internal conflict, and
changes in national law. It cannot be overstated, however, that this concerns not merely
national boundaries (although geography is a crucial element of sovereignty) but is more
generally about belonging, the collective sense of what is “ours” and what is “theirs”. At
its most fundamental levels, sovereignty is about identity.
In the first chapter, I am going to introduce a history of the concept of
sovereignty, beginning in Europe’s Middle Ages. The purpose of this is to show that
sovereignty is not an eternal category of political authority but rather the outcome of an
historical political conflict among a number of authorities claiming ultimate authority
over the others. The medieval Christian Church and its protector, the Holy Roman
Empire, stood at odds with one another from the beginnings of the empire in the 9th
century. By the late Middle Ages, feudal relations were breaking down and consolidating
under a number of powerful national monarchs, and this created yet another source of
authority within the conflict. The waning of both the power of the Church and the Holy
Roman Empire left a number of monarchs and their national states with the claim to
supreme political authority over their territories and populations. As these countries
began to extend their influence through colonization, the idea of sovereignty spread
across the world and become the dominant mode of conceptualizing the authority of the
state in the contemporary world.

5

Since sovereignty retains in the predominant status, in the second chapter I return
to the early modern period and examine the ways in which sovereignty was theorized.
Sovereignty essentially moves along an axis between two poles, which I call monarchical
and popular. I examine the development of monarchical sovereignty in the works of Jean
Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes. Monarchical sovereignty is initially
formulated as being limited by ideas of natural law and natural right, but in its operation,
it remains essentially unfettered. By the 17th and 18th centuries, a constitutional
revolution takes place in Europe which moves the concept of sovereignty along the axis
toward popular rule; supreme authority is said to lie in the people themselves. However,
I demonstrate that there remains the same formal idea of a power, once instituted, which
remains unaccountable, especially in national emergencies. The Italian philosopher
Giorigo Agamben argues that this is the essential nature of sovereign power; it remains
outside of the limits which seek to bind it.
In the next section of the dissertation is a series of five case studies in which I
explore the implications of this concept of sovereignty in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries. In the countries of Cambodia, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan,
crimes against humanity have been committed against broad segments of their own
populations; I will examine the degree to which political authority claiming sovereignty
is implicated in each set of crimes. By way of contrast, I will also examine the role
played by each country’s political culture in these crimes. In my conclusions to these
case studies, I will show that, apart from the motivations behind the crimes committed,
state authority and the state’s institutions were implicated to a very high degree, and that
political culture itself can fall within the concept of sovereignty.
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In the last chapter, I will turn to an examination of the ways in which sovereignty
may be modified and/or challenged as a way to prevent future large-scale crimes against
humanity. I will look at the role of humanitarian military intervention as a preventative
measure; the International Criminal Court as an institution that does away impunity for
these crimes; and the process of democratization around the world as a long-term means
of creating political environments that value human rights. I conclude that these
measures, while important for curbing future atrocities, only wind up recreating
sovereign authority at the national level; they do not limit the abuses inherent in
sovereign authority itself. Until humanity is able to come up with a way of insuring
protection of basic human rights outside of a context of absolute control over the means
of violence, sovereignty will remain with us, with all of its dangers.
Because I am trying to make connections across several areas of the social
sciences – including political theory, international relations, comparative politics, and
history – this dissertation will sacrifice much depth for breadth. My treatments of the
different subject matters will undoubtedly not impress specialists in each of those fields,
but I hope that that my arguments will open doors for futures areas of research.
Understanding the role played by sovereign authority in the commission and justification
of crimes against humanity remains a central task in creating a more just, more secure,
and more humane world.
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CHAPTER 2
RISE OF LEVIATHAN

In order to understand the dynamics of sovereignty, the first step I want to take is
to show how the concept of sovereignty came into existence. Sovereignty, like all
concepts, has a history, but the success of the institutions of sovereignty in the
contemporary world tends to obscure rather than elucidate the understanding of
sovereignty. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is usually regarded as the “beginning” of
the modern sovereign state. However, prior to this date, a number of historical events
had already taken place which laid the foundation for sovereign political authority, and
developments would continue after 1648 to ensure that the sovereign idea became the
dominant model of political authority by the end of the 20th century.
Thus, I think it is necessary to create an historical narrative of the origins of the
concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty had its beginnings in the Middle Ages in the debates
between Church, Holy Roman Empire, and national monarchs over political primacy on
the European continent. While the Church and the Empire, often linked and also often at
odds with each other, claimed symbolic primacy in the temporal world, it was the local
feudal lords, and eventually, the national monarchs, who ended up with military and
political control over their populations and territories by the end of the Middle Ages.
Using theological concepts to legitimate their rule, national kingship was transformed
into sovereign authority. The development of state bureaucracy in the early years of the
Modern era borrowed these same legitimating ideas for what was largely a matter of
secular administration. Finally, through colonial expansion, the idea of sovereignty was
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spread throughout the entire world, laying the foundations for its eventual predominance
in world affairs.

The Political Foundations of European Christendom

In 313 C.E., the Roman Emperor Constantine officially recognized Christianity,
and seventeen years later, he moved the administrative center of the Empire east to
Constantinople, an event which is generally regarded as the advent of the Byzantine
Empire. During the following century, Byzantium began to lose its control over the
Roman territories of Western Europe after a series of invasions by Germanic peoples into
the heart of the Italian peninsula. Much of subsequent Byzantine foreign policy focused
on regaining control over this region.7 At not point had relations between the two regions
been particularly close. While a number of ecumenical councils of Western and Eastern
Church officials in the early Middle Ages attempted to maintain ritual and doctrinal unity
within the realm of Christendom, centuries of growing geographic, linguistic, and
ideological separation eventually led to two separate and competing domains of
Christendom.8
Traditionally within Christendom, the Bishop of Rome was considered primate,
first among equals. From the fifth to the early thirteenth centuries, the Pope struggled
with the lack of recognition of this role by Byzantium.9 As the last remaining outposts of
imperial rule in Western Europe succumbed to the Germanic invasions, and the Patriarch
of Constantinople rose in prominence and power in the eastern empire, the Bishop of
7

Walter Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought (Baltimore: Penguin, 1975), 72
John Julius Norwich, Byzantium: The Early Centuries (New York: Knopf, 1989),120
9
Ullmann, 96-7

8
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Rome began to assert that he could appoint an emperor in the west, and this signaled a
different kind of power to Eastern Christians.10 Around the year 750, there appeared in
Rome a forged document, The Donation of Constantine, which claimed to have been
written by the Emperor Constantine himself, which stated that he had merely "retired" to
the Byzantine capital and left the crown for the Pope to bestow on the next emperor of
the Romans.11
In the wake of this growing rift between Western and Eastern Christendom, a
"siege mentality" developed in the West in the 8th and 9th centuries, as the European
continent came under further invasions: the Islamic caliphs into the Iberian Peninsula;
the Norsemen, the Slavs and the Magyars from the east; unfriendly Christian kings in
western France; and hostility from princes in northern Italy. It fell upon the papallyappointed emperor to organize the defenses of Western Christendom against these
invasions.12 In the late 8th century, Pope Leo III led the coronation of Charlemagne as
"Emperor of the Romans." Later, the papacy turned to the German kings as protectors of
Western Christendom, and potentially, as instruments of the Pope's power. Once the
authority of Western Christendom was consolidated in the Bishop of Rome, separate
from the authority of Constantinople - made official with the mutual excommunication
between Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael I in 1054 - the papacy then began to
establish its authority in relation to the rulers within its own domain.
As the earlier Germanic invaders had settled throughout Western Europe, they
began to convert to Christianity. At the same time, their focus was not on the role

10

Ullmann, 77
Norwich, 119
12
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 100-1
11
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emperor, who to them was just another local ruler. They acknowledged the authority of
the Bishop of Rome, but the idea of a united European empire faded from their concern.
This loose network of local kingdoms and authorities developed their own political and
religious institutions, influences by Christianity and by local custom. They looked to
their elders, folk custom, and tribal leaders for their immediate protection and the
maintenance of social order. Isolated from the Church and from the office of the
Emperor, this situation provided an opportunity for the development of the law of the
king, which began to evolve alongside the already-existing law of the community.13
These separate communities passed beyond a tribal stage of social development, with the
ruler governing as a representative of the community and so being bound by the
community's sense of justice.14 This network of custom and traditions within these
communities allowed people to assert their rights and privileges against those of the ruler;
these arrangements came to be regularized under the spread of feudal and manorial
relations throughout Western Europe. Through the influence of Christianity, the
authority of local rulers was viewed as an extension of the authority of God and the
Church; the need for governance was seen to be a result of humanity's fallen nature, in
need of tending and guidance. Because of the heritage of the Roman Empire, all rulers
were looked upon as divine, or taking on divine qualities, consecratio.15 Because of the
Christian heritage, rulers were viewed as Rex Gratia, king by the grace of God, and as
"vicar of Christ," God's regent on earth.16

13

In a few centuries, it would eclipse the law of the community in the guise of monarchical aboslutism.
F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 107
15
This was reflected in coronation rites, which were developed in the 9th century throughout Western
Europe in the wake of the Carolingian Empire; see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study
in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 89-92
16
Also known as "sacral kingship," in Kantorowicz.

14
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This tension between the Germanic ideal of kingship and the Christian ideal was
never resolved,17 but as suggested above, the line between secular and ecclesiastical
authority was not sharply drawn. The Western Church had adopted the political structure
of imperial Rome; imperial Rome had had its own set of religious legitimations and
functions, whose trappings the Church had also variously ignored and incorporated.18
Pepin, king of the Franks, agreed to be protector of the Romans after meeting with Pope
Stephen II in 754, consecrating his service to the papacy. His grandson, Charlemagne,
declared himself "Rector of Europe" and cast his rule in theocratic terms. A century and
half later, the Ottonian kings of Germany19 assumed leadership of their local churches
through a proprietary system, in which bishops were treated as princes of the empire and
as such secured privileges, becoming feudal lords over their districts.
These political and institutional developments were followed by wide-sweeping
changes in the socio-economic conditions in the 10th and 11th centuries. This was a
period of economic development, with the introduction of new technologies and new
methods of cultivation, which in turn led to agricultural surpluses that supported both a
general increase in the population of Western Europe and an increase in trade and
merchant activity. These last two developments were central in the growth of urban
centers, the rise of a merchant class, fairs and markets, credit, banking, insurance, and the
growth of handicrafts and crafts guilds.

The Papal Revolution

17

Ullmann, 55-6
The Eastern Church, on the other hand, remained openly subordinate to the Byzantine Emperor, which
kept alive the older practice of Roman emperorship.
19
beginning with Otto of Saxony, who was named imperator and augustus by Pope John XII in 962

18
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The 9th century was a period of renewed piety within the Church, and this was
given institutional form with the founding of the Clunaic system of monasteries in
France. The initial aim of the reformers was to end the inter-related practices of the
purchase of clerical offices, clerical marriage (and the problem of clergy fathering
children in and out of wedlock), and the influence of local barons in the selection of
bishops. Once these reforms were set in motion, a more fundamental set of questions
emerged: if church offices were not inheritable and could not be purchased, could their
appointment be left in lay hands? Were kings and lords qualified to make what would be
a large number of appointments of bishops and priests once the latter were no longer
allowed to marry and have heirs? Until this point in Western history, the Church retained
the right to appoint its own officials, but in actual practice, local rulers under customary
authority could invest bishops and priests with their offices.
The Church’s first act against investiture was at the Synod of Reims in 1049 and
was followed by similar acts in subsequent decades. This initially caused conflict with
the Emperor and the Pope's Norman allies, leading to the ignonimous sack of Rome in
1084. In its conflicts with King Henry II of England and Emperor Henry VI of Germany,
the Papacy was not able fully to establish its supremacy over issues of investiture, but it
did secure a number of advantages for the Church in the long run. In the Concordats of
Bec (1107) and of Worms (1122), which brought the Investiture Controversy to a
resolution, the Pope was able to insist that: 1)the future ordination of clergy would
require his approval; 2) he would establish the functions and powers of clerical officials;
3) rulers could not create new bishoprics, divide or suppress old ones, or transfer or
dispose of bishops; 4) the Pope would become the principal dispenser of all Church
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property; 5) he was supreme in all matters of worship and belief; 6) he could grant
absolution of grave sins, canonize saints, and distribute indulgences; 7) he was able to
summon church councils, preside over them, and declare their decisions official; 8) he
would issue decretals to settle Church controversies; 9) he was the supreme legislator and
interpreter of the law; 10) the papal court was the court of appeal of all Christendom and
has jurisdiction over all cases submitted to it by anyone.20
Many of these aims were first articulated in a document attributed to Pope
Gregory VII, the Dictatus Papae, in 1075. In this list of twenty-seven propositions, the
Pope set forth his jurisdiction as God's sole human representative on earth, described later
as fullness of power, or plenitudo potestas. This was an important part of the worldview
shared by the Church reformers, as the secular world (the saeculum, the world of time
and human history, and mundus, the material world, in contrast with aeternitas, eternity,
and ecclesia, the Church)21 was in need of reform and guidance, which was to be carried
out through the proper administration of the sacraments22 and the further institutional
establishment of the authority of the Church.23
The Church slowly undertook this monumental, if not ultimately impossible, task
of governing the entire secular world within Christendom. It sought to establish itself as
an independent, self-conscious identity, as the supreme institution from which flowed the
power of kings and princes. The Pope ruled Christendom as an inheritance of Saint
Peter, while the Emperor (and by extension, all kings) ruled by delegation from the Pope.
During this time, the Pope began to see himself as the chief prince of the Christian
20

Berman, 98-9
ibid., 112
22
ibid., 174
23
Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages: A Completely Revised and Expanded Edition of
‘Medieval History: The Life and Death of a Civilization’ (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 245
21

14

polity,24 and he began to refer to himself as "the vicar of Christ", taking the title from the
emperor.25 Similar statements made by later Popes sought to define the supremacy of the
Papacy in relation to worldly rulers and the reach of the Pope's powers. Innocent III's
bulls Quanto personam and Per venerablis (both 1202) created important distinctions
between the Pope's ordinary powers of office and his powers as vicar of Christ.26
Boniface VIII's Unam sanctum (1302) asserted the supremacy of his powers in relation to
those of worldly kings.
The Church went about this wholesale reordering of the social and political life of
Western Europe. In order to carry out this mission, it created an enormous bureaucracy,
whose jurisdiction would come to straddle both secular and ecclesiastical realms.27 There
was also a great need for a coherent body of laws, and the Church supported efforts at
systematization of canon law and civil law.
In no European country in 1100, and not even in the church, was there
anything approaching a comprehensive and organized legal system. In attempts
to assert their authority in society and to provide a measure of order and justice,
the secular governments of Western Europe were hampered by limitations of and
conflict among the various German customary legal traditions. In Mediterranean
countries Germanic legal procedures and principles further clashed with debased
fragments of the much more sophisticated Roman legal system. In northern
France and England feudal law presented yet another group of competing juristic
traditions. A new political order and the slow shift toward a money economy
demanded legal rationalization and codification.28
The private efforts of individuals such as Ivo of Chartres (1040-1116) and Irenius (10661125) paved the way for the codification of law, particularly Gratian's organization of
canon law in the Decretum in the 1140s and the development of a standard law
24
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curriculum in universities around the continent in order to teach the newly revived
Roman civil code. This revival of Roman law laid groundwork for the further
development of concepts of political authority already in circulation – potesta (power),
auctoritas (authority), imperium (discretionary authority), and iurisdictio (jurisdition).
The influence of Justinian's code was felt most strongly on the continent, less so
in England. Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa of Germany began to use it to buttress his
claim to absolute authority over the city-states of northern Italy, and his grandson
Emperor Frederick II used it as the basis of his Constitutions of Melfi. In France, the
Capetian monarchs of the 12th and 13th centuries realized the utility of the Code in
expanding their administrative control their territory and began to employ the same
absolutist claims to rule as used by the German emperors. French legal scholars
developed the legal maxim rex imperator in regno suo (the king is emperor in his own
realm) as an interpretation of the imperial office found in the Justinian Code.29 Finally, as
noted above, remnants of Roman law were already a part of the legal systems of the
Italian peninsula and the Mediterranean region. Yet, there has always been some
question as to why Roman law was not as influential in England. The Norman kings of
the 11th and 12th centuries would not have resisted the absolutist implications of Roman
law, which provided a definite contrast with the community-based Germanic law which
was predominant. Instead, the Norman kings utilized existing institutions to strengthen
their royal power. As a result, no permanent administrative, judicial, and legislative
bodies operated on their own autonomous authority, as on the continent.30 All local and
feudal institutions became absorbed under the control of the king. This had two
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important implications for the political culture of England. First, this led to the
development of strong checks on royal power, despite the king’s administrative control.
An abstract idea of the “state,” divorced from the local people administering it, never
developed in England.31 The local “King’s men” remained a visible and approachable
part of the community. Second, there developed the system of common law, another
innovation of royal power under King Henry II. Under common law, the king used the
local nobility to carry out his administration of justice, who performed unpaid services by
acting as judges and serving on juries.32 The king also made use of writs to carry out his
orders, but this also had the unintended consequence of placing limits on the king's
jurisdiction, by holding him to the letter of his own law.
The Church was also strongly influenced by Roman law concepts during this
period. Despite the initial reluctance of the papal reformers to embrace secular law for
spiritual ends, especially the pagan legacy of Rome, the usefulness of the vocabulary of
the law proved irresistible. The canonists had already described the Pope's authority over
the Church and Christendom as plenitudo potestas; to this list was added iudex ordinarius
omnium, ordinary judge of all; lex animata, the living law; and omne habet in pectare
suo, all the laws are in his breast. Later, these same terms would be borrowed to describe
the office and powers of the national monarchs.33
Despite the influence that the Church and Roman law would come to have within
Western Europe through both the civil code system and canon law, the administration of
affairs at the local level remained within the province of custom (consuetudines) and long
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practice and were supplemented by the laws of the king (constitutiones), and the
mechanisms of enforcement and adjudication were strengthened by the expansion of the
kings' courts (curia).34 The authority of monarchs and nobility continued to flow from
existing Germanic law and feudal customs, with their emphasis on contractual obligations
between the ruler and the people.35

[The] law curricula for university instruction from the twelfth to the eighteenth
centuries in Europe were exclusively based on the laws of Justinian, the Corpus
iuris civilis, and the corpus iuris canonici, but judges and notaries did not usually
apply these laws. Furthermore, as is known, the contents of these bodies of laws
gave no guidance and provided no norms for those who had responsibilities for
governance or administration on the local level, in the commune civilis or the
regnum, in the seigniry or the principality, in the hierarchy of the Church or in the
monastic orders.36

Thus, two kinds of law existed: utrumque ius, the one and the other, i.e., the duality of
civil and canon law; and the ius proprium, the local laws of Europe. Thus, the authority
of the Church over Western Europe was to remain ultimately religious and ritual, and it
was left to the local rulers to fill in the blanks of governance.

Opposition to Pope and Empire

The Papal Revolution was not without its opponents. From the very beginning,
resistance emerged from other centers of authority within medieval society. While
remaining respectful of the Church's position as spiritual shepherd of the Christian
community, lay critics began seeking to refute the Papacy's hierocratic concepts and aims
34
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by developing a number of arguments.37 The writer of the 11th century tract On the
Preservation of the Unity of the Church, argued that the primary source of the Pope's
power, from Christ's commission to Peter "to loose and to bind,"38 was not a
comprehensive jurisdiction and did not apply to local rulers.39 Peter Crassus, who taught
at the University of Ravenna, argued that the Pope had set aside the “sacred laws” of the
Emperor by arrogating to himself the function of law-giver.40 Reiterating the Gelasian
doctrine of the "two-swords,"41 defenders of Emperor Henry IV said that Christ had
established two governing authorities over Christendom, Pope and King, and in asserting
his sole power to invest clergy, the Pope had usurped the power of temporal rulers.42 A
tract written by an anonymous defender of the Norman king showed that "the concept of
the king as a person endowed with spiritual qualities was still in bloom and had hardly
passed its heyday."43 Guido of Ferrara sought to preserve the supremacy of the king's
power by focusing on the issue of material possession and the importance of regalian
rights within the feudal system. In the feudal understanding of property, the property of
the king was inalienable, and therefore, anything conferred by the king to anyone,
including the office of bishop, made that person a usufruct of the king; they had the right
to the “fruits” of the office but not ownership of it. Thus, the Church would be seizing
the king's prerogative if it took away his power of investing the bishop with his office.44
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In the 13th and 14th centuries, direct opposition to the Papacy by both the emperor
and the regional monarchs continued to grow. While the Church was successful at
dominating rational discussion of both theological and political issues, it never actually
established its supremacy as a political authority. The relationship between the emperor
and the Pope had always been tenuous at best, but it reached a low point during the reign
of Emperor Frederick II (1220-1250). Under the influence of Roman law and his own
sense of having a world-historical role, Frederick resisted the coercion of the Pope and
carried out his rule despite being excommunicated a number of times. Frederick's
approach to his own authority was based on the assumption of a dual vicariate of Christ:
Christ was both king and priest. The royal function had passed into the hands of the
emperor, and while the priestly function was in the hands of the Pope. Within this theory
of political power, the Pope had no power to issue laws which affected the royal
domain.45 In 1231, Frederick issued the Constitutions of Melfi, a law code for the
kingdom of Sicily, which asserted the predominance of the role of the Emperor over the
secular affairs of Christendom.
After Frederick's death, the Holy Roman Empire imploded over a succession
crisis. In 1320 another conflict arose, this time between Emperor-elect Ludwig IV of
Bavaria and Pope John XXII, over papal interference in the election of the emperor. This
ultimately led to the promulgation of the Golden Bull in1356, which reformed the
election procedure of the emperor and implied the absence of papal control over the
empire. This episode also inspired thoughtful lay reaction to the claims of the Church,
including Marsilius of Padua in his Defender of the Peace, and William of Ockham, in
his Dialogues. Both argued (on very different grounds) in support of the temporal
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authority of the emperor as necessary aspect of keeping the peace among the kings of
Europe; they also argued for a greatly diminished role for the Church in the
administration of the empire.
In the midst of these clashes between emperor and Pope, the power of the regional
monarchies was growing. England and France were at war with one another in the late
13th century, and both countries sought to levy taxes on the clergy and Church property to
help finance their war efforts. Pope Boniface VIII issued his bulls Clericos Laicos
(1296) and Unam sanctum (1302) during this conflict in order to protect church property
and to reassert the Church's supremacy over temporal matters with a version of the “two
swords” argument; both lay and ecclesiastical officials were threatened with papal
interdict and excommunication if they took part in the provision of church revenues for
lay purposes without papal approval.46 In reponse to this, King Philip IV of France and
his chief minister William de Nogaret had the Pope kidnapped and were going to have
him brought to France to try him on charges of heresy; Boniface soon escaped with the
help of locals but died shortly thereafter. From that point on, French cardinals began to
dominate the College of Cardinals, and they elected a Pope who was subservient to
French national policy. These events would directly contribute to the Great Schism
within the Church and its subsequent loss of prestige and legitimacy among the
population of Europe.47
By the end of the 14th century, the power of the Church over the secular affairs
was on the wane. The seeds for the Protestant Reformation were already sown. The

46

see Internet Medieval Sourcebook, “Boniface VIII, Clerico Laicos,”
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/b8-clericos.html, accessed 8/21/08; and “Boniface VIII, Unam
Sanctum,” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/b8-unam.html, accessed 8/21/08
47
Cantor, 495-97

21

power of the Holy Roman Emperor was on the decline, whose realm now consisted only
of a number of independent and loosely united principalities stretching across central
Europe. The Italian principalities and city-states variously acquiesced to papal or
imperial control or else asserted their independence. England and France emerged as
independent kingdoms in their own right, and Spain arose a century later, following the
Reconquista, becoming a powerful kingdom in its own right.
All of these changes pointed to the emergence of new circumstances which
inspired new approaches to the question of political supremacy. The word "sovereign"
made its first appearance during this time in Philippe de Beaumanoir’s the Coutumes de
Clermont en Beauvais (1283). He argued that while each baron was "souveran" over his
own barony, the French king was "souveran" over all of his barons.48 The realm of the
king, his regnum, has less and less to do with the authority conferred to him by Pope or
emperor than it did with the territory under his actual administration. Following the
defeat of Pope Boniface VIII, Pope Clement V issued the bull Pastoralis curia in 1313,
which supported the claims of independence of Robert of Naples from Emperor Henry
VII. This was the first time that the empire had been recognized as a territorially-limited
entity, from which other political communities were separate.49 This only confirmed the
obvious, that territorially-based rule50 was becoming of central importance in conceiving
of political authority, and the French legal maxim cited earlier, that a king is emperor in
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his own realm, contained the foundational idea of what would emerge as sovereignty in
the West.

The Modern Era

With the decline of the authorities of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman
Empire, the territorial state was poised to assume its central position as the dominant
political institution throughout Europe. As noted earlier, the territorial state was but one
of a number of political institutions existing in the late medieval period, one of a number
of loci of authority in the complex web of feudal society; the national monarch was but
one of many feudal lords and princes. A number of changes lead to the emergence of a
new political order in Europe. The Black Plague had significantly reduced the population
of Europe by the mid-14th century, but this had also created agricultural surpluses and a
need for labor in the urban areas. Latin was being supplemented by vernacular
languages, first in literature, then in religion, and finally in government. The loss of
confidence in the authority of the Church led many throughout Western Europe to
embrace the various strands of Protestant reform, which in many instances allied
themselves with the national monarchs against the Church. The Protestant Reformation
itself signaled the end of a united Christendom and, in most instances, split Europe along
national lines.
At the same time, the priority of the spiritual life and its identification with public
life, once assumed during the medieval period, gave way to a pronounced divide between
public and private lives, where authority in spiritual matters migrated to the private
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sphere, whether in terms of individual conscience or a local congregation or the
individual choice of a ruler; the nature of public authority was left open to be filled,
although the legacy of the spiritual underpinnings of that authority still existed.
The efforts . . . to provide the state institutions with some religious
aureole, as well as the adaptability and general usefulness of ecclesiastical thought
and language, led the theorists of the secular state very soon to a more than superficial appropriation of the vocabulary not only of Roman Law, but also of Canon
Law and Theology at large. The new territorial and quasi-nation state, selfsufficient according to its claims and independent of the Church and the Papacy,
quarried the wealth of ecclesiastical notions, which were so convenient to handle,
and finally proceeded to assert itself by placing its own temporariness on a level
with the sempiternity of the militant Church.51

As much as the complexity of social and political relations that developed within feudal
society was an attempt to deal with the breakdown of the Roman Empire's power across
Europe, now the independent territorial states sought to build upon the remnants of feudal
society. It was inevitable that the dominant political institution would borrow its
conceptual self-understanding from previous institutions, including the religious idea of a
supreme power, only now in secular form.
In fact, what made the situation of the European territorial monarchies unique was
this absence of a supreme authority, such as the Pope or Emperor, above them to settle
disputes and broker agreements among kings and princes. Kings had supreme authority
over the people within their own realm but were beholden to no such authority
themselves. In the absence of sovereign, or supreme authority, among kings there began
to develop an entire body of norms and practices which would become what we today
call "international relations" – rules of war and peace, laws of the seas, establishment and
maintenance of diplomatic relations, rules of trade, and so on. The relationships of
51
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independent territorial states grew out of ongoing negotiation and conflict among their
rulers, unimpeded by external authority.
The first inkling of this situation can be seen in the work of Niccolo Machiavelli.
Although his reputation precedes him in the modern era as an advocate of political
manipulation and "reason of state," at the time of his writing in the early 16th century the
political geography of Europe was unsettled, and the larger territorial states were
jockeying for control of the Italian peninsula as well as for control of trade routes to Asia.
Although the Church retained some control of the Italian peninsula and had some
influence through the kings of France and Spain and through the Holy Roman Emperor,
its preeminence as an arbiter of conflict was clearly on the decline.

Machiavelli's

experience in the diplomatic office of his native Florence gave him a unique perspective
on the ways in which these newly emerging territorial states had to negotiate their actions
with one another.52 Conflict among states was becoming increasing destructive at that
time, reaching a nadir during the Thirty Years' War, and diplomacy would assume a
decisive role in the following decades.53 It was out of this conflict that the Peace of
Westphalia (1648) recognized the role of monarchs to determine the dominant religious
institutions within their territory (cuis region, eius religio); it was also one of the first
major diplomatic congresses in early modern Europe. Permanent embassies and
ambassadors were becoming a necessity as territorial states carried on unilateral and
multi-lateral relations with one another. Diplomacy and the norms of international law
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would come to embody these developing means of coordinating international actions in
the absence of a supreme authority.
While rulers of these territorial states were developing rules and norms amongst
themselves, domestically another set of changes were taking place.

In the earliest

decades of the modern era, monarchy seemed to be the form that sovereign statehood
would take. It went without question, at least for a time, that monarchy was the most
"natural" form of government, the most familiar to European experience. However,
social relations were in continual ferment, and beginning during the time of the Protestant
Reformation and continuing until the late 18th century, a few of the territorial states in
Europe would undergo "constitutional revolutions" in one form or another.

The

Kingdom of Poland, and later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, established a
representative assembly of the nobles, the Sejm, in 1493, and instituted the principle of
"nihil novi," "nothing new" without the consent of the assembly.

Its last dynastic

monarch, Sigismund II August (ruled 1548-1572), made changes that allowed the country
to become a constitutional republic with an elected monarchy.54 The Dutch Republic
declared its independence from the Spanish monarchy in 1581, and it adapted the
medieval institution of the States-General to create a system of representation and
constitutional limits on the chief stadtholder. England already had a strong constitutional
tradition, growing out of the institution of common law, the use of writs, and the
occasional demands for specified rights by the landed nobility. The nobility and the
commoners continued to make demands on the King through the institution of
Parliament. In the 17th century, the tensions between Parliament and King would turn into
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the English Civil War (1642-1651), the restoration of the monarchy (1660), and the
“Glorious Revolution” (1688) which broke the absolute power of the monarchy.
In the kingdom of France, while the Estates did not have the same ability to make
demands of the king, there still existed a strong strain of demand for constitutional
controls on the monarchy, visible particularly during the French Wars of Religion (15621598). It would ultimately take the violence of the French Revolution to topple the
monarchy and create some semblance of constitutional rule. Louis XIV, who reigned
from 1638 to 1715, did more than any other French monarch to establish the strength of
the centralized, absolutist government. The other monarchies of Europe followed
France's lead in promoting their own versions of absolutism. The Habsburg rulers
undermined the elected office of the emperor in the Holy Roman Empire by turning the
office into a hereditary entitlement for themselves, following the reign of Charles V in
1556.55 Furthermore, the rule of the Habsburgs remained personal, not constitutional;
their empire remained a collection of feudal estates, and each domain had its own
traditions and institutions and regional interests, with no interest in administrative
centralization.

Attempts at centralization and administrative reform under Empress

Maria Theresia (1740-1780) and her son Joseph II (1765-1790) eventually failed. Spain
and the Italian peninsula were two areas least affected by the Protestant Reformation, and
they retained their strong alliance with the Catholic Church. Spain eventually became a
united country under centralized control under Bourbon rule after the War of Spanish
Succession, ending in 1714. The 18th century saw the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia in
northern Germany, especially under Frederick Wilhelm I, who introduced some
Enlightenment ideas for pragmatic reasons, such as improving the efficiency of public
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administration, and sought to have all realms of public life emulate military discipline.56
Absolutist monarchy was also a feature of political life in the Kingdoms of Sweden and
Denmark in the 17th and 18th centuries. Finally, the Empire of Russia was influenced by
this same strand of Enlightenment absolutism through Peter the Great and Catherine the
Great, also ruling in the 18th century.

Colonialism

While constitutional revolutions were taking place in some countries and
enlightened absolutism was being established across the rest of the European continent,
the foreign policy of these new territorial states was wedded to the exploration of the
globe and the establishment of settler colonies, trading posts, and plantations in other
parts of the world. This grew out of attempts to circumvent the Ottoman Empire's control
of trade routes with the Far East, a mercantilist preoccupation with accumulating precious
metals and acquiring monopolies over trade routes and the trade of valuable products, and
national support for Christian missionary activity in the newly discovered lands. Spain,
Portugal, France, and England controlled the Americas until the early 19th century, when
European influence was decisively eliminated on those continents, and the newly
independent countries became sovereign, constitutional, territorial states in their own
right.
Portugal and the Dutch Republic dominated trade with Asia in the 17th and 18th
centuries. England established a colonial presence in India in the 17th century, and this
provided it with a gateway to inner Asia and a base for the dominance of trade in the
56
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region by the end of the 18th century. By the early 19th century, the British East India
Company effectively controlled the Indian subcontinent.

Traditionally resistant to

outside presences, both Japan and China would eventually yield to Western pressure and
open up their interiors to trade and commerce. The Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60)
and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) weakened the Chinese Empire, opening the way for
the European states to carve out their "spheres of influence." The collapse of the Mughal
Empire in India, already weak in the early 19th century, allowed the British government
to assume complete administrative control of the region in 1858. Following attacks on
French Catholic missionaries in the empire of Vietnam, the French government managed
to convince the Vietnamese Emperor to cede control of its Southeast Asian provinces
(Cochin China) and placed them under French "protection" in 1862; France would
directly control all of Southeast Asia by 1884.

The United States Navy under

Commodore Perry paid a number of visits to Japan between 1852 to 1854 and managed
to convince the Japanese emperor to open up to trade with the Western nations; what
made the case of Japan different from the course of other Asian countries was that, in
another decade, after the beginning of the Meiji Era, Japan undertook an ambitious
course of Western-style technological and economic development.

In the following

years, Japan would take control of Korea, Taiwan, and sections of Manchuria.
Africa also had contact with European countries in past centuries, but the
European presence was not large, consisting of Portuguese trading posts in coastal areas
in the sub-Sahara regions, and Dutch and English settlers in the Cape Colony in the
south.

France began the conquest of northern Africa in the 1830s, beginning with

Algeria, later annexing the kingdoms of Tunisia and Morocco. France also enjoyed good
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relations with the viceroy of Egypt, and it was under French auspices that construction of
the Suez Canal began in 1854. Because of debts incurred for its war against Ethiopia, the
viceroy of Egypt, Ismail Pasha, was forced to sell his shares of the Canal to the British
government in 1875. France and Britian assumed financial control over Egypt four years
later. In 1882, following a period of civil conflict, British troops began their occupation
of the country. Following the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, the major European powers
agreed to guidelines on how to lay claims to their colonial possessions, and this marked
the beginning of the "scramble for Africa." Belgium gained control of the Congo Free
State; Germany controlled Togoland, the Cameroons, South West Africa, and East
Africa; Britain controlled Kenya, Uganda, the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, and
Tangyinka; and France controlled Guinea, French West Africa, and French Equatorial
Africa. Italy followed suit by claiming Libya and Chad and making incursions into
Ethiopia.
This period of colonial expansion would continue until the First World War, after
which there was a broad (though shallow) international support for the national
independence and self-determination of peoples. Those regions in the Middle East that
had been under the rule of the Ottoman Empire were transferred to the administration of
Britain and France. Between the First and Second World Wars, there was a period of
growing domestic support for national independence in the Middle East, Asia, and
Africa.

The Second World War weakened the ability of the European powers to

administer their colonial holdings.
After 1945, the push for decolonization had begun, both at the local level and
through the newly-created United Nations.

However, a number of factors stood in the
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way of former colonial dependencies becoming sovereign states. The Cold War began
shortly after World War Two, and the ideological battle between the United States and
the Soviet Union subsumed practically every movement for national independence in the
years that followed. Many of the countries striving for independence were economically
weak and underdeveloped, eventually making them dependent on foreign aid, and thus,
on the national and international agendas of the aid providers. These two factors created
domestic situations in those countries which often polarized the population, undermining
attempts to create broad popular support for new governments and often leading to civil
conflict; some of these conflicts still continue today.

Conclusion

While the idea of sovereignty sought to provide populations of European
countries with some semblance of political order and security in the decline of the feudal
era, this has not always been the case for a great many countries which have sought
political independence in the 20th century. For them, sovereignty has become a kind of
trap – a political ideal that seems to work for many Western nations but which has
disastrous effects when put into practice in their own political communities. It was
thought that after the end of the Cold War, struggling nations around the world would
then have the opportunity to escape of the ideological conflict and to pursue their own
courses of development, but this has been far from the case. In the five case studies of
crimes against humanity that will follow, three of them occurred after 1990. Two wars
have been fought in the Persian Gulf region and southwest Asia, and civil conflict has
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raged through Sub-Sahara Africa. Although national borders exist, and international
recognition has taken place, sovereign authority has failed in those regions.

Even

Western nations haven’t escaped these problems. The European states were born out of a
crucible of war and civil conflict in the early modern era. The settlement of the Americas
led to the extermination of native peoples, the institution of slavery and varying degrees
of racial segregation, and extremes of economic inequality; sovereignty has apparently
existed for the benefit of some people but not for others.
This history of the concept of sovereignty demonstrates three things.

First,

sovereignty is not a “natural” or self-evident concept of political authority. Rather, it is a
mode of political authority whose origins can be traced to the breakdown of feudal modes
of the authority at the end of the Middle Ages; it was one solution to a set of political
problems confronting the peoples. Other legitimate modes of authority existed alongside
of the national monarchies until the modern era. In the contemporary world, no other
means of organizing political authority is considered legitimate by the community of
states. Second, the idea of sovereignty is a theological-political concept; the idea of a
political authority that knows no accountability to any authority higher than itself is one
that takes over the theological language of the debates between Pope, Emperor, and King
in the Middle Ages. This aspect of sovereignty became obscured after the Enlightenment
period, as political language became more secularized.57 When we speak of sovereignty,
we are still speaking in theological, even metaphysical terms. Finally, there exist two
poles of sovereign authority, as evidenced by the constitutional revolutions in the early
modern period: absolutism and constitutionalism. In the next chapter, I will explore this
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in greater depth, but at this point, it is enough to say that theorizing about sovereignty has
not moved far beyond these two poles.
Taken together, these conclusions point to a facet of sovereignty that remains
unrecognized and “un-thought.” There is a dangerous aspect of sovereignty that is often
overlooked but which becomes visible in times of social and political instability; the
sovereign authority has the ability to define threats to its existence, to define its enemies
as it sees fit; the perception and definition of threats to the body politic is one of the
central roles of sovereign authority. In times of war, this role seems straightforward and
receives its institutional form as military power. At other times, the body politic is
protected from internal threats by police power. The paradox is this: by the late 20th
century, there is never a time when the body politic is not threatened. I will examine this
assertion in more depth in the case studies and in the conclusion, but at this point, it is
enough to say that this situation ensures that the sovereign authority is always justified in
defending against or attacking threats.
However, this authority remains beyond the reach of accountability - there is no
limit to what it may do, within its own material capabilities. Accountability here means
the condition of being answerable for one’s actions to a higher authority. As I have
shown in this chapter, the development of sovereign authority slowly does away with the
notion of authority that is higher than that of the state itself, drastically curtailing the
degree to which a state is accountable to any entity. In the next chapter, theorists of
monarchical sovereignty such as Bodin and Hobbes define the limits of monarchical
power by arguing that the law of God and natural law are the boundaries of sovereign
authority. In turn, theorists of popular sovereignty such as Locke and Rousseau sought to
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reign in the claims to sovereign power by absolutist monarchs by relocating sovereignty
in the people, by making the sovereign authority answerable to the people themselves.
Under either monarchical or popular theories of sovereignty, through its prerogative
power the sovereign has a wide authority for interpreting and defining threats to the
existence of the political community. When threats are seen as an internal, then the stage
may be set for atrocities to be committed, because the very people that the monarch or the
elected government is supposed to be protecting comes to be viewed as the enemy. This
is why it is important to understand the internal dynamics of sovereignty in theory, in
order to make sense of this permanent state of war.
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CHAPTER 3
NAMING THE BEAST

Out of the medieval period emerged both new practical arrangements of power in
the institutions of both absolutist and constitutional states and a new theory of power
constructed around the concept of sovereignty. The most influential philosophers of
sovereignty in the early modern period were Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas
Hobbes. During the period of the “constitutional revolutions” in the 17th and 18th
centuries, thinkers such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the framers of the
American Constitution began to advocate a different configuration of sovereignty, one
which relocated the source of sovereign authority away from God and the monarch
towards the people. Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes were almost contemporaries of one
another,58 and they wrote in response to the events of the Protestant Reformation in their
respective countries. The later writers rethought the structures of sovereignty advocated
by Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes, while retaining the concept’s broad delineations of
authority within the country’s boundaries. These variations in the concept of sovereignty,
developed over the course of three centuries, have proved to be enduring until the present
day.
What these two poles of sovereignty, which I will call monarchical and
constitutional, have in common are their positions toward the security of the population
and territory under sovereign authority. Questions of subversion and the role of defining
threats to the existence of the state fall to the sovereign authority. This becomes a
troublesome duty in the advent of civil war. Almost by definition, civil conflict occurs
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when the basic unity of country breaks down and one part of the population fights against
the sitting government or another part of the population. In the process, a government’s
legitimacy is called into doubt; its sovereign authority is called into question. Civil
conflicts can ultimately decide when legitimacy is restored. This points to a deeper issue,
the very foundation of sovereign authority itself, which is grounded in control over the
means of violence, without regard to the historical origins of that authority. These
theorists of sovereignty, from Bodin to Rousseau, consistently defend a conception of
authority rests on control over the means of violence. Borrowing an argument from
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, this means that, because it controls the means of violence,
sovereign authority partly lies outside the sphere of the law it enforces and further, it lies
beyond all accountability, even in constitutional settings. The ability to define threats,
the control over the means of violence, and the lack of accountability together create the
potential for atrocities within a country’s own borders.

Sovereignty and Monarchy
Bodin

Bodin’s treatment of sovereign authority is a codification and clarification of the
already-existing political relations of his day in France. In particular, he sets out to
distinguish the relationship between sovereign authority and subject from the network of
feudal relationships of the previous era. In doing so, he is describing the emerging
relationships between government and subjects in the other two prominent monarchical
states of his era, England and Spain. For Bodin, what differentiates sovereign authority
from the feudal modes of authority is the absence of reciprocal rights and privileges: the
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subject obeys, and the prince commands and protects them. Subjects have no rights
except for those conferred upon them by the sovereign himself. On a social level, this
represents the rise in preeminence of the king’s law, which supplanted and in many cases
superceded the laws of the towns and villages, the Church, guilds and fraternities; a
multiplicity of laws was trumped by laws emanating from one source, as all other modes
of authority in late medieval/early modern Europe were falling under the jurisdiction of
the king’s law. The king’s relationship with his subjects was to be direct and
unmediated. “The highest degree of compulsion is the power of life and death . . . This is
the highest attribute of sovereignty, proper to the majesty of a prince, and inherent in him
to the exclusion of all other public persons.”59
The nature of this sovereign authority is explained by reference to two other
fundamental modes of authority, that of a father over a household, and that of God over
creation. Bodin focuses on the correspondence between these three modes of authority,
the centrality of command. “[T]here is none that has a natural right to command save
only the father, who is the image of the Almighty God, the Father of all things.”60
Sovereign power, in its essence, is paternal power, the power of a father over his
household, which would include wife, children, and servants. Bodin defined sovereignty
as the absolute right to command. “[He] cannot in anyway be subject to the commands
of another, for it is he who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and
amends absolute law.”61 As has been noted, the power of a sovereign is power over life
and death, and it is also the absolute power of command in a political community. Bodin
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considered these two attributes as making up the quality of “majesty” that also defined
sovereign authority, from the Latin term maiestas, describing absolute and perpetual
power to hold a commonwealth in awe.62 In summary, the power of sovereign authority
is the power to command, backed by the means of violence.
Yet even for Bodin sovereign authority has limits. “[All] princes of the earth are
subject to the laws of God and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all
nations.”63 Bodin consciously distinguished his concept of sovereignty from mere
tyranny, which he defined as rule in which the laws of nature are ignored.64 First and
foremost, the sovereign prince is subject to the laws of God. God is the ultimate
sovereign, the Father of creation, and the princes of the earth are His lieutenants.65 By
treating earthly princes as part of the divine hierarchy, Bodin sidesteps the issue of the
authority of the Church, which is probably a function of his intention to focus exclusively
on the role of the sovereign prince; the unique position of the French monarchy within
Christendom, as the unofficial protector of the Church’s interests in Europe; and the Wars
of Religion in France. As a lieutenant of the Almighty, however, the sovereign prince
will one day have to answer for actions before God, so it falls upon the prince to behave
in a godly manner.66 Second, the prince is subject to the laws of nature. For Bodin, this
concept of nature covers everything from honor and equity, to the sanctity of covenants.
The law of nature is what is reasonable and equitable.67 Bodin eloquently describes a
prince who governs in accordance with the laws of nature as one who
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fears God, is merciful to the afflicted, prudent in his undertakings,
brave in action, modest in prosperity, constant in adversity, true to his plighted
word, wise in counsel, careful of his subjects, helpful to his friends, terrible to
enemies, courteous to men of good birth, a scourge of evil-doers, and just
towards all.68
Finally, the sovereign prince is subject to the laws that are common to all peoples. Bodin
does not discuss these at length, but they include just war, property, and the constitutional
laws of the realm. The latter refers to the rules that make up the foundation of a
commonwealth, and the sovereign prince may not alter them.69 As Bodin summarizes,
justice is the end of law, the law is the work of the prince, and the prince is the image of
God, so the law of the prince should be modeled upon the law of God.70
A heavy burden rests upon the sovereign prince. He is the father of his nation and
is responsible for its common welfare. It is his law, his command, which brings this
about, but primarily, it is his good faith and example that holds the commonwealth
together. “The surest foundation of a commonwealth is public confidence, for without it
neither justice, nor any sort of lasting association is possible. Confidence only arises
where promises and legal obligations are honoured.”71 The sentiments of faith and trust
in the sovereign prince are what allow him to be able to carry out the demands of justice.
For Bodin, trust, more than justice, is the basis of a political community. Justice
considered alone is without sympathy, since it demands “the strict exaction of rights”
without regard to persons. “But mutual affection leads men to make concessions.”72
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This explains the necessity of divine and natural law for the political community, since
their sole end “is to foster love among men, and between men and God.”73
The concern with trust and public confidence will lead a prince to observe the
principles of just war and the sanctity of agreements with other princes. “[Seeing] that
they are the guarantors of good faith and sworn engagements, what assurance will those
subject to them have of their own mutual undertakings if the rulers themselves are the
principal breakers and violators of good faith?”74 For reasons of domestic stability, it is
in the interests of sovereign princes to carry on their affairs with one another in good faith
and without ill-will, even in warfare. They will observe the right of conquest in war with
one another, which creates its own form of legitimate rule in its wake, instead of mere
tyranny.75
There is a significant religious dimension in Bodin’s understanding of
sovereignty. There exists a cosmic hierarchy, and a relationship of correspondence
between the cosmic macrocosm and the social microcosm. God rules over the physical
creation as father and judge; this is mirrored at the level of the political community, by
the rule of the prince over his subjects; and at the level of the family, but the rule of the
father over the household. These forms of rule are perpetual and absolute, the rulers of
the lower orders subject only to the rule above them. The will of the sovereign authority
is expressed as law. However, instead of being a mere arbitrary exercise of power,
sovereign authority is held in check by divine and natural law. Power is exercised in
accordance with the dictates of divine mercy and justice and by the standards of right
reason and equity. Absolute authority, in this case, refers to the degree of a subject’s
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obedience rather than the reach of the ruler’s power. In a well-ordered universe, political
community, or household, the subject owes obedience to the ruler in exchange for
protection, mercy, and justice. God respects a human’s dignity in the form of free will; a
prince respects a subject’s life and property; and a father respects his wife’s, children’s,
and servants’ humanity by treating them well. At the level of relations between political
communities, princes observe the sanctity of covenants with one another as well as the
rules of just war.
Within Bodin’s concept of sovereignty there is little room for popular rule or
democracy; even aristocratic governments get no sympathy in his account of sovereign
power. “All the laws of nature point towards monarchy.”76 This should come as no
surprise in the late medieval/early modern context in which Bodin lived. Democratic,
republican, or popular government was viewed either as decadent, because of its
association with ancient Greece and Rome - where it was castigated by the ancient
Roman and Greek writers themselves - or as violating the Christian ideal of a unitary
authority. Given these assumptions, how can those who are subjects of the law also make
those same laws? Bodin reluctantly and briefly considers the possibility of popular
government.
The first attribute of sovereignty is the power to make law binding on the
subject. But in such a case who will be the subjects that obey, if they also have a
share in the law-making power? And who will be the law-giver if he is also
himself forced to receive it from those upon whom he has imposed it? One is
forced to the conclusion that if no one in particular has the power to make law,
but it belongs to all indifferently, then the commonwealth is a popular state.77
Bodin’s difficulty with popular government also stems from his assumption that the law
is not binding upon the lawmaker himself. This applies not only to rulers in other
76
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political communities, but also to subsequent rulers in the ruler’s own community. “[All]
laws, ordinances, letters patent, privileges, and grants whatsoever issued by the prince,
have force only during his own lifetime, and must be expressly, or at least tacitly,
confirmed by the reigning prince who has cognizance of them.”78
Bodin postulates an essential division within a political community under
sovereign authority between those who rule and those who are ruled, and this is what
distinguishes Bodin’s concept of sovereign authority from earlier feudal modes of
authority. Feudal modes of authority incorporated reciprocal duties and privileges
between lord and vassal, while sovereign authority counts on their absence. Under
sovereignty, the subject obeys, and the prince protects. Subjects have no rights except
those conferred by the prince himself. Political and social relationships are reduced to
those of subjection and command, which makes it so difficult to conceive of any form of
popular government that is stable.
Bodin is also unable to conceive of any power-sharing arrangements between
kings, aristocrats, and people. Sovereignty is not divisible, and any division of sovereign
rights would inevitably lead to civil war.79 In Bodin’s own lifetime, the Estates General
began to exert some power against the French monarchy, but Bodin did not see the
Estates as anything more than a ratifying body for the king’s laws.80 “[If] the authority of
the monarch is to be limited, and subjected to the popular estates or to the senate,
sovereignty has no sure foundations.”81 To drive home his point, Bodin points to the
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tendency of aristocracies and democracies to turn to dictators in times of emergency82 as
proof that sovereign authority should reside in the hands of one person.

Grotius

When Grotius refers to sovereignty, he says that he is not interested in looking at
“civil acts,” the outward form of daily administration of the state, but at the body of law
upon which the administration rests.83 Furthermore, Grotius only defines sovereignty
insofar as it is useful in answering his primary question, can a public war be waged by an
authority who is not sovereign?84 For Grotius, only a civil power can wage a public war.
Civil power is defined as the moral faculty of governing a state.85 Grotius uses the term
“faculty” to denote active ability, as opposed to aptitude, or potentiality.86 This in turn
leads Grotius to ask, exactly who or what has this active power to govern the state? This
leads him to consider the question of sovereignty.
Central to Grotius’s idea of sovereignty is the idea of a people. He defines this
term from both legal and theoretical points of view.
An association in which many fathers of families unite into a single people and state
gives the greatest right to the corporate body over its members. This in fact is the most
perfect society. There is no lawful act of men which does not have relation to this
association either of itself or by reason of the circumstances. And this is what Aristotle
expressed in saying that ‘the laws prescribe concerning matters of every kind’.87
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From a legal point of view, a people is the households belonging to the class of bodies
made up of separate members but who are comprehended under a single name, a kind of
public association (in terms of Roman law, a collegium or universitas, or what today
would be called a corporation). “[Those] who unite to form a state form a kind of
perpetual and lasting association by reason of the character of those parts which are
called integral.”88 From a theoretical point of view, a people is an association of families
or households, borrowing from Aristotle’s understanding of the constitution of the polis
(civitas in Roman terms), which seeks to realize the common good. This association has
a singular essential character or spirit, which is the “full and perfect union of civil life, the
first product of which is sovereign power,” the bond which holds together the state.89
Following this, Grotius takes the relationship between king and people as
paradigmatic in his understanding of sovereignty, and he begins to question the validity
of contemporary ideas of popular sovereignty. While not wholly consistent in his chain
of arguments, he shows that claims to sovereign authority by the people do not stand on
their own. Interestingly, the central importance of the concept of the people can be seen
most clearly in a number of arguments Grotius used to specifically refute popular
sovereignty. First, Grotius argues that all men possess the legal right to enslave
themselves to another for private ownership;90 a people with legal competence may
submit itself to another (people or king) in order to be governed, thereby transferring its
sovereignty over itself to the dominion of another.91 Second, a people may select the
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form of government it wishes,92 thereby indicating a collective agency in its decisionmaking powers. Third, a people may have recourse to any number of justifications to
renounce its right to govern itself and thus vest this right in another.93 Fourth, citing
Aristotle, Grotius argues that some men are by nature suited for slavery, and thus, some
peoples are by nature better off being ruled by others rather than ruling themselves.94
Fifth, throughout history, a number of nations have lived happily and prosperously under
monarchical rule.95 Sixth, Grotius cites the principle that property may be acquired by
means of just war and then draws from it that notion that public authority may be
acquired by conquest independently of any other source (not only from the people).96
Seventh, some peoples have other peoples under their sway as subject to them.97 Eighth,
history shows that monarchs have not always derived their power from the will of the
people.98 Ninth, among people who are not permanent subject to kings, there are
temporary kings, who are not subject to the people, as when Republican Rome turned to
dictators in times of crisis.99 Tenth, it is not always true that the one who vests another
with authority is superior to him upon whom that authority is vested (a people is not
superior to their king).100 And eleventh, not all governments are established for the
benefit of the governed (as with peoples who are made subject during wartime).101 At the
end of this section of the text, Grotius goes on to make a further point, that a king and a
people are not mutually dependent upon one another, and that if a people can decide
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whether or not to obey a king’s command, sovereignty is divided and thereby rendered
ineffectual.102
What may we draw from these arguments about the nature of a people? As noted
earlier, a people is a legal body and a corporate entity. It has legal competence to make
decisions about itself, in the same way as an adult male may make decisions for himself
(since, for Grotius, it is made up of adult males); peoples exist within an international
system of laws and may choose for themselves how they are to be governed. At the same
time, while sovereign authority is created through consent,103 Grotius is at pains to show,
as noted above, that this does not imply anything about the idea of popular sovereignty,
an idea that was gaining currency at the time, particularly through the writings of another
Dutch contemporary, Johannes Althusius.104 Popular government is but one possible
outcome of popular consent, and it is not a necessary outcome; more often than not,
history and practice shows that peoples have usually been ruled by kings, and their
governance has been transferred from one king to another.
Grotius seems to treat the people as a kind of property of the king, but he is aware
of this problem, and in order to clarify his argument, he turns to a discussion of Roman
property law and its distinction between property and right of ownership.105 He proposes
an analogy between sovereignty and the right of ownership. The king does not possess
the people; he possesses sovereign authority. First, he argues that in the case of both
ownership and sovereignty, there is a distinction between a thing and its modes of
possession. Here, sovereignty is regarded as incorporeal object, and it may be held with
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full right (as when a king subjugates a people in wartime); with usufruct106 (when a king
is chosen to rule, and others succeed him); or with temporary use (as when republican
Rome was ruled by a dictator during crises).107 Second, Grotius makes a distinction
between civil liberty and civil subjection, analogous to the Roman distinction between
the personal liberty of a property owner and subjection to a master. “Just as personal
liberty, then, excludes subjection to a master, so civil liberty excludes subjection to a king
or any other form of control properly so called.”108 It is in this distinction that Grotius
finds a basis for popular sovereignty, in the Roman idea of the personal liberty of the
adult male property owner, but instead of developing this, he continues his focus on
monarchical rule. Finally, Grotius follows this analogy between sovereignty and private
ownership by examining the distinction between the right of sovereignty and its exercise;
he uses the examples of a king who is an infant, or who has been captured in battle, or
who is insane. In all of these instances, the king possesses the right of sovereignty, but he
is not able to exercise it, making necessary guardians or regents to exercise power for
him.109 Sovereign governance, whether of a people over itself or by a king, is foremost
an exercise of right.
So, given that a people is a legal actor, how should the position of the king be
characterized? The king is also a legal actor who possesses rights (whether absolute or
partial) over a people; he represents the people at the international level. Grotius at one
point goes as far to ask, to whom in a nation does the sovereign power belong, but instead
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of directly answering the question (whether it lies in the king or in the people, or derives
from some other source), he makes a series of distinctions regarding sovereign power:
principatus (chief authority) is distinguished from regnum (royal power); power that is
wholly sovereign from that which is less than sovereign (for example, that of a king
versus that of a magistrate under the king); and between sovereign power in itself and its
modes of possession (again, using Roman law terms, ownership, usufruct, and temporary
use).110 What Grotius seems to be doing is something other than rendering a simple
account of the origins and sources of sovereign authority. Instead, he defines the term as
a power whose actions are not subject to the legal control of another, actions that cannot
be rendered void by the operation of another human will.111 He then goes on to say that
the state is the common subject of sovereignty.112 Sovereignty becomes a neutral legal
term, existing within an international system of laws and rules, and no reference is made
to its sources or origins, nor is it infused with any normative content. In contrast to
Bodin, whose central effort is to describe the source of source and domestic form of
sovereign authority, Grotius’s primary concern is to elucidate the laws of war and peace
between states, and whether a state is a monarchy or a republic is not important. History
demonstrates that sovereign states can take any number of forms, so for Grotius there is
simply no point in making arguments about the validity of this or that form of the state
when attempting to analyze the legal principles which underlie the interactions between
states.
Despite the analogy he suggests above, Grotius distinguishes between sovereignty
and private ownership in his discussion of the mode of original acquisition, by which
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private property and sovereign territory are created. Until this point in his discussion,
Grotius has not made such a distinction; in fact, it seems as if he was proposing an
analogy between sovereignty and private ownership. However, when he begins his
treatment of the mode of original acquisition, by which previously unoccupied or
unclaimed things are occupied or claimed, he makes the point that a distinction does in
fact exist between sovereignty and private ownership. He says that they are both
acquired by a single act, by occupation, but the sovereign has power over all things under
his occupation, while individuals have only proprietorship over what is allowed by the
sovereign.113 The law of nature establishes the right of ownership, but insofar as
individuals submit together under a sovereign power for the protection of their lives and
property, then the sovereign authority trumps their rights to privately defends themselves
and their property, in the interests of public tranquility.114

Hobbes

Hobbes’s Leviathan begins as a polemic against a number of conceptions of
political theory by way of his own extreme nominalism. Scholasticism, the dominant
mode of education and philosophical argument since the 11th century in Europe, is based
on deduction from first principles and on the synthesis of conflicting arguments. For
Hobbes, first principles have often been shown to be unclear, and this ambiguity can lead
to erroneous conclusions in the process of argument. Hobbes seeks to proceed from
precise and consistent definitions of his terms, taking his cues from the science of
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geometry. Only with precise and consistent definitions throughout the chain of reasoning
can one be guaranteed the certainty of the conclusion.115 Hobbes also sees his work as a
critique of the centrality of prudence in politics. Prudence is dependent upon experience
and memory and upon the ability to realize a design the flux and movement of things.
While this may be a laudable quality, it should be not provide the basis of a theory of
politics; Hobbes argues that what is needed is a science of politics, which will grant a
foundation of certainty.116 Finally, Hobbes is critical of the role of custom. To him, it is
ignorance of the causes and the original constitution of right, equity, law, and justice that
dispose men to make custom and example the rule of their actions.117 Rejecting these
classical and medieval understandings of political life, Hobbes sets out to provide a new
foundation for the study of politics in human nature. Political life proceeds from the
consequences of human nature. Hobbes begins with the primacy of thoughts and ideas
and the motions of the passions, and from there he considers the social significance of
both understanding and feeling (in terms of honor, manners, and religious belief).
Another facet of Hobbes’s work is his religious project. In rejecting Scholasticism (and
implicitly, Catholicism), his work moves toward a more naturalistic understanding of
God and the Christian religion, and perhaps more importantly, the role of religion in
stabilizing the political order. This explains his approval of the Church of England,
which was under the authority of the King of England.
Hobbes’s work can be clearly placed in the social contract tradition. For him,
people are already sociable, possessing language and the ability to reason, but they
originally live in a conflict-ridden state of nature. By using their reason, human beings
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will always seek to protect themselves and their possessions, and for Hobbes the most
reasonable way of ensuring this protection is within a civil society and under a sovereign
authority, under which all agree by way of a covenant or contract.
Within Hobbes’s system of thought, the concept of authority is necessarily
connected with the concepts of representation, personhood, and covenant. A person is
either one whose words and actions are considered his own or which represent the words
and actions of others.118 The word “person” comes from the original Latin persona, a
disguise, referring either to one who acts on the stage or in a court of law. The persona is
the same as to be an actor, and to act, or to personate, or to represent, is to bear a
person.119 In the case of artificial persons (corporations, or corporate persons), the actor’s
words and actions may be owned by those whom he represents. The person is always an
actor, while those who actually own the words and actions are the author of them; thus,
the actor always acts by authority.120 When an actor makes a covenant, he binds the
authority that he represents; but no authority is obliged by any covenant that he did not
authorize or which is made against himself, and the actor himself is similarly not bound
by covenants that violate the law of nature.121 Hobbes discusses covenants in Chapter 14,
as the second of his laws of nature, which describes how men give up their original
natural right in exchange for peace. This is done by way of a covenant, an exchange for
mutual good. In the covenant of which Hobbes speaks, to lay down a right creates an
obligation and a bond (in other words, a duty), and this is done by some means of
declaration (express consent). Also, to transfer a right is to transfer the means of
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enjoying it. “[They] that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty, are
understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing
magistrates for the administration of justice.”122
This leads to an interesting question. Hobbes notes that, in order to ensure that
covenants are performed, there must already exist a common coercive power over the two
parties, because trust in itself is not enough.123 If this is the case, then how was the
original social covenant created? In a state of nature, there is by definition no confidence
or trust, so how is it possible for men to even come into agreement with one another,
except through the use of force? Hobbes assumes that human beings are reasonable
enough and tired enough of the state of war that they will exchange their natural right for
something more secure for themselves.
With the above definitions in place, Hobbes then proceeds to describe the process
by which sovereignty is created. Men will
confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will; which is as much to say, to
appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own, and
acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall
act or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and
therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment.124

This conferral by the multitude to a few or to one in the interests of the common good or
common peace and safety is the process of representation or authorization writ large. In
this case, it is an absolute and irrevocable grant; the subjects may not decide to change
the form of government or free themselves from their subjection. They effectively turn
their lives, strengths, and judgment over to the sovereign. The subjects’ liberty becomes
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what the sovereign himself permits.125 “[Nothing] the sovereign representative can do to
a subject, on what pretense soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury; because
every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth; so that he never wanteth right to
anything, otherwise, than as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to
observe the laws of nature.”126 At the same time, Hobbes carefully examines the
implications of this statement. Earlier, he pointed out that covenants are void which seek
to transfer a man’s right to save himself from death, injury, and imprisonment.127 Thus,
there are some conditions under which a subject is released from his obedience to his
sovereign, particularly those involving the risk or harm. This in turn raises some
interesting issues: What about military service? What about punishments for crimes
involving prison sentences or the death penalty? The individual retains the right to refuse
(and therefore suffer the consequences of refusal), but the sovereign has absolute control
over the peace and safety of the commonwealth, and he is the sole judge of what is
necessary for the peace and defense of his subjects.128
The grant of these sovereign rights is irrevocable, and the rights themselves are
indivisible and non-transferable; this, Hobbes argues, is central to the peace and security
of the commonwealth, and this can be witnessed from Hobbes’ experience of civil wars
in England.129 Hobbes follows this with a consideration of the dangers of such an
unlimited fount of power, weighing it against the miseries produced by civil war, the
human condition, and from “masterless men.” He concludes that any criticism of
absolute power that proceeds from a defense of human freedom amounts to a refusal to
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see that, on their own, people will not contribute to the common defense, because they
care only for themselves and do not see the long-term consequences of their actions.130
Hobbes distinguishes between the right of nature (jus naturale) and the law of
nature (lex naturalis). The right of nature is the liberty each man has to preserve himself;
in pursuing self-preservation, he has the liberty to do what he will with other men and
their possessions. A law of nature is a general rule discovered by reason which indicates
that which is a man is forbidden to do, specifically, to harm himself or to allow harm to
come upon himself.131 Hobbes does not favor the right of nature as a positive condition
but instead views it as the cause of the negative situation which makes necessary civil
government. Without restraint, the right of nature inevitably gives rise to a state of war,
and people are wholly insecure. In consulting reason, people are first and foremost
counseled to find the best way to preserve their lives, and if not through peaceful means,
then through whatever advantages may come by way of war.132
Within the law of nature, men are commanded to seek peace amongst themselves.
If this condition prevails, then there follows, as noted, the second law of nature, in which
men are counseled to seek peace by means of giving up their rights of nature and
retaining only as much liberty against others as he would allow himself from others.
Hobbes says that this is a restatement of the Law of the Gospel: whatever you want others
to do to you, do to them. The law of nature points to the covenant as the only sure means
of preserving life and security. The third law of nature requires that all men observe the
covenants they make. Hobbes says that this is the fundamental meaning of justice, to
keep good faith, and it is the coercive power created by the surrender of the right of
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nature that creates the distinction between justice and injustice.133 Hobbes divides the
laws of nature into nineteen topics, but they all fall into a number of general categories
(peace, good faith, justice, gratitude, equality, and equity); they are all ultimately
reducible to the Golden Rule. Without the existence of a sovereign power, these laws of
nature do not hold much sway over the hearts of men. Without power and a source of
fear, men are wont to continue following their passions and the right of nature.134 Thus,
without fear and subjection, there is no security and no peace. The laws of nature by
themselves have no “teeth” without violence to back them up, because in nature, humans
do not follow the law of nature, but rather natural right alone.

Popular Sovereignty

As noted above, the idea of popular sovereignty was beginning to gain currency
by the end of the 17th century, in the work in the John Locke, and in the 18th century, in
the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the writers of the Federalist Papers. Their
defense of popular sovereignty was not an equivocal support for democratic government
but rather a rejection of monarchical supremacy, an increased emphasis on the rights of
property owners versus the privileges of titled nobility, and a focus on the importance of
settled constitutional arrangements in the body politic. These men sought to adapt the
idea of sovereign authority away from a monarchical basis and absolutist rule to a more
popular basis and toward more limited powers, particularly in the domestic sphere.
During this process of adaptation, they retained many of the features of sovereign
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authority as developed in the earlier writers just examined, in particular, the inability to
limit sovereign power in instances of emergency or national threat.
A recurring feature of popular sovereignty is the difficulty of reconciling the
inevitable rise of dissent from within the body of the people with the need to maintain
public order. As noted, these theorists were not fans of democracy as understood in the
sense contemporary sense of universal suffrage and participation in government; instead,
they set strict limits on the role of factions and parties and the expression of opinion, and
they exhibited a profound distrust of popular political movements. The “popular” aspect
of popular sovereignty referred instead to a more abstract sense of the public good, not an
authority arising directly out of the will of the people en masse or as expressed in what
today would be called public opinion. Instead, democratic impulses within the political
community were seen more as threats to public order; the body of the people was as
much distrusted as the members of government. Because of this, the concept of
sovereign authority acquires interesting shades of meaning.

Locke

The work of John Locke, particularly his Second Treatise of Government, is
usually cited as a defense of individual rights and popular sovereignty against absolutist
government. While this may be the case, Locke’s work still adheres to the same formal
definition of sovereignty outlined in the works of Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes. Locke is
unique in the history of the social contract tradition in making property rights absolute;
for him, the task of government is to protect individual property. “Hence it is evident,
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that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the
world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government
at all”.135 Locke is also unique in that he highlights a separation between legislative and
executive authorities, leaving the supreme authority in the hands of the legislative.
“[There] can be but one supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are
and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain
ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative,
when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them”.136
At the same time, Locke invests the executive with the power of prerogative,
which is the “power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the
prescription of law, and sometimes even against it.”137 Ordinarily, prerogative power is
used for areas in which the law is silent or to call the legislative to consider issues at
hand. However, the potential for abuse of this power exists.
“But who shall judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer: between an
executive in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will
for their convening, there can be no judge on earth; as there can be none between the
legislative and the people, should either the executive, or the legislative, when they have
the power their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The people have
no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to
appeal to heaven . . . where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their
right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then
they have a liberty to appeal to heaven . . . “138

Locke supports the right of rebellion on the part of the people against unjust government,
but again he acknowledges that no judge on earth may adjudicate such a conflict and that
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it is left to war to decide, similar to the way Grotius looks upon just war as part of an
adjudication process between states. “[Force] between either persons, who have no
known superior on earth, or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a
state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and in that state the injured party
must judge for himself, when he thinks fit to make use of that appeal, and put himself
upon it.”139

Rousseau

The idea of popular sovereignty is most fully developed in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract. The creation of a people as a people is the
foundational act of the political community. Like Hobbes, and unlike Locke, individuals
cede all of their rights and powers toward the creation of the public person; this process
has to take place as a unanimous act in order to encompass all who wish to be full
members of the community.140 Out of this act is created the general will, which provides
the body politic with a common self and direction.141
Since sovereignty is created by the individuals who make it up, Rousseau goes on
to argue that the sovereign cannot have an interest that is contrary to their own, nor can it
ever harm them in particular. “The sovereign, by the mere fact that it exists, is always all
that it should be.”142 This is because, in binding themselves by means of the social
contract, the people create a two-fold commitment within themselves: one as members of
139
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the sovereign in relation to themselves as private individuals; another as members of the
state in relation to the sovereign itself.143 In becoming a party to the social contract that
creates the sovereign, each person becomes a private individual (who participates in the
social contract), a member of the sovereign (Rousseau calls him a citizen) and a subject
(that is, subject to the laws of the state). Because each person embodies these three
identities, the sovereign (the public person) is, by definition, unable to act wrongly
against the individuals who make it up. At the same time, an individual’s private interest
can run be contrary to the interests of the general will144 as can a majority of concurring
private interests.145 This is because “what makes the will general is not so much the
number of votes as the common interest that unites them, for in this institution each
person necessarily submits himself to the conditions he imposes on others”.146 The
general will rises above a simple majority decision, encompassing the interests common
to and every citizen within the body politic.
Rousseau emphasizes the difference between sovereignty and government. For
him, the social contract creates a people, but it is a people that create a government.
“Power can perfectly well be transmitted, but not the will.”147 Governments have to be
adapted to the character of the people they serve, and to this end, Rousseau points to the
need for an outside legislator to draw up a set of fundamental laws for them, including
the form of government.148 Government acts as an instrument of mediation and
communication, forming a link between the people in their capacity as sovereign and the
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people in their capacity as subjects. “His force [the prince, Rousseau’s generic term for
administration] is merely the public force concentrated in him.”149 Rousseau argues that
the government itself is in continual conflict with sovereign authority and will always
prove to be its undoing, either through the reduction of the base of participation from
democracy to monarchy, or through the attempted usurpation of sovereignty by the
government, which destroys the social contract and releases all individuals from the
general will.150

The American Founding

The supporters of the American Revolution and the framers of the Constitution
fall within the social contract tradition and embrace the tenants of popular sovereignty as
both reason for their support of the revolution and as a basis for the new American
government. Both in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison lay the foundations of political
authority squarely in the hands of the people: “[A]ll men are created equal . . . they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed”;151 and “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this
Constitution”.152 These same considerations are also present in the The Federalist

149

ibid., 176
ibid., 192
151
Thomas Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,”
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html , accessed 9/5/08
152
“The Constitution of the United States,”
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html, access 95/08
150

60

Papers, when James Madison notes in No. 49 that “the people are the only legitimate
fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the
several branches of government hold their power, is derived.”153
Concomitant with popular sovereignty in the American context was the idea of
limited government. What Americans of the Revolutionary period experienced as
absolutist and arbitrary government from the English Crown led them to embrace a
number of institutional features which sought to curb the ability of the government to
impinge the free exercise of basic rights.
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative checks and balances; the institution of courts composed
of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the
people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly
new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in
modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies
of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided.154
While limited government carried the more general meaning of restraints on the exercise
of a government’s power, it also sought to curb the “passions” of the people themselves.
Although the people remained the source of a government’s authority, the smooth,
efficient, and regular exercise of power required that the tendency of people to develop
factions,155 foment revolutions,156 and continually change the laws be limited through
these same institutional means. Infamously, Madison remarked in Federalist No. 51,
“you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.”157
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The revolutionaries and the Framers had to contend with the necessity of
providing security for the people, the highest end of a government that aimed at the
protection of individual rights. As noted above, domestic security was as much of a
concern as was external threats, particularly with recent memories of both the war for
independence (ending in 1782) and Shay’s Rebellion (1787). Internal tranquility, it was
hoped, would be managed effectively through the mechanisms of limited government,
while the threat posed by external enemies would be dealt with through both diplomacy
and the creation of a national army. Alexander Hamilton also considers the existence of a
standing army as a deterrent against future domestic problems.158 Common defense
under the new constitutional arrangements is of such importance that Hamilton suggests
that no limits be put upon the authority necessary to carry them out. “The circumstances
that endanger the safety of the nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.”159

Conclusion

As I argued in the last chapter, the concept of sovereignty emerged from the
historical conflicts between Church, Empires, and the early monarchical states. By the
late 16th and early 17th centuries, we can see an effective break taking place between the
national governments of France, the Dutch Republic, and England from the Catholic
Church. While this change was less pronounced in strongly Catholic areas such as Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and central Europe under the control of the Habsburgs, it is from these
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other regions that we see the most extensive development of the idea of the sovereign
authority of the state.160 The leaders of the national governments of France, the Dutch
Republic, and England realized they were going to have to take a stronger hand in
maintaining civil order after the rise of Protestant sects, and this concern is reflected in
the works of Bodin, Hobbes, and Rousseau. In France, where the Catholic Church was
the national church but remained subordinate to the authority of the French monarchy,
Bodin argued for strengthening the king’s powers when it came to dealing with the
Huguenots and settling matters of religious dispute. The Dutch Republic freed itself from
Spanish and Catholic control, and afterwards its government was seized by Calvinists;
Grotius, in turn, sought to understand sovereign control in terms of law and constitutional
order instead of by particular religious sects. In England, the Anglican Church was
subordinate to the Crown, and Hobbes took upon himself the task of redefining the
powers of the Crown in order to deal with what he took to be predations by the Puritancontrolled Parliament.
This historical era was also beginning the process of exploration and colonization
around the globe, and this led to the need for an idea of an international system in which
national states and other entities interact with one another. The interests of Western
Europeans were no longer confined to the European continent itself but also spread to farflung areas of the world where European influence did not exist at the time. They began
to encounter a multitude of different peoples, so over time this made necessary some
centralized concept of foreign policy, and it fell here to the national government, whether
160
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monarchy or republic, to assume the decision-making process regarding foreign
interests.161 At the same time, the exhausted governments of Europe used this foreign
policy-making process to deal with the consequences of the Thirty Years’ War,
formulating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, it fell to the heads of national
governments to actively formulate the idea of what was in the national interest. Thus, at
the beginning of the modern era, the national state becomes the center of sovereign
authority, both at the domestic level and at the international level.
Since Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes were now free to think of an independent
sovereign authority located in the state, they had to rethink the relationship between the
king’s authority and both natural law and divine law. Here, Bodin is unique in that he
does not rely on the arguments of natural law and divine law to buttress the sovereign’s
authority; instead, he sees them as self-imposed limits on the king’s power as sovereign.
A true and responsible monarch, in Bodin’s world, would graciously take those upon
himself as befitting a Christian king, but they are not necessary for the exercise of
sovereign power. Natural law takes a much more prominent role in the works of Grotius
and Hobbes, but it is more and more distant from its medieval Christian form. For
Grotius, natural law, particularly as it is expressed through Roman law, is the foundation
of sovereign authority and international law; while for Hobbes, natural law is viewed as
inherent in the process of reasoning that leads humanity out of the state of nature and
towards the creation of sovereign power. Hobbes also makes natural law coextensive
with the Law of the Christian Gospel, arguing that they are two different means of
making the same point. Divine law for Grotius is an important point of reference,
161

Exploration and colonization was carried out largely by means of chartered companies operating semiindependently from the government; also, in France, the Catholic Church had a large hand in the
colonization process in its missionary work among native peoples.

64

particularly in elaborating upon the principles of war and peace, and it serves to buttress
his arguments from natural law. The important element being registered here by all three
thinkers is the slow un-linking of state authority from moral and ethical considerations.
During the feudal era in Europe, the Church argued that natural and divine law was
inherent in the exercise of sovereign authority by both Church and King. By the early
modern era, natural law and divine law no longer had any means of enforcement apart
from the authority of the state, which was now believed to exist independently from it.
Bodin, Grotius, and Hobbes also shared a general rejection of popular rule. The
idea of popular sovereignty was beginning to gain currency in Western Europe during
this era, but it would not be more fully developed until the late 17th century in the works
of Locke and in the 18th century in Rousseau and in the leaders of the American
Revolution. For Bodin, popular rule was simply unthinkable within his understanding of
sovereignty; as noted above, how would it be possible for one to be able to both give
commands and obey them? Grotius was not outright opposed to popular rule, but he was
no advocate of it either, and he presents a great many arguments against it in his
discussions of sovereignty. In the work of Hobbes, power may not be divided between
the ruler and the people, as that undermines sovereign authority. Related to this point is
their support for the status quo governments of their time. Both in their personal lives
and in their works, these three thinkers sought to uphold the royal governments of their
national states. Bodin was a staunch supporter of the French monarchy; Grotius
remained a strong supporter of the Dutch government of the staadtholders as it had
existed prior to the Calvinist coup in which he was imprisoned; and Hobbes sought a
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return to preeminence of the Crown in English government over the Parliament after the
Civil War.
Finally, while none of them sought revolutionary change in the political order,
they were revolutionary in terms of their methodologies for understanding politics.
Bodin was directly influenced by the historical school of jurisprudence, which grew out
of Renaissance criticism of Roman law (at least as understood in medieval times) as
flawed and ignorant of the laws of other ages and peoples. Grotius, in contrast, remained
within the classical school of jurisprudence, at the same time acknowledging history and
non-European law as important for the natural law tradition and extending the reach of
Roman law concepts to the international level. Hobbes sought a fundamental rethinking
of how to understand politics, rejecting Scholastic deduction from religious and
philosophical first principles and turning toward mathematics, geometry, and science for
certainty of method and toward human nature as the foundation of political thought.
The proponents of popular sovereignty relocated the basis of political authority
away from monarchy and royalty and toward the people. The constitutional revolution of
the 17th and 18th century sought to impose definite limits on the power of the monarchy
and to include the interests of rights-bearing property holders into the sphere of
government. No long was it trusted that the king would rule in the interests of all;
instead, the rise of individualism and the idea of individual rights became the core of
theories of popular sovereignty, and the idea of a binding legal contract between two
parties became the model of political community. Hobbes popularized this idea, and
from there it received fuller development in the work of Locke, Rousseau, and the
American writers.
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Despite this seeming revolution in sovereign authority, all of these writers
remained deeply distrustful of the people themselves.162 While ultimate authority may
indeed originate in the members of a political community, their actual participation in the
resultant government remained limited. For Locke, legislative authority, the embodiment
of sovereignty, is limited to periodic meetings, while the executive authority is always
active;163 Locke’s executive also possessed prerogative power, which acted as a kind of
blanket grant of power to deal with political issues where the law had been silent.
Rousseau’s conception of the sovereignty of the people is less limited. Although the
people require an outside legislator to create fundamental laws for them, the people in
their role as sovereign authority meet periodically to make law for themselves;
government administration, as a separate entity, is a recipient of the sovereign’s power to
execute the laws on a daily basis. However, in order for Rousseau’s republic to work
effectively, it requires a consistent common interest among the people in order to produce
the general will, and this is be ensured by maintaining a high degree of cultural and social
homogeneity, as well as by keeping the republic small in area and population. The
American revolutionaries and framers of the Constitution seek to limit the people’s
participation in government through divided government and a strong standing national
army. Whereas for Rousseau, social and political homogeneity was practically necessary,
the framers of the American Constitution assumed the relative impossibility of creating a
common interest across the original thirteen colonies.
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For both the proponents of monarchical sovereignty and those of popular
sovereignty, sovereignty turns out to be something deeply paradoxical. Hobbes proposed
that all men possess the unalienable right to defend their own lives, while sovereign
authority had the ultimate power over life and death as it sees fit. Grotius providea a
number of bases for popular sovereignty but then rescinded them in his discussion of the
monarchy. Locke argued for the centrality of individual rights as the basis for
government but then provided no normative basis to defend them, apart from violent
revolution, when absolute power tries to usurp the government. Rousseau’s concept of
popular sovereignty assumed its own demise over time, based on the inherent conflict
between the sovereign authority and the administration of government, which often
works against the general will. The Americans spoke of the inherent right of revolt, but
the defenders of the new constitution saw the need to put down domestic insurrection.
Only Bodin escaped from these paradoxes relatively unscathed, because his theory of
sovereignty did not rest on the foundations of right or the social contract.
Although the concept of sovereignty has generally come to be accepted in the
West in its popular form as the basis for political rule, what I have sought to emphasize in
this chapter is that the idea of sovereignty does not undergo a drastic change, whether in
its monarchical or popular form. In the early centuries of the modern era in the West, the
meaning of sovereignty was essentially defined and has changed little since then, and it
has become a permanent fixture of Western political thought. Sovereignty is a mode of
authority which stands alone, once constituted. It remains autonomous and indivisible
and answers to no authority higher than itself. In modernity, it is difficult to come up
with any such higher political authority. This is the consequence of the national state in
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the West becoming independent of any religious associations (even if certain countries
retained national churches, these still remained subordinate to state authority) and
existing apart from any imperial government (especially after the decline of the
Habsburg’s Holy Roman Empire).
Although individual rights, and later, human rights, have been elaborated which
may not theoretically be violated by sovereignty authority, in all instances, these rights
exist only within the context of the sovereign’s authority, and while in international law
they are designated as non-derogable, they exist at the discretion of the sovereign; the
word of the sovereign is primary law. Rights may be suspended in times of crisis. Italian
philosopher Girgio Agamben argues that this is, in fact, the very nature of political order
in the contemporary world; this “clause” is built into the very definition of sovereignty.164
When it comes to conceptualizing political authority in the world today, sovereignty is
the dominant mode of understanding it. With the waning of religious authority and ideas
such natural law as a check on sovereignty, the national state remains unchecked by
anything except other states. When we speak of the domestic sphere, democratic states
are considered as embodiments of popular sovereignty, while non-democratic states
similarly consider their governments as sovereign over their own people and territory. In
the international sphere, states with standing in the world community are considered
sovereign in relation to one another.
Sovereign authority, considered in this light, exists to a) provide the primary
source of domestic stability, and b) provide the primary source of protection against
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external threats. The sovereign state has provided the foundation for the extensive
technological, economic, and social developments of the modern world, and in
democratic states, it has allowed for their continued existence. At the same time, this
authority has been complicit in numerous atrocities and crimes against humanity in the
modern era. It has allowed states to engage in crimes against humanity with impunity,
since there is no greater authority to step in and prevent them from being undertaken. On
the one hand, once a sovereign government begins to commit atrocities within its own
territory, particularly when it does so against what it identifies as an internal threat, there
is nothing citizens can do to effectively stop it. The state, sole repository of sovereign
authority, retains monopoly control over the means of violence. On the other hand, it is a
central norm of international law that no state may interfere in the internal affairs of
another state (non-intervention). Although this norm came under renewed scrutiny
beginning in the 1990s and will be examined in greater depth later in this dissertation, it
remains a defining element in the international system.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDIES
Introduction

All national states that claim sovereignty today share certain basic characteristics:
each has a center of political power, usually a national government administration; they
have defined territorial boundaries; they have a population that lives within those
boundaries and whose membership is defined by internal rules of citizenship; and they
are recognized as sovereign states by other sovereign states. As noted in the first chapter,
this system of sovereign states did not come into existence ex nihilo but rather developed
out of the decline of the feudal system that existed across Western Europe before the
1500s. These early sovereign states were monarchies in form, but following the
constitutional revolution in the 18th century, the source of sovereignty was relocated in
some countries in the body of the people. During those same centuries, the colonial
enterprises of the European states began to encompass the globe, and by the middle of the
20th century, the entire world belonged to this system of sovereign states.
While all states165 in the international community share these basic features, the
differences between states outweigh what they have in common. Each state has a unique
history, or rather, a set of multiple and overlapping histories, involving both the peoples
within the borders of the state as well as those of neighboring states. States differ greatly
in their constitutional arrangements, in their levels of economic development, in
population density, in urbanization, in ethnic and religious composition, to list just a few
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of the characteristics. While certain regions of the world may share common features,
whether religion (Catholic Christianity in Latin America, Sunni Islam in North Africa
and the Middle East, Buddhism throughout Asia) or political institutions (social
democracy in Western Europe, councils of village elders in Sub-Sahara Africa, the
mullah in predominantly Muslim countries), each country has its own unique set of
histories and institutions.
In order to ascertain the precise role sovereign state power has played in the
crimes against humanity that have occurred in the latter part of the Twentieth Century, it
seems important to take a closer look at specific instances of those crimes and the
historical and political context in which they took place. To that end, I have constructed
a number of case studies of relevant countries. In particular, I examine the cases of
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime; Argentina under the military junta from
1976 to 1983; the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the atrocities committed during
the subsequent civil conflicts; the genocide in Rwanda in 1994; and the ongoing conflict
in western Sudan in Darfur, which began in 2003.
I have selected these cases according to a number of different criteria. The first
thing I wanted to do was to examine a number of cases that are geographically,
historically, and culturally different from one another. This allowed me to examine the
role of sovereign state power in the commission of atrocities under a number of different
circumstances. Second, I wanted to situate these cases historically after World War II,
the creation of the United Nations, and the adoption of an accepted worldwide doctrine of
human rights; I wanted to deal with recent cases of atrocity, against the backdrop of a
world community that espoused at least basic ideals of acceptable and unacceptable
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treatment by political regimes of their citizens, embodied in the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent human rights’ treaties. Finally, I
chose cases which were extreme examples of crimes against humanity, where personal
injuries were extensive, everyday life was disrupted, and torture and murder ran into the
thousands of casualties. At the same time, because of limited time and space, I had to
leave out other cases that fit these criteria, such as the murder of the Kurds in Iraq in the
late 1980s and of the East Timorese by the Indonesian government in the 1990s.
In order to examine the role of sovereign state power, I focus on those institutions
and practices of state power that flow from the (presumed) legitimacy of the state. In
most of these cases, crimes against humanity have been justified in the name of
protecting the security of the country and eliminating threats to the population. To this
end, the means of state power are employed, and this includes both military and police
power, usually at the behest of a given state’s executive authorities. As the reader will
see in these case studies, state authorities that commit these crimes often go to great
lengths to cover up their crimes if they cannot find adequate justification for them. In
times of civil crisis, the constitutional order is usually either suspended or ignored, so the
role of executive authority becomes less clear; also, those extra-governmental groups
struggling with the state’s authority often seek to gain control of the state themselves.
Sovereign power itself comes up for grabs, and atrocities have often been committed
under these circumstances. Those groups that do assume control of the sovereign state
institutions also often justify the atrocities they commit as a way of protecting the “new”
order or a restoration of an “old” order. This struggle for control of sovereign power
should be kept in mind while reading these case studies.
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The format of these case studies proceeds as follows. I present a short narrative
for each country while highlighting elements of both the country’s institutions of
sovereign state power and the country’s political culture (explained below). Each case is
chronological; most of the historical detail follows after World War Two, but there is
considerable attention devoted to the earlier history of the political development of each
country. Within the chronology, I make digressions into the deeper facets of the
country’s sovereign institutions and practices and political culture. The chronology
finishes after the atrocities have been committed. Following the case studies, I make an
analysis of all of the case studies, examining the role of both political culture and
sovereign state power in the commission of those crimes against humanity. This analysis
looks specifically at the roles of identity, civil conflict, and constitutional order and their
relationships to both political culture and sovereign state power.
These cases have been chosen on the basis of the issues to be explained, massive
atrocities and crimes against humanity, so it may be argued that they run the risk of
selection bias; that is, these examples involve occasions in which crimes against
humanity have been committed on a wide-scale, and this study seeks to understand the
role of sovereign state power in those crimes. The risk involved here is that I will choose
cases that will only highlight the role of sovereign state power and that I will interpret the
events in light of that power and will thus avoid considering other factors that might
better explain why and how these crimes against humanity have taken place. In order to
avoid this dilemma, I concomitantly examine the role of a country’s political culture in
the commission of these atrocities, looking at factors that exist outside of or beyond the
institutions of sovereign state power that have made a contribution.
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Political culture is an analytic concept that seeks to capture the subjective
elements of political life, beyond institutions: values, beliefs, rituals, symbols, and ideals.
The role played by political culture in countries where crimes against humanity are
committed is complex and varied, so this dissertation examines only the most obvious
elements of that influence and draws only tentative conclusions about causation. In the
concluding analysis of the case studies, I make some brief remarks about the relationship
between state sovereignty and political culture, arguing that the two concepts share a
mutually reinforcing relationship in defining the limits (or lack thereof) in the political
life of a country.
The concept of political culture made its first appearance in the work of Gabriel
Almond in the mid-1950s and 1960s166, where it was used as a way of making sense of
the differences between civic institutions in the United States and other countries. Since
that time, a number of approaches toward the analysis of political culture has developed
within political science, drawing from the resources of other social science disciplines,
including anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics.167 Because of this, no
single methodological approach to the study of political culture exists. Indeed, as one
scholar suggested, “Political culture remains a suggestive rather than a scientific
concept.”168
The concept of political culture sets out to answer a number of questions: “how
individuals and/or groups are socialized, how different individuals organize their thinking
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about rules and norms, how discourse affects the legitimacy of political institutions, how
and why individuals orient their thinking and communications in terms of salient myths,
rituals, and symbols, and how moral criteria are apprehended and with what
consequences for political behavior.”169 In my approach to political culture for this
dissertation, I am not going to adopt a specific theory of political culture, but instead I am
going to answer a number of pertinent questions in each case study that will highlight the
features of that country’s political culture as it relates to the crimes committed against
humanity. These questions include:
- What are the sources of state legitimacy? What are the boundaries of state
power? What are the ways in which state power may be challenged, criticized
and changed (e. g., elections, a free press, political parties, amendments, and
checks and balances within government, just to name a few of the ways)?
- Do the moral values of a country place a high value on basic human rights? On
individual rights? Does the individual have an intrinsic value, or is he or she
viewed only or largely as an extension of the community?
- Do there exist institutions that are independent of the state? Is there is a strong
civil social? What is the level of social integration within the country?

For the purposes of these case studies, I am interested in looking at the political culture of
the country which existed before and leading up to the atrocities under examination. The
eras following each set of atrocities have been extremely turbulent in terms of rebuilding
the countries as well as creating punitive measures for those involved in the crimes
against humanity, which in turn has often led to wholesale reorderings of the countries’
169
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political culture, and it is simply beyond the reach of this study to take that history and
activity into account. The reader may also note that I am leaving out some important
aspects of political culture such as political socialization and the study of the role of
specific myths and symbols within each country. This is again largely due to constraints
of time and space, and a more robust study would take note of them.

Cambodia

For most of its long political history, Cambodia was a hereditary monarchy, and
the majority of its people lived in loosely-organized villages centered on subsistence rice
farming. These villages were informally governed by elder men, and the life of the king
and the court were far away from their daily concerns.170 The only indigenous political
models that the Cambodian people had were those of the monarchy and the mandarins.171
Political power was exercised from the monarchy through patronage networks, called
k’sae, throughout the countryside; each leader in the k’sae, or “string,” interpreted orders
as he saw fit, with a greater or lesser degree of severity, and this practice continued
throughout the Khmer Rouge period.172 Traditionally, political power in Cambodia was
measured, not by control over territory, but was based on the number of people over
which one exercised control through the patronage system.173 Whether with the
monarchy or with guerrilla groups in the Twentieth Century, those in political authority
focused less on maintaining territory (though that was certainly a concern in foreign
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relations with Vietnam) as they did in insuring loyalty in the population under its control,
usually through patronage but also by force; it is no coincidence that throughout the 20th
Century, from Prince Sihanouk to Lon Nol to Pol Pot to Hun Sen, Cambodian political
leaders have ruled the country on a personal basis, taking any dissent and opposition as
tantamount to disloyalty and treason.174
As far as historical records show, Cambodians converted en masse to Theravada
Buddhism sometime in the 13th century, due to the growing influence of the Thai
kingdom to the west, and they gradually abandoned the “Angkorean” civilization that had
marked the highpoint of Cambodian power in Southeast Asia. Prior to this conversion,
the Cambodian people held to a belief in Hinduism and the worship of local spirits, and
elements of these beliefs continued to exist alongside Theravada Buddhism, particularly
in its national literature and in its kingship rituals. “Until recent times, the Khmer
language employed the same word for race and religion: to be Khmer was to be
Buddhist.”175 The Buddhist sangha (the monastic community) retained a largely
independent status within Cambodian society and history, and it was responsible for
maintaining basic educational institutions, encouraging literacy, and providing a way of
life outside the relatively limited institutions of the family villages.176
The territory that made up Cambodia was a protectorate of the French colonial
empire of Indochina. Under the French protectorate, which lasted from 1863 to 1953, the
Cambodian people were generally not encouraged to take part in the political process; it
was only in the 1920s and 1930s that they began to take a larger part in the civil
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bureaucracy introduced by the French.177 Cambodia gained its formal independence from
France in November 1953, shortly before the end of the conflict between France and
Vietnam in 1954; the country was accepted as a member of the United Nations in 1955.
Under the leadership of Prince Nodorom Sihanouk, Cambodia sought closer alliances
with North Vietnam and China following France’s departure from Southeast Asia, while
it increased domestic repression of opposition political parties and political dissent from
both left and right, as well as Vietnamese and Chinese minorities. Several attempts were
made on Sihanouk’s life in the late 1950s, including one orchestrated by the leaders of
both Thailand and South Vietnam; this was carried out because Sihanouk was allowing
the Communist Viet Minh to operate openly on Cambodian soil. These events led to
Cambodia breaking off diplomatic ties with those two countries, as well as with their ally
the United States, in the early 1960s.
Throughout the 1950s, the Khmer Issarak, originally anti-French guerrillas after
World War II, remained active in the northwestern areas of the country, which had been
under Thai administration until the area was formally declared to be Cambodian territory.
In the eastern and southern areas of the country, which were largely rural or forested,
communist guerrillas, both indigenous and the Viet Minh, controlled large areas after
independence was declared, perhaps as much as half of the country.178 While after the
1954 Geneva Conference, many of these guerrillas withdrew into North Vietnam, the
boundaries between North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos remained fluid as North
Vietnam began supplying the communist insurgency in South Vietnam along the Ho Chi
Minh Trail.

177
178

Chandler, 162
Chandler, 180-181

79

The brutal repression of domestic political opposition drove some people out of
the cities and into the countryside, where the reach of the Sihanouk’s government was not
as strong. It was in the countryside that the Communist group led by Saloth Sar, better
know as Pol Pot, and Ieng Sary began forged closer ties with the Communist Party
leaders of North Vietnam. It was also where they began to create a unique identity for
their organization, the Khmer Rouge, not subordinate to the goals of the Chinese
Communist Party, which dominated the Communist movements in the region (except for
that of North Vietnam). This new identity would culminate in the doctrine of
“independence-mastery,” the right of Cambodian Communists to determine their own
strategy for both political and armed struggles.179 It would also lead to a political
program that sought the cultural, social, and economic leveling of the Cambodian
population, refashioning “the whole of Cambodian society in the image of [an] authentic,
autochthonous peasantry, unsullied by the outside world.”180
The growing tension within Cambodian society in the late 1960s would
eventually lead to outright civil war. Pressures from the Cultural Revolution in China
caused strained relations with Sihanouk. Sihanouk then began to seek rapprochement
with the United States, which by that time was fully involved in the war in Vietnam.
Guerrilla attacks by the Khmer Rouge increased in the southern and eastern areas of the
country, leading Sihanouk to rely more on the security forces of General Lon Nol to
maintain order throughout the country. In March 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon
began a series of secret bombing raids against Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia, which
drove many people back into the cities and which emboldened the forces of the Viet
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Cong and North Vietnamese Army to begin attacking the Cambodian government. In
early 1970, Lon Nol and the Cambodian National Assembly deposed Sihanouk, and the
monarchy was abolished. “Each side was deliberately cutting loose from its traditional
points of reference: the monarchy, in Lon Nol’s case; the legacy of Indochinese
communism in the case of the Khmer Rouges [sic]. The normal restraints on thought and
behavior were eroding. Cambodia was moving into unknown territory.”181
The early 1970s marked a turning point for popular support for the Khmer Rouge.
The United States continued bombing the country, trying to root out the Viet Cong
presence, and it continued to support the Lon Nol government.182 The pragmatic alliance
between North Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge began to become strained as both the
Khmer Rouge began to control more Cambodian territory, and the North Vietnamese
began to move more of their troops into South Vietnam. It was at this time that
Cambodians began to get a taste of the wholesale changes that were going to become
national policy in the next several years. Village life in the countryside was being
uprooted, and families were made go live in communes. Town-dwellers were
encouraged to return to the country, in order to “re-forge” themselves and to reconnect
with their traditional Khmer roots.183 For communications, couriers were used instead of
radios, and there was a growing distrust of Cambodians who were educated, those
Cambodian Communists returning from North Vietnam, anyone of Chinese descent, the
native Muslim Cham people, and generally anyone who dissented from the revolutionary
Khmer Rouge doctrine.184 The language of Theravada Buddhism came to unconsciously
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permeate the ideology of Khmer communism, specifically with regard to the ideas of
consciousness and class. “To ‘proletarianise’ the peasantry, all that was needed, in this
Buddhist-inspired scheme of things, was ‘proletarian consciousness’. Class, which to
Marxists everywhere else . . . was determined by a person’s economic activity, was for
Cambodian communists a mental attribute.”185 For rank-and-file members of the Khmer
Rouge, there were the “Twelve Commandments,” which mirrored the Buddhist monks’
vows of abstinence, and after 1975, Cambodian people in the communes were
encouraged to practice ‘renunciation’.186
In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took control of the capitol city, Phnom Penh, and
they immediately began a general evacuation of the city; it is estimated that some 20,000
people died during the evacuation alone.187 The country’s borders were closed, foreign
ambassadors and press agencies were expelled, newspapers and TV stations were shut
down, radios confiscated, mail and telephone use suppressed, and the speaking of
languages other than Khmer were punished.188 The population was divided into two
groups: the new people (neak thmey), made up of urban evacuees and peasants who have
been living under areas controlled by the Lon Nol government, amounting to about 30
percent of the population; and the base people (neak moultanh), the peasant majority
living in areas under insurgent control.189 When people were finally settled into the rural
communes, they were all required to write a short autobiography, in order to disclose
their family ties and class backgrounds and how they spent their lives during the Lon Nol
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years. Technicians and skilled workers were sometimes allowed to return to the towns, in
order to reopen production in factories, while civil servants, doctors, engineers, lawyers,
school teachers, university students, and former military personnel were all sent for “reeducation”, meaning either execution or intense manual labor and further interrogation.190
In the winter of 1975, the Khmer Rouge opened a high security prison at Tuol Sleng,
known infamously today as S-21; its purpose was to “provide information as to furnish
‘proof’ of treason which would then justify purges that the leadership had already
decided to carry out.”191 It is estimated that some 15,000 to 20,000 people died at S21.192
To further add to the population’s growing misery, illness, lack of productivity,
and failure to achieve agricultural production goals were all attributed to opposition to the
regime or to a lack of revolutionary consciousness.193 During the reign of the Khmer
Rouge, between one-third and one-half of the population was sick, hungry, and not able
to work; the rest did as little work as they could get by with. The rural communes, out of
fear of the political leadership, began falsifying records of their production in order to
avoid punishments. In turn, the state assessed levies on the rice to supply its armed
forces, administration, and strategic reserves, which left around forty percent of the
population with starvation rations.194 “Democratic Kampuchea was a prison camp state,
and the eight million prisoners served most of their time in solitary confinement. And 1.5
million of the inmates were worked, starved, and beaten to death.”195 Paranoia amongst
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the political leadership was rife, leading to a number of purges in the following years,
with as many as 100,000 to 250,000 dying in 1978 alone, accused of collaborating with
the Vietnamese government.196
In the spring of 1977, conflict with the now unified Vietnam increased, and
Vietnam carried out a full-scale invasion of the country in December of that year. The
conflict continued until January 1979, when the Khmer Rouge government collapsed, and
its leadership fled once again into the countryside. The Khmer Rouge had been in power
exactly three years, eight months, and twenty days,197 and this had resulted in the deaths
of between one and a half million to three million people within the country’s borders,
most of whom were Cambodia’s own population.198

Argentina

Argentina declared its independence from Spain in 1816, part of a larger wave of
Latin American independence movements in the early 19th century. Its bid for
independence was influenced by both the American and French Revolutions; its early
constitution combined both American and European elements in the political life of the
unified country. The Catholic Church was also an important part of national political life,
and the church-influenced political philosophy of corporatism later became important in
public life, as it did throughout Latin America. “The very idea of democracy, of the
political representation of social interests, of negotiation first in the context of the party
196
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and then in shared political forums, had little prestige in a society long accustomed to a
situation in which each of its parts negotiated separately with the state. Politics appeared
a fiction that served to mask the real negotiations between the true factors of power.”199
By the early Twentieth Century, patterns of social and economic development in
Argentina were similar to those of other European settler colonies, except for land
ownership, which was dominated by oligarchs, consisting of a few powerful families or
estates (estacias), many of whom would become involved in the mercantile business,
finance, and secondary industries;200 this was a legacy of Spanish colonial practice.
Following the growth of the urban population, further democratic reforms were
introduced in the 1910s, but due to labor uprisings in the 1919 and in the early 1920s, the
propertied classes began to distrust the government’s ability to put down such rebellions
as well as the value of democratic government itself. The first military coup took place
in 1930; the Argentine Supreme Court ruled that the military could in fact oust a legally
elected government.201 A succession of military governments ruled until the late 1940s.
This tendency to intervene reflected the lack of civilian control over the military, as well
as the corporatist tendency within Argentine society for interest groups to act without
regard for other groups.
Throughout the 1940s, the political power of Colonel Juan Peron grew as he
crafted a political alliance between the military and labor organizations, eschewing the
traditional partnership of the military and the economic elites. When elections were
finally held in Argentina in 1946, Peron was elected president, and members of his
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Justicialist party won seats in Congress and in the provinces. Peron sought to reorder the
social and political life of the country through a number of reforms. His political style
was at once authoritarian, factional, and anti-Communist.202 He managed to forge a
broad coalition of political actors across Argentine society - labor and business, youth,
women, and left-wing movements - all under the influence of his and his wife Evita’s
charismatic personalities. He created a much more centralized government and an
enormous public bureaucracy, and he staffed public offices with his followers, including
the justice system. He nationalized all railroads and foreign-owned business,
strengthened the power of labor unions, and brought about a massive redistribution of
income towards the working classes. At the same time, all public media were brought
under strict control, civil liberties were curtailed, and political opposition was either
forced into exile or imprisoned. Union membership grew, but members lost control of
their leadership, as they were dependent on Peron and his government to intervene for
them. At first on good terms with both the Catholic Church and the military, both
institutions eventually turned hostile toward him as he subordinated their authority within
Argentinean society to his own. Peron was reelected to office in 1951, after having
created a new constitution that would allow him to serve consecutive terms. Following a
failed coup attempt, he declared a state of emergency which remained in force until he
was finally overthrown by another coup in 1955 and forced into exile; the shadow of his
influence lingered over Argentinean politics for almost two decades.
The military remained hostile toward Peron’s political movement after his ouster.
Pedro Aramburu was elected president from 1955 to 1958; Peronist generals attempted an
unsuccessful coup against his government in 1956. Also in 1956, special elections were
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held to reform the constitution, and 25% of the ballots were turned in blank as a protest
against the government’s anti-Peronist policies. Arthur Frondizi was elected president
from 1958 to 1962; he received support from Peron in exile, but during the last year of
his presidency, the military intervened when Peronist candidates began winning
majorities in local elections. Arturo Illia was president from 1963 to 1966; during this
time, both communists and Peronists were banned from seeking office, and the use
Peron’s name was prohibited in public life. In 1966, General Juan Carlos Ongania was
named de facto president by the military, and this marked the beginning of a series of
military-appointed presidents.
Throughout the late 1960s and the 1970s, the Argentinean public was struggling
with a great deal of social upheaval, much of it in reaction to the decades of military
interference with elected governments. A number of left-wing groups, both communist
groups like the ERP, and Peronist organizations such as the Montoneros, began to adopt
guerrilla and terror tactics in order to carry on a political struggle against the predominant
power of the military and to win further public support for their causes.
The military coup authorized elections again in 1973 but did not allow Peron
himself to seek office. Hector Campora, a moderate, left-wing Peronist, was elected as
president. Peron’s political followers also gained majorities in Congress. At the same,
the 1973 oil crisis affected the country, generating a great deal of social conflict,
including acts of terror from both right and left. Peron returned to Argentina in June of
that year; his arrival at Ezeiza airport was marked by the murders of a number of his
supporters in the crowd by a right-wing death squad. Following this incident, President
Campora and his cabinet resigned, and new elections were held the following September,
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leading to the election of Peron and his wife Isabel. The cycle of violence was continued
by extremist groups.
After his election, Peron sided with the right-wing of his own political movement,
the trade-unionist bureaucracy, and the Radical Civic Union party. He sought to exclude
the more radical left-wing Montoneros from his Justicialist Party. The Montoneros
followed suit with other radical groups, continuing to use terror tactics against the
government in order to push it into repressive actions, seeking to turn popular support
against the government. The prospect of the return of Peron had led the military to resist
attempts to restore democracy throughout the 1960s, and now growing social turmoil had
led them to make way for his return in 1973; Marchak argues that “the underlying reality
included military control or a strong military presence in the state from 1930 to 1973,”
yet it was a presence that was not united in its own interest.203 These divisions continued
to grow even after Peron’s return. The military had taken upon itself the mission of
resisting both Peronism and burgeoning militant communism and became fragmented
itself in the pursuit of those goals. These conditions created a “siege mentality” among
members of the military. As a social class, the military leadership had always been
generally isolated from the mainstream of Argentinean society, and they often styled
themselves as the protectors of the country. They came to believe that “politics had
exhausted its possibilities without overcoming the destructive effects of terrorism,” and
that what had to be done was to be done out of necessity for continued existence of
Argentina.204 Thus, through a number of coups and weak civilian governments in the
later 20th century, the ideology developed within the military that “the enemy within” was
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whoever had the greatest chance of winning an election fairly;205 in other words, the
military high commands had lost faith in the ability of democratic citizenships to lead
themselves, and more importantly, to correctly recognize threats to their own well-being
as a people.
Peron died of a heart attack in July 1974, and he was succeeded in the presidency
by his wife. Throughout 1975, a number of secret directives were issued by Isabel Peron
and by the military, in which the army was ordered to take whatever measures were
necessary to quash the activities of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP, Ejercito
Revolucinario del Pueblo), a radical left-wing guerrilla group which had seized control of
the northern state of Tucuman, as well as other guerrilla groups. These directives also
gave extensive powers to the military over local police forces and jails and prisons, and
they divided the entire country up into military zones and districts. The Argentinean
economy continued to decline, and intra-party conflict and further acts of terrorism
throughout the country led to her being removed by a military coup in March 1976.
A ruling junta was established, called the National Reorganization Process
(infamously known as the Process), led by Generals Jorge Rafael Videla, RobertoViola,
and Leopoldo Galtieri. Argentina always had a tradition of a strong executive, but under
the junta, the actual authority of the president became weak and subject to military
control. Presidential powers were ill-defined and subject to a changing balance of
alliances and confrontations within the dual chain of command between what would
become the clandestine terror state and the visible state. Romero argued that this was “a
veritable revolution against the state, affecting the possibility of exercising even those
functions of regulation and control that according to liberal concepts were its rightful
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preserve.”206 The junta sought to jumpstart the economy through pro-market reforms,
deregulation, and by attracting foreign investment. It also began applying harsh measures
against all political opponents and anyone suspected of opposing the government in what
they called an “ideological war,” or “The Dirty War.”
Under the junta, political repression was systematized through the use of forced
“disappearances,” which made it impossible to bring criminal charges against anyone,
and a nation-wide system of tracking down subversives was organized. After being
abducted, suspects would be interrogated and tortured. Many were executed by being
drugged and thrown out of military aircraft over rivers or the Atlantic Ocean. This went
hand-in-hand with the efforts of General Auguste Pinochet in neighboring Chile,
collectively known as Operation Condor. The disappearances occurred mainly from
1976 to 1978, when both the ERP and the Montoneros were finally decimated, after
which the number of disappearances drastically reduced. More than half of the regime’s
kidnappings and murders took place in 1977.207 In all, as many as 30,000 people died
during this time.208
Greater efforts toward the centralization of political power in Argentina had
already taken place under the Peron regime after World War Two. Later, as noted above,
during the mid-1970s the military was given the power to divide up the country into
military districts and to centralize their control over local and regional police forces and
detention facilities in order to deal with the problem of terrorism. This was a very easy
way for the central government to use already existing institutions for the purposes of
totalitarian control of the entire country. Under the junta, all of Argentina’s political
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institutions disappeared, all political activity was prohibited, and only the state apparatus
remained. The majority of people reacted by rationalizing the political repression and
internalizing it, informing on neighbors and censoring themselves.209 The state terrorism
that took place “was in reality an integral operation of terror, carefully planned by the
leadership of the three service branches, rehearsed first in Tucuman – where the army
officially intervened in 1975 – and then executed in a systematic fashion throughout the
country.”210
Argentine society had tended to operate in an authoritarian fashion and had failed
to develop and sustain the rule of law and the legal resolution of conflict, largely because
any viable form political pluralism failed to emerge. “A volatile mixture of competing
interest groups struggled within a society that had already dismantled if not fully
destroyed its judicial system, its free press, the possibility of independent academic
inquiry in its universities, its political parties, and independent or disengaged police
action. All activities were therefore political in the rawest sense.”211
Another economic crisis began in Argentina in 1980 with bankruptcies and runs
on the country’s banks, and massive capital flight followed. To counter this, the
government then began devaluing the peso and nationalizing the private debt of
companies, causing the national debt to grow into the tens of billions of dollars over the
course of a few years; the same thing was occurring throughout Latin America. In 1982,
the Argentine military invaded the Falkland Islands but were soundly defeated by the
British military within a few months. Following this, the junta began to fall apart, and
the military government began covering up its involvement in the worst parts of the
209
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repression by giving themselves legal amnesty before stepping down.212 At no point
during the period of the junta did the military outright deny the murders, tortures, and
kidnappings; rather, they refused to explain themselves and refused to answer for their
deeds, using the rhetoric of “the victors cannot be tried after the victory.”213

Yugoslavia

In making sense of the crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many writers and scholars have emphasized the role of ethnic
identity, but I think a better place to start would be with the political culture of singleparty Communist states. As with all of the Eastern European countries that fell under
Soviet influence after World War II, Yugoslavia adopted the Stalinist model of political
leadership. All competing parties were banned from the political process, and vocal
dissent from the Communist Party line was punished in a variety of ways, ranging from
the loss of jobs and opportunities for advancement to torture, imprisonment, and murder.
To keep a tight control over dissent, an extensive network of secret police and informants
and strict control over the public media were created to keep tabs on and shape public
opinion. Central control over the country’s economy was also directed by the party’s
political leadership.
What made Yugoslavia unique among European Communist states was the
consequences of its break with the Soviet Union in 1948. This allowed Yugoslavia to
“go its own way,” opening up to Western nations both culturally and economically (and
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eventually becoming dependent on foreign money markets). The concept of “socialist
self-management” grew out of Yugoslavia’s attempts to create a planned economy apart
from the rest of the Communist world. Finally, Yugoslavia was at the forefront of the
Non-Aligned Movement, providing an example for developing nations around the world
which sought to steer clear of Cold War alliances.214
Marshall Josip Broz Tito sought to organize the post-war Yugoslavia around the
concept of “brotherhood and unity” (bratsvo i jedinstvo). Throughout modern history,
the southeastern European region had been the object of numerous power struggles
between major powers and well as various attempts to assert provincial and ethnic
independence, often at the expense of neighboring peoples. The idea of a unified
Yugoslavia had first appeared in the 17th and 18th centuries; with Western
encouragement, an independent Kingdom of Yugoslavia was declared following World
War I. Following Axis occupation, this idea was reasserted in the form of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Marshall Tito wanted to focus on developing the
country’s strength from its diverse population, which was organized into six federal
republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia)
and two autonomous regions within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina; each republic and
autonomous region roughly corresponded to the majority ethnic population of the
territory, although there was a mix ethnic populations within each region that continued
to grow in the following decades. Despite this recognition of ethnic, religious, and
linguistic diversity, it was understood that these federal units were largely administrative,
as Tito and the Communist Party leadership were not interested in tolerating “negative
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local patriotism.”215 The republics and autonomous regions were unified under the
authority of a single government, single party rule, and in an authoritarian fashion.216
Under this system, “[while] it sought to accommodate the national interests of the most of
Yugoslavia’s peoples in a federal system, it also assumed an unchanging unity of
interests,”217 which was turn out to not be the case in subsequent years.
Much in the same spirit as other Communist parties, Tito’s Yugoslavian model
sought to move the country forward socially, politically, and economically. In the
interests of this end, he sought to forge a new national identity for the diverse peoples
within Yugoslavia’s borders, but this came at a price.
Tito’s policy was to draw a line under the past. Everyone who had died
in the Second World War had either been a collaborator or a Partisan or a victim
of the Axis powers and their satellites . . . . The effect of this was not to make
people forget, as was the intention, but to leave the wounds unhealed . . . . As
Communism crumbled in the late 1980s, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes began to
dig up their dead and rebury them . . . . the atmosphere of the times was such that
these events inevitably fed the growing nationalist hysteria and was used by
nationalist politicians to further their aims.218
Stjepan Mestrovic has argued that after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe
beginning in 1989, already existing national, ethnic, and religious identities, which had
supposedly been “supplanted” by a secular ideology, were there to step in and take the
place of the authority of the Party and the state.219 These alternative identities had neither
been supplanted nor eradicated by communism. Besides this, efforts to overcome ethnic
differences within the country, many recognized within the country that Serbs dominated
the political life of the country after World War II. This was largely an accident of
215

ibid., 140
ibid., 138
217
ibid., 136
218
ibid., 132-133
219
The Balkanization of the West: The Confluence of Postmodernism and Postcommunism (London:
Routledge, 1994), 144-148
216

94

history, due to the large number of Serbs among Partisan fighters during the war, who
were rewarded for their service with political positions in government and in the party.220
Drawing from the experience of the Second World War, Tito and the elder
Yugoslavian leadership also realized that any future military conflict would likely
involve occupation of the country, and the Yugoslavian military would not have the
resources to carry out full-scale defensive operations of the country’s borders. Instead,
the military’s strategy was designed around waging guerrilla war against potential
occupiers. Military supplies were placed in each republic, and the command of the
military was decentralized along regional lines. While there existed a unified
Yugoslavian National Army (the JNA), for all practical purposes there existed six
potentially separate armies within the former Yugoslavia.221
In the 1960s, there began a series of debates at the national level over political and
economic issues that eventually reopened ethnic fault lines. There were upsurges of
nationalist sentiments, beginning in the universities in Belgrade in 1968, in Pristina in
1969, and during the “Croatian Spring” of 1970-71, all of which were inspired by student
movements in other parts of the world. There was also a call for decentralization of
political authority and economic planning within the country, culminating in the revised
1974 constitution, which, among other things, created a rotating presidency of the
country which would not allow a single republic dominate the rest of the country and
which gave considerably more autonomy to the regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
Finally, Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment allowed Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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to make contacts with fellow Muslims outside of the country.222 Even with these
widespread expressions of ethnic identity and the moves taken toward decentralization,
efforts toward ethnic separatism were still discouraged and often punished.
A number of Serbians responded to these changes with dismay and anger, and
they began to perceive discrimination directed at them from the federal government as
well as from other ethnic groups. Throughout the early 1980s, stories circulated among
the Serb population that Serbs were being subject to discrimination, abuse, and even
murder, although later, most of these stories were shown to be without foundation.223
There were also a number of outbursts of violence between Serbs and Yugoslav state
authorities as well as increased emigration of Serbs, particularly from the province of
Kosovo; this led to a general government crackdown on all nationalist protests.
The death of Tito in 1980, political deadlock created by the 1974 constitutional
arrangements, perceived discrimination against Serbs, and the spiraling national debt in
the 1980s224 all converged to create an extremely volatile situation throughout the
country. Some sense of this volatility received a public expression in 1986 with the
leaking of the incomplete Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
(SANU) through the news media. The previous year Ivan Stambolic, head of the Serbian
Communist Party, had requested input from SANU in order to aid in the reform process.
The first part of the document was an economic analysis of the condition of Yugoslavia
in the mid-1980s, tracing the origins of the financial and economic crisis to poor
decision-making and planning in the 1960s and to the failure of the new federalist
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arrangements created by the 1974 constitution. The latter section of the unfinished
document presented a case for the strengthening of the Serbian nation. It referred to the
emigration of Serbs from Kosovo as a result of “neofascist aggression” and as
“genocide,”225 and it blamed this on the Communist Party’s tradition of “blaming the
Serbs” for Yugoslavia’s problems.226 The document ended by asserting that “the Serbian
people must be allowed to find themselves again and become an historical personality in
their own right.”227 It proposed two steps to do this: regaining jurisdiction over the
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; and creating a specifically Serbian national
interest.228
The following two years were decisive for Yugoslavia. There were mass protests
in Serbia regarding the status of Kosovo. A Serbian Communist Party official, Slobodan
Milosevic, took advantage of these protests to engineer his own rise to power and to
exacerbate already existing Serbian nationalism. He was able to capitalize on an incident
in which Kosovo police violently attacked a crowd of ethnic Serbian protesters and which
led to the resignation of Serbian President Ivan Stambolic in April 1987; Milosevic
assumed the Presidency the following year. Once he did so, he began what came to be
known as the “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” in which staged protests against the
parliaments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro led to the replacement of their
presidencies with allies of Milosevic. This increasing popular rise of Serbian nationalism
(encouraged, as noted above, by intellectuals and politicians) greatly contributed to the
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growing self-consciousness of other ethnic groups within Yugoslavia; the assertion of
Serbian identity forced other groups to define themselves in relation to Serbian
nationalism.
By January 1989, Serbia under Milosevic controlled four of the eight votes in
Yugoslavia’s Federal Presidency, giving it effective control over the Yugoslav Republic.
At this point, the Kosovo issue ceased to be of interest to Milosevic, and he began to
focus on gaining control of Yugoslavia’s political identity.229 In March 1989,
amendments to the Yugoslavian constitution reduced the autonomy of Kosovo and
Vojvodina; Kosovo Albanians responded by creating a separatist movement. And in
June of that same year, Milosevic gave a speech at Gazimestan in Kosovo,
commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, in which he emphasized
Serbia’s central role in saving Europe from the Ottoman Empire.
Beginning in 1990, the former Yugoslavia began to break apart along ethnic lines.
Following a Communist Party Congress in January, delegates from Slovenia and Croatia
protested against Serbia’s dominance of the proceedings and left. Inspired by the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the overthrow of Communist Party dominance in other parts
of Eastern Europe, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia each held their first free elections;
Serbia followed suit in December, with a majority victory for Milosevic and his Socialist
Party. One problem that stood in the way of national independence for each of these
republics was control over the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA). In January 1991, the
military threatened coups in Croatia and Slovenia unless local police were disarmed,
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while the military leadership became alarmed over nationalist agitation by state-run
television and by the nationalist leaders of the republics.230
Following this, the situation throughout the country became more violent.
Clashes between Croat security forces and ethnic Serbians protesters in Croatia became
frequent after the Serb Republic of Krajina declared its independence from Croatia in
April 1991. Both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in
June 1991, and conflict immediately broke out between these republics and the central
government. The international community’s response was mixed; Germany recognized
the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, while France and Britain were more reluctant
to do; the United States treated the matter as an exclusively European problem. The
United Nations sought to broker a temporary settlement among the parties to the conflicts
in order that peacekeepers could be deployed.231 The conflict between Slovenia and
Yugoslavia was over in ten days, because Slovenia had taken steps to gain control over
the military command structure within its own borders over the preceding year. Fullscale war broke out between Yugoslavia and Croatia in August 1991. During the seige of
Vukovar, which lasted from August until November, the world began to see massive
internal displacements of the population, including deliberate “ethnic cleansing” of
certain regions. Numerous massacres of civilians also occured during this period of time
throughout Croatian territory, committed by both the Yugoslavian and Croatian military
forces.
The idea of “one people, one nation” was taken to its extreme in the practice of
the ethnic cleansing of these regions; individuals not belonging to the ethnic group laying
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claim to the territory were forcibly excluded from the area, or they were sometimes
killed. This happened in the Serbian attack on Croatia, and would occur later in the
Croatian attack on Bosnia, in the Serbian separatist attacks within Bosnia, and in the
Serbian attacks against Kosovo. Here, political sovereignty and ethnic identity were
made inseparable. After 1990, the Serbian political leadership began identifying the
interests of Yugoslavia with the idea of a “Greater Serbia,” which in turn justified
violence against the “separatist tendencies” of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and later
Kosovo; there was no recognition of the legitimacy of right to secede, nor was there any
sense that the future of the region was conceivable without the Serbian leadership of a
unified Yugoslavia. The desire for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia to break away from
Yugoslavia was seen as a threat to Serbian dominance. A similar course of events took
place in Croatia when the nationalist leadership of Franjo Tudjman began to practice
ethnic cleansing of the border areas between Croatia and Serbia and to lend support to
Croatian separatists in Bosnia. Even in multi-ethnic Bosnia, the same tactics were carried
out later in the conflict against both Croatians and Serbians. Later in the 1990s, ethnic
cleansing was deliberately undertaken during the conflict in Kosovo by both the KLA
against Kosovar Serbs and by the Serbian military against Kosovar Albanians.
Many of these atrocities during the Yugoslav wars were committed by
paramilitary units, whose members were drawn from Serbia’s criminal underworld.232 In
many formerly communist nations, there existed an extensive underground economy that
provided access to otherwise unavailable Western goods, and this economy became
visible after the fall of communist regimes in the rise of criminal gangs and organized
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crime in the absence of authorities. Figures within organized crime had access to
resources from outside of the country, they had connections within the country, and they
had experience with violence. In a few instances, they created their own militias within
certain regions.
At this time, number of other independence movements grew within the borders
of Yugoslavia. Macedonia and Kosovo held referendums for independence in September
of 1991, and the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in October.
Within Bosnia, ethnic Croats and Serbians declared themselves independent from the
Bosnia government.
By December 1991, the United Nations was able to deploy a protection force
inside of Croatia, and in January 1992, a successful ceasefire was put into place. The
forces of the Yugoslav Federal Army withdrew, although fighting continued on smaller
scale between these two groups throughout 1992 and 1993. The European Community
final gave recognition to both Slovenia and Croatia.
Just as the conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia was winding down, problems
began to rise between Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which declared its
independence in April 1992. War broke out immediately, and ethnic cleansing began
again throughout the territory, particularly in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and
in the Serb-dominated Republic of Srpska. The United Nations extended its Protection
Force Mandate to Bosnia shortly after this, in order to protect the airport in the city of
Sarajevo. The following year, a number of peace plans were put forward, including the
Vance-Owens plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, both of which sought to divide
Bosnia into ethnic regions; both were rejected by the Bosnian government. The United
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Nations Security Council passed resolution 827, which created an international tribunal to
try war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the conflict.233 A successful
ceasefire was finally declared in February 1994 between Bosnia and Croatia, and NATO
establishes a no-fly zone over Bosnian territory. In March, the Washington Agreement
was signed, ending the conflict between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the Serbians in
Krajina agreed to the ceasefire as well, and American and German negotiators pressured
Bosnia and Croatia to form a confederation, but the latter was rejected.234
Later in the year, the forces of Serbian Krajina launched another offensive within
Bosnia, renewing the conflict. The Croatian military intervened a number of times into
Bosnia, attempting to encircle the Republic of Krajina. The Contact Group, consisting of
the United States, Russia, Britain, and Germany, put forward another peace plan in
October 1994, which sought to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities, the
Federation and the Republika Srpska. In July 1995, a massacre at Srebrenica took place,
carried out by Bosnian Serb forces under commander Ratko Mladic; over 8000 Bosnian
Muslims were killed. In August, Croatian forces take over most of the Krajina region,
leading to the ethnic cleansing of 200,000 Croat Serbs. That same month, NATO began a
bombing campaign in Bosnia against the Bosnian Serb forces. Finally, in November, the
conflict came to end with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which divided the
country along ethnic lines and left an UN peace-keeping force in place.
It is important to be clear about how to characterize the history of the breakup of
the former Yugoslavia, as either a large-scale civil war, in which a legitimate central
government attempted to prevent breakaway republics from seceding, or as a situation in
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which these republics had legitimate reasons for seceding. Recognition for independence
was relatively slow in forthcoming to the republics, because many Western nations
wanted to wait; independent statehood would have implied taking sides in the on-going
conflict, something most Western governments were loathe to do at the time, preferring
instead to treat the situation in Yugoslavia as a civil conflict that could be resolved
peaceably. Mestrovic argued that this unwillingness to take sides was symptomatic of a
fundamental flaw within modernity and Western Enlightenment, a refusal to recognize
the importance of national and ethnic identity in the wake of the Cold War.235 While
ethnic differences certainly do not imply an automatic claim to self-determination,
Western nations at the time did not take seriously the danger implied in the claims of
Serbian and Croatian nationalism and the role of the nationalist ideology in persuading
people to carry out ethnic cleansing within Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. By
not taking seriously the democratic decisions of the Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian
people to secede, Western nations inadvertently fueled the efforts of virulent Serbian
nationalists. The country of Slovenia was the first to realize this situation and began to
create a parallel command structure over its military forces, separate from the central
command, in preparation for its declaration of independence. The other republics were
not able to act with this haste; conflict was waged in Croatia between the JNA and the
fledgling Croatian military (using JNA equipment). By the time conflict erupted in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations had already established an arms embargo to the
Yugoslavia region, so it took a number of years before the Bosnian military was able to
create forces able to stand on level ground with the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpka, which
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had inherited the majority of military resources as well as received aid from the JNA
(now under the de facto control of Serbia).
In 1996, a new phase of the conflict began. The Kosovo Liberation Army, which
at the time was not an organized unit but operated only as small cells, began carrying out
attacks on Serbian civilians and security personnel in Kosovo. Much of the KLA’s
funding and support came from Albanian Kosovars in exile, and its policy was to oppose
the moderate government of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo. The following year, the fall of
the Albanian government led to the looting of stockpiles of military weapons by criminal
gangs, and many of these weapons wound up in the hands of the KLA, allowing them to
step up their attacks in early 1998, especially in the Drenica Valley region in southern
Kosovo.
In March 1998, the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian Interior Ministry began
operations to control KLA activity along the border area between Kosovo and Albania.
International concern in the region led to negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, which led to a halt of Yugoslavian operations and the
establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. However, the conflict
continued as the KLA brought more territory under its control and moved further north
toward the capital of Pristina. A number of atrocities were committed against Serbians in
Kosovo by the KLA during this time. In October, the international community demanded
an end to the fighting through the Kosovo Verification Agreement; the Yugoslav
government was asked to end all offensives, while the KLA was asked to end its bit for
Kosovar independence. To this end, NATO peace-keeping troops would be stationed

104

throughout Kosovo. A ceasefire began on October 25, and a group of observers from the
OSCE nations moved into Kosovo.
The conflict started up again in December, when the KLA shot up a café in Pec,
occupied strategic bunkers along the Pristina-Pec highway, and assassinated the mayor of
Kosovo Polje. In January 1999, KVM observers gained access to the besieged town of
Racak and discovered the bodies of 45 dead civilians; two days later, Serbian police
entered the town and took the bodies away. This news received universal condemnation
and set the stage for both the Rambouillet Conference and the announcement of NATO’s
readiness to launch air strikes against Serbian forces. The Rambouillet Conference ended
on March 18, with a plan in which NATO would administer Kosovo as an autonomous
region within Yugoslavia, with 30,000 troops on the ground, but the Serbians refused to
comply with these conditions. From March 24 to June 11, NATO began its bombing
campaign. During this period, ethnic cleansing continued with Kosovo; over 300,000
Kosovar Albanians fled to neighboring Albania and Macedonia. By April, 850,000
people were displaced in the region. In May, an indictment was read at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia against Slobodan Milosevic regarding
crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo. On June 12, Milosevic accepted the
terms of Rambouillet Agreement, and the NATO peacekeeping force, along with a
number of Russian peacekeepers, entered the region, and the conflict was ended.
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Rwanda

The ethnic identities of Hutu and Tutsi are central in understanding the atrocities
committed in Rwanda in 1994. Rwandan society was dominated by a feudal system
called igikini until the late 1950s. Under this system, the Tutsi monarchy (the mwami)
received service in exchange for use of land (under a contract known as uburetwa) and
for cattle (ubuhake). Over time, this resulted in the creation of a social hiearchy within
the region.
The nature of divisions between Hutu . . . and Tutsi has [sic] always been
complex, especially since the Belgian colonial era. Before colonialism,
‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ signified little more than socioeconomic status, with Hutu the
cultivators who worked in the service of the Tutsi pastoral aristocracy. Hutu and
Tutsi spoke the same language, held many of the same religious beliefs, and
practiced the same rituals. The categories were permeable, so that a Hutu who
gained sufficient wealth, usually in the form of cattle, could become a Tutsi. The
lines blurred further with widespread intermarriage between the groups over
several generations.236
In the late 19th century, Rwanda had been controlled by Germany as part of the
territory of German East Africa. Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, control
over the territory was given to Belgium. During this period, the Belgians introduced
their mode of public administration in Rwanda, organizing Rwanda down to the level of
the street and the household. “A strict hierarchy of government prevailed. The country
was divided into eleven prefectures led by prefets; 145 communes led by burgomestres;
1,600 secteurs led by conseillers; and tens of thousands of sous-secteurs comprising
small groups of households. At each level Banyarwanda [the Rwandan people] displayed
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a high regard for authority.”237 As Mann points out, this system of public administration,
combined with a good transportation infrastructure and relatively tightly structured set of
civil society institutions (churches, agricultural cooperatives, credit associations, and
development NGOs), created a tight network of social control.238 Another aspect of
domestic political sovereignty introduced by the Belgian colonial administration was a
system of ethnic identity cards, distributed after a 1933-34 census of the country, which
sought to settle ethnic identity between Hutu and Tutsi along racial lines. “The Belgians .
. . froze racial, political, legal, and educational privileges, reducing ethnic mobility.”239
After 1934, the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi took on more than socioeconomic
significance; ethnicity became a political identity, one that persisted until after the 1994
genocide, when the system of identity cards was eliminated.
Following World War Two, Belgium was given a trusteeship over the Rwandan
territory under the United Nations. Under the trusteeship, Hutu political activists began
to call for political change and social revolution. In August 1959, the reigning Mwami,
or king, died while receiving medical treatment in neighboring Burundi, and rumors
spread among the Tutsi population that he had been poisoned. A popular Hutu uprising
occurred the following November, and a number of violent attacks took place against the
Tutsi population, beginning in central Rwanda and spreading throughout the country.
The new Mwami deployed royalist troops in a counteroffensive, but the Belgian military,
in an about-face from its historical support for the Tutsi, supported the Hutu uprising and
put down the Mwami’s military actions. In early 1960, the leader of the Belgian military
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in Rwanda, Col. Guy Logiest, staged a coup and replaced all of the Tutsi chiefs with
Hutu chiefs. Communal elections were held mid-year, and the Hutus won 90% of the top
government posts. In October 1960, Col. Logiest declared that the Hutu social and
political revolution was complete and installed Dominique Mbonyumutwa as head of the
provisional government. At this point, 20,000 Tutsis had been displaced by the violence.
The transition to political independence in the early 1960s took place alongside
the rise of the ideology of Hutu Power. Much of the driving force for political
independence came from Hutu reaction against Tutsi hegemony that had been promoted
sustained by the Belgian government throughout the period of Belgian colonial rule. The
idea of Tutsi racial and cultural superiority was turned upside down; the Hutus were
viewed as a simple, hardworking people whose land had been usurped by the arrival of
the Tutsis from the north centuries earlier; now, on the cusp of independence, it was the
task of the Hutus to take back their country from Tutsi dominance. Politically, this took
the form of “majority democracy,” rubanda nyamwinshi, the dominance of public life by
the Hutus and the exclusion of Tutsis from politics.240 Thus, although Tutsis would live
alongside Hutus in the course of everyday life, public institutions would be controlled by
the Hutus for the good of the Hutu majority. The presence of the Tutsis, of course,
remained a problem for those who subscribed to this ideology, and it was this ideology
that would ascend both in the early 1960s (during the initial attacks by Tutsi monarchist
guerrillas) and again during the years leading up to the 1994 genocide (during the RPF
invasions). As long as the Tutsis remained within Rwanda’s borders, it was felt that the
Hutu majority could never feel safe.
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During the period from 1961 to 1962, the Tutsi monarchy was abolished under increasing
pressure from both popular Hutu protests and from the Belgium government, which, as
noted above, had turned its support away from the Tutsis and toward the Hutus. The
people voted to create a republic, and Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President in 1962.
However, in response to increasing guerrilla attacks from Tutsi monarchists, the
government banned all non-Hutu political parties. From that point on, the Rwandan
government has been dominated by single-party rule, while still using the rhetoric of
democratic participation. 241 Belgium withdrew its military forces in 1962, and Tutsi
supporters of the monarchy began to carry out guerrilla attacks against the government;
Hutus responded by attacking Tutsi civilians. From December 1963 to January 1964, a
number of massacres of Tutsi civilians occurred following sustained guerrilla attacks
from across the Burundi border; during this time, almost a quarter of a million Tutsis fled
into exile. These early massacres were also met with little or no punishment within the
country.242 By 1966, the Tutsi monarchists disbanded their guerrilla army and ceased
their attacks.
Until 1961, Rwanda and Burundi had been treated as a single entity under Belgian
colonial rule. Unlike Rwanda, Burundi chose to retain a monarchy within a
constitutional framework, with Mwambutsa IV, a Tutsi, as king, after independence. The
subsequent history of the two countries is closely intertwined, because of their shared
colonial history and dominant ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi; the enmity
between Hutu and Tutsi with Burundi is also instructive. The monarchy was abolished in
Burundi in 1966, which set off a period of civil unrest resulting in the massacre of over
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100,000 Hutus in 1972. Following this, around 200,000 Hutus fled Burundi and settled
in Rwanda in 1972, which led to a civil unrest there. Following a military coup in July
1973, President Kayibanda of Rwanda was ousted by Major General Juvenal
Habyarimana, who then declared himself president and instituted one party rule
throughout the country, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development
(MRND), seeking to take advantage of the growth of Western development aid money.
Pressure on the Tutsi people continued to grow, and by the early 1980s, over 1
million Rwandan Tutsis had left the country, with half of them settling into refugee
camps in neighboring Uganda. Many of these Tutsi refugees joined the rebel army of
Yoweri Museveni, who eventually overthrew the dictator Milton Obete and became
President of Uganda. Realizing the dangerousness of this situation, Rwandan President
Habyarimana closed Rwanda’s border to all refugees.
At this point, Rwanda had become dependent on foreign aid; by the late 1980s, it
accounted for 60% of Rwanda’s annual budget.243 Because of this, Rwanda’s economy
was tied to the Western world’s economic fluctuations. In 1986, the prices of coffee and
tea, Rwanda’s chief exports, crashed on the world’s markets, and by 1989, the IMF and
the World Bank were demanding that Rwanda implement a structural adjustment
program. Deep cuts in the government’s budget, mismanagement of agricultural
resources, and a year of drought created areas of famine around the country, leading
criticism of the government and social unrest, to which the government responded with
crackdowns and repression. The dependency on foreign aid also created networks of
corruption within the government, including the akazu, or little house, the true font of
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power within Rwanda, which was controlled by Habyarimana’s wife Agathe and which
had its power base in the northwestern areas of the country. Despite these adverse
conditions, the mass violence carried out against the Tutsi population had largely
disappeared under Habyarimana’s rule.244
The early 1990s brought more instability to Rwanda. France had taken Belgium’s
place as paternal trustee for Rwanda under the Habyarimana regime in 1975, and it began
to pressure Habyarimana to allow other political parties to have a place in the political
process following the end of the Cold War; Habyarimana announced in July 1990 that a
multiparty system would be established. The following October, Rwanda was invaded by
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army made up of mostly Tutsi refugees who had
fled to Uganda and who had taken part in Museveni’s seizure of power. The government
responded by arresting Tutsi civilians as RPF sympathizers. This set off a wave of local
violence against Tutsis throughout the country. This tense situation also gave rise to
virulent anti-Tutsi propaganda, including the newspaper Kangura, which was edited by
Hassan Ngeze, who was a member of the Madame Agathe’s akuza. In December 1990,
Kangura published “The Hutu Ten Commandments,” which was a militaristic doctrine of
Hutu purity.245
The first half of 1991 saw numerous attacks against Tutsi civilians in
northwestern Rwanda. The country’s multi-party system began to operate during the
summer of 1991; while most of the parties were fronts for Habyarimana’s MRND, it is
interesting to note that only one party had significant Tutsi membership, and the rest were
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divided between reformers and Hutu extremists. The main issue that dominated debate
was the necessity of Hutu security; this gave rise to a new “Hutu Power” movement. The
RPF invasion continued, and France began sending soldiers to advise and to fight
alongside Habyarimana’s army as well shipments of arms. The war quickly drained the
government of funds, so the army began a lucrative drug trade, setting up marijuana
plantations in the forests. By early 1992, the Hutu Power extremists had become very
well-organized, stockpiling weapons and creating youth militias, known as the
interahamwe, “those who work together.” Further massacres of Tutsi civilians continued
throughout the year.
The social divisions continued to grow between Hutu and Tutsi peoples
throughout the country. By early 1993, all of the opposition parties had split into two
factions, supporting either Hutu Power or not. This same year, the government granted a
license to operate Radio Television Libres des Mille (RTLM), the first non-government
run radio station in the country, which began broadcasting anti-Tutsi programming246. A
peace treaty between the Habyarimana government and the RPF, the Arusha Accords,
was signed in August 1993, and plans were made to create a transitional government
along with a power-sharing agreement. That same month, neighboring Burundi held free
elections for the first time in thirty years, and a Hutu was elected president. The
following November, the Burudian president was assassinated by the Tutsi dominated
military; this trigged a Hutu uprsing in Burundi, followed by a military crackdown,
leaving more than 50,000 people dead. These events led Hutu Power activists in Rwanda
to begin arguing that any peace accord with the Tutsis or the RPF was deceptive. Also in
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November, the United Nations began deployment of a small peace-keeping force, the UN
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda and Uganda, under the command
of Major General Romeo Dallaire from Canada.
Dallaire was aware that his mission was under-funded and under-manned, yet he
was able to stay abreast of what was going on within the country and maintain a steady
flow of intelligence back to the United Nations about the situation within Rwanda. In
January 1994, he learned of a plot to murder opposition leaders and UN soldiers, and he
immediately faxed the information to the UN, but nothing was done.247
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana, the new
Hutu President of Rwanda, and Habyarimana’s top advisors, was shot down near the
Rwandan capital of Kigali, as they were returning from Tanzania (as of this writing, it
has never been determined who shot down the plane, and investigations are still being
conducted248). Within an hour of the plane crash, roadblocks had been set up around
Kigali, and people, primarily Tutsis but also moderate Hutus, were being killed.
Government radio and RTLM began urging violence against the Tutsi, blaming them for
the murder of Habyarimana.
Prior to the genocide, the country’s extensive political organization was utilized
by the Hutu extremists to prepare to carry out the massacres more efficiently. Col.
Theoneste Basagora, who would establish a provisional government in the wake of
Habyarimana’s assassination, created “self-defense” units in each commune, trained by
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local military and police officials and instructed to act under the authority of the military,
police, and local councilors; Basagora also made sure that weapons, including firearms
but also machetes were distributed throughout the country.249 When the killing began,
leaders of the killers were given lists of people to kill; according to one account given by
Philip Gurevitch, “‘[they] had the number of everyone’s house, and they went through
with red paint and marked the homes of all the Tutsis and moderate Hutus’”. 250
The capital city was soon overrun with government soldiers, members of the
Presidential Guard, and the interahamwe, who were armed mostly with machetes, clubs,
spears, and farm tools, with their lists of people to kill. Their primary targets were Hutu
opposition leaders, including the Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was
killed along with ten Belgian peace-keepers trying to protect her. The RPF quickly
moved its own troops out of the city and launched an attack within the demilitarized zone
but were met with strong government resistance.
The slaughter of Tutsis and Hutu opposition leaders spread from region to region
after this. Within a matter of days, the Tutsi populations of many villages were
completely eliminated.251 The slaughter was also accompanied by rape and looting.
Hours after the death of President Habyarimana, Col. Bagasora had set up a crisis
committee, ratifying the coup in the name of Hutu Power, and several days later, the
committee had appointed an interim government and set up its headquarters to the Hotel
des Diplomates in Kigali. Fighting between government forces and the RPF continued
around Kigali, however, and by April 12, the Hutu Power government had to flee the city
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and take up residence in Gitarama. On April 21, Maj. Gen. Dallaire requested 5000
troops in hopes of ending the slaughter, but the UN leadership responded by slashing the
UN force by 90%, leaving only 270 troops; a week earlier, Belgium had withdrawn all of
its own troops from Rwanda.
As the killing continued throughout the country, the international community
found itself deadlocked. Because of the deaths of American troops in Somalia the
previous October, the United States was unwilling to commit any further troops to an
African peacekeeping mission, and it blocked sending assistance through the UN Security
Council. A number of nations pushed for increased UN troop strength in Rwanda, but
this met with little success. By late May, the killing of the Tutsis had slowed down; it was
now centered in the country’s western provinces of Kibuye and Cyangugu. Most Tutsis
who had not been murdered had fled the country. At the same time, in the eastern part of
Rwanda, a quarter of a million Hutus, fleeing the RPF, crossed the border into Tanzania
for safety. By early June, the United Nations was beginning to consider calling what was
happening in Rwanda as genocide.
Meanwhile, France sought to salvage its political prestige in Rwanda252 by
protecting the Rwandan government from defeat at the hands of the RPF; France justified
its position by arguing that the massacres were taking place because of mass outrage at
Habyarimana’s death. In mid-June 1994, France began to deploy a humanitarian mission
under the auspices of the UN; many African leaders, including the RPF, questioned the
motives of the French and found the plan unacceptable, but with the endorsement of the
Security Council, the deployment began on June 23.
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When the French troops began arriving, the RPF controlled the eastern sections of
Rwanda and were preparing to move westward. Their engagements with the Rwandan
national army were easy victories for them. Within a week of the French arrival, French
troops controlled a fourth of the country and sought to turn its territory into a “safe zone;”
despite this, Tutsis continued to be murdered in French-controlled territory, and in most
cases, the French military supported the local leaders who presided over the massacres.
In July 1994, the RPF continued its successful offensive westward, taking Kigali back on
July 4; by the 15th, over a half million Hutus fled the country in advance of the offensive,
settling into refugee camps in Goma, Zaire. Two days later, the Hutu Power government
fled to Zaire, and the RPF announced that it would form a new government along the
lines laid down in the Arusha Accords. On July 19th, a new government was sworn in at
Kigali. The Red Cross announced that month that one million people had been killed in
the genocide (current estimates say that 800,000 Tutsi people were killed).253

Sudan

Throughout most of the region of Sudan, the village remains the center of
everyday life. Communities are variously settled, semi-settled, or nomadic, and are
organized around ethnic identity. Within these villages, descent groups are the primary
basis of organization, although some are based around occupation of a common territory.
These descent groups control religious rituals and access to political power and social
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prestige.254 Although villages can exist largely independently of one another, most
peoples identify with one of the major tribes of Sudan. Until recent years (as will be
explained below), Arab tribes have not been regarded as a cohesive group and are divided
into Juhanya, Jaali, and Kawahla, living in the northern regions of Sudan. The Nubian
tribes live along the Nile River in far northern Sudan, including Darfur. The Beja tribes
live in eastern Sudan in the Red Sea Hills region. The Fur remained an independent
sultanate until 1916, as noted above, and they live in the central Darfur region. The
Zaghawa tribes live in northern Darfur and across the border in Chad. Other smaller
tribes living in northern Darfur include the Masalit, Daju, and Berti. Most of Sudan’s
non-Muslim peoples live in southern Sudan; the largest group is the Nilotes, which
include the Dinka and the Nuer tribes; the Bari, Kuku, Kakwa, and Mandari tribes; the
Murle and Didinga tribes, along the border with Ethiopia; the Azande of southwestern
Sudan; and a number of other smaller tribes.255
Regional differences have dominated the political landscape of Sudan. Before
independence in 1956, southern Sudan was already rising up against the perceived
domination of national affairs by the peoples of northern Sudan; throughout the late
1960s and again after 1983, the central government did not exercise effective control over
the southern half of the country, due to the existence of armed militias opposed to the
government. This rift resulted in two major long-term civil wars which have lasted to the
present day. The conflict in Darfur began in 2003, but its roots extend back through the
entirety of modern Sudanese history, as the region was variously ignored by the central
government or treated as a territorial pawn in conflicts with neighboring Chad and Libya.
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The subsequent civil conflict in Darfur emerged from dissatisfaction over how the
government had treated peoples in the region over the last two decades, and by May
2008, the rebel forces had made inroads almost to the capital city of Khartoum before
being repelled. Although not chronicled in this case study, shortly after the turn of the
millennium, conflict also began in the eastern section of Sudan, along the border with
Ethiopia. The common element in all of these conflicts is the role played by the
overrepresentation of northern politicians in the central government as well as the
promotion of northern interests at the expense of other regions. These regional
differences within Sudan, particularly between north and south, have prevented the
country from being governed as a unitary political entity.
Except for periods of military rule from 1958 to 1964, in 1969, and in 1989,
Sudan has been governed as a parliamentary democracy. A number of political parties
have been active since independence, and their number has grown over time. At the
same time, the existence of strong political parties in country is also indicative of deep
divisions within Sudanese society regarding how the country is to be governed,
particularly with the distinctly religious parties, such as the Umma Party and the National
Congress Party. Until 1983, President Nimiery sought to govern Sudan as a secular state,
but continuing pressure from Islamist groups led him to adopt an Islamic form of state.
The majority of people in Sudan are Muslims, so support for this form of government is
not surprising, but a substantial number of people, living in the south and in the Darfur
region, are not Islamic, but rather are Christians and practitioners of animist religions,
and they have suffered both discrimination and active persecution, since they fall outside
of the dar al-Islam (domain of Islam).
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Following the Second World War, the country of Sudan remained a colonial
possession of the British government and was ruled jointly by Britain and Egypt as a
condominium. Petitions for independence had begun just prior to the end of the war, and
political parties grew up around a number of group interests: those committed to
remaining in union with Egypt, those seeking to regain an independent Mahdist
government (which had ruled the region from 1884 to 1898), those promoting
Communism, and those belonging to a local section of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Parliamentary elections were held in 1953, with the Hizb al-Ittyaddiyin (the Unionist
Party) winning the majority of seats, followed by the Umma (the pro-Mahdist party).256
Prompted by the revolution in Egypt in 1952, the British signed an agreement with Egypt
to leave Sudan, which became independent in January 1956.
During the period of British colonial rule of Sudan, particularly from the 1920s to
1956, Sudan was governed as two separate countries, divided between north and south,
between the 8th and 10th parallels. The northern area was mostly Muslim, economically
developed, more urbanized, and had traditional ties with Egypt and the rest of the Arab
world, while the south was divided between Christian and tribes with animist beliefs,
largely undeveloped, and had closer ties with sub-Sahara Africa. The British had carried
out this policy in order to contain the spread of Islam from the south and to allow
Christian missionaries to convert the animist believers of the region.257 Just prior to
1956, northerners began to dominate the civil administration of the country as the British
began pulling out; out of almost 800 civil positions, the southerners held only six of
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them.258 In 1955, an insurgency began in southern Sudan as military units mutinied and
seized control of Equatoria province, but the national government quickly quelled the
revolt. However, this uprising would sow the seeds of further rebellion in southern
Sudan, beginning again in 1963.
During this early period of Sudan’s modern history, the Darfur region was largely
ignored. Darfur had been an idependent sultanate from the 15th to the early 19th
centuries, when it was conquered by the Egyptian army in 1821. The Mahdiyya uprising
in 1881 threw off Egyptian rule for a time, until the intervention of the British in 1898.
The Darfur region itself remained largely autonomous until 1916, when the British army
finally subdued Ali Dinar, the ruler of Darfur, out of fear that he might lend his support to
the Ottoman Turks during the First World War, and the region was made a part of Sudan.
As noted above, the ethnic and religious make-up of the Darfur region has been
(and remains) complex and shifting. The dominant tribe in the region is the Fur, whose
lives are largely based around settled cattle herding in the central Jebel Marra mountain
region; they are Sunni Muslims and speak both a Nilo-Saharan language as well as
Arabic. Until recent years, they shared the same land as the Bagarra, a Bedouin tribe
who also live in other countries in northern central Africa; they, too, speak an Arabic
dialect, are Sunni Muslims, but they nomadic, grazing their camels and cattle from one
area to another seasonally. The Zaghawa people live in western Sudan and Chad, are an
ethnically African (Saharan) tribe who are semi-nomadic, and practice Islam; they are
related to the Bidayat, who live in the same region and are more nomadic. The Masalit
tribe also live in western Sudan and Chad and speak a Nilo-Saharan language, but who
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also practice Islam. The Berti tribe lives in northern Darfur and is related to the Masalit
people, and they practice settled agriculture and husbandry; their Nilo-Saharan language
today has been largely replaced by Arabic. These groups had settled in the region by the
end of the 16th century and were followed by two more larger migrations of peoples from
the east, the latter of which was the awlad al-Bahar, Arab tribes who lived along the Nile
River and its tributaries and who settled almost exclusively in towns and came to control
the economy of the region.259
Following independence, the Umma Party came to power in the Sudanese
government, but these years were marked by economic instability and the growing
rebellion in the south. In 1958, the military seized the central government; the country
finally gave way to civilian rule again in 1964, with Umma Party still in power under
Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the party’s founder. During the period of military rule,
opposition forces in the south coalesced into the Anyana guerrilla group and fought
against the government’s promotion of Islam as the official religion throughout the
country; the subsequent civilian government refused to accept this group’s demands for
regional autonomy and continued with the goal of establishing an Islamic republic in
Sudan. Prior to national elections in 1968, the Umma Party split into two factions. The
Darfur region had traditional lent its support to the party, but after the split, both factions
began making appeals to the different tribes, seeking to split the support along ethnic
lines. It was during this time that the rhetoric of “African” versus “Arab” was introduced
into political debate and which would later become a factor contributing to the
polarization of ethnic identities in the region.260 Another military coup in 1969 brought
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Col. Jafaar al-Nimiery to power, whose government initially sought to emulate Nasser’s
socialist reforms in Egypt and which was opposed to the predominance of religious-based
political parties. In 1972, Nimiery came to a peace agreement with the southern
insurgency, and in 1973, a new constitution was introduced that gave significant
autonomy for the south and recreated Sudan as a secular state.
In the mid-1960s, civil war was beginning in neighboring Chad. Chad had
achieved independence from French colonial rule in 1960 and had come under the
autocratic rule of President Francois Tombalbaye. Resistance to his rule coalesced in the
mid-1960s throughout the country, and a number of organizations arose in opposition to
his government. In Sudan, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) was
formed in Nyala in 1966, and its forces grew in the following years, with the
establishment of bases in Darfur. The Sudanese government supported the insurgency
against Tombalbaye’s government because of his opposition to Islam in the name of PanAfricanism. FROLINAT was eventually expelled from Sudan in 1971 after fighting with
the Chadian government spilled over onto Sudanese territory in Darfur.
Another complicating factor with the civil war in Chad was the rise of Col.
Muammar Gadaafi in neighboring Libya in 1969. He became involved in the civil war in
Chad, lending to support to FROLINAT and allowing them to establish bases on Libyan
soil. Gadaafi initially had cordial relations with the Sudanese government under
Nimiery, but this went sour after in 1971 after Nimiery rejected Gadaafi’s suggestion that
Sudan and Libya form a union of their two countries and made peace with the southern
insurgency in 1972. To further his own revolutionary ends in the region, Gadaafi
established the Failaka al-Islamiya (the Islamic Legion) to help overthrow the Chadian

122

government, and he supported the Tajammu al-Arabi (Arab Union), a pan-Arabist
organization in Darfur; both orgaizations operated on Sudanese soil.261 Gadaafi also lent
his support to Umma Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had been jailed following the
Nimiery coup but who was released in 1972 and moved to Tripoli.
The Tombalbaye government in Chad fell in 1975 after the president’s
assassination, and the Sudanese government sought some rapprochement with the new
government under Gen. Felix Malloum in order to diffuse growing civil unrest in the
Darfur region. However, Libya’s Gadaafi had already established bases in a disputed
border region between Libya and Chad and was aiming to conquer the country and join it
with Libya. Gadaafi also supported a coup against the Sudanese government in 1976, led
by Sadiq al-Mahdi and Baggara tribesmen, which gained controlled of Khartoum for
three days before being defeated; this was followed by brutal acts of repression against
civilians in Darfur who were accused of sympathizing with the coup attempt, leaving
some 3000 dead.262
In an effort to avoid further instability inside of Sudan, President Nimiery brought
prominent Muslims into his government in 1977, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and alMadhi’s brother-in-law, Hassan al-Turabi, hoping to appease critical opposition in the
north. Al-Turabi was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan and had been
involved with Islamist politics since the 1960s. Oil was discovered in southern Sudan in
1978, and that led to renewed regional tensions between north and south; the south was
already suspicious of Nimiery’s growing rapprochement with Islamic political groups.
The southern government had initially sought the construction of an oil refinery in the
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south, but the Nimiery government instead built a refinery in the north and had a pipeline
constructed directly to the Red Sea for direct export of crude oil.263 By the end of the
1970s, the Sudanese government was also lending its support to Hissan Habre and his
Northern Army (FAN) in Chad because of his opposition to both the Malloum
government and Libya’s designs on Chad. The FAN began using Darfur as a base and
staging area for attacks upon Chad.264 “This rough handling of Darfur by the Libyans,
the Chadians and the Khartoum forces decisively worsened the regional ethno-political
landscape. Tribes which had seen themselves primarily in local terms were suddenly
catapulted into a broader artificial world where they were summoned to declare
themselves as either ‘Arab’ or zurqa [Arabic for black, a euphemism for African]. . . .
Darfur did no seem to matter enough to be taken seriously at the level of good
governance, but it certainly mattered enough to become an increasingly racialized
battleground between Khartoum, Tripoli, and Ndjamena.”265
The Nimiery government began to undertake a number of reforms throughout the
country. The Regional Government Act of 1979 sought to make provincial governments
more responsive to their local populations by appointing solely local leaders. In the
Darfur region, the central government attempted to appoint an outsider to the area as
governor, in order to oversee Hissan Habre’s military efforts, but this was met with
popular protest, and Ahmed Diraige, a respected Darfurian leader, was appointed in his
place. In 1983, due to pressure from al-Turabi, then the Attorney General, and from
other prominent Muslims in the north, Nimiery declared an “Islamic revolution” and
began to institute Islamic legal reform over the country and to support the establishment
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of Islamic banks. He also undid the 1972 peace agreement with the southern provinces
and tried to redraw the boundaries of the northern provinces to include the oil fields and
agriculturally productive land in the Upper Nile region.
The changes had dire consequences for the country. Civil war erupted again with
the south; national army troops in the south deserted and reformed themselves across the
border in Ethiopia as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Col. John Garang
de Mabior, a member of the southern Dinka tribe. They received support from both
Ethiopia’s government and Libya’s Muammar Gadaafi. A drought in 1983 led to
catastrophic food deficits in the region, including Sudan, in 1984 and 1985; Nimiery at
first refused to acknowledge the problem, but by the second half of the year, camps for
internally displaced persons began appearing outside of Khartoum. At least a quarter of a
million people died before the government began to accept food aid, and 95,000 died in
Darfur alone.266 Economic problems increased, including a growing national debt and
inflation. Popular protest against Nimiery grew, and in April 1985, he was overthrown
by his own military.
Elections were held in 1986, and with the assistance of millions of dollars in
election funds from Libya, Sadiq al-Mahdi and his Umma Party won.267 In return,
Gadaafi began sending convoys of humanitarian relief and military troops into the Darfur
region; he also began arming the Baggara tribes, whom he saw as “Arab” allies in the
region. Because of his renewed ties with the Sudanese government, Gadaafi began to
lend his support to government forces in the southern civil war. The government under
al-Mahdi remained a firmly Islamic state, maintaining the changes introduced by Nimiery
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in 1983. He too began arming the Baggara tribes (known as the murahaleen militia), in
hopes of using them in the civil war, and he allowed them to attack the Dinka and Nuer
tribe civilians in Bahr al-Ghazal in southern central Sudan. At the same time, because of
the drought of 1983-84 and the increasing desertification in Darfur, the traditionally
cooperative relationship between settled and nomadic peoples in use of the land was
becoming more difficult to maintain, as farmers began fencing off areas through which
nomads herded their livestock and began burning off wild grasses that nomads were
hoping to use as fodder for their animals.268
Libya also continued its efforts to overthrow the government in Chad, and it was
using its troops and local Arab recruits in Darfur to that end. In April 1987, the Chadian
army crossed the border into Darfur and attacked these forces, wiping out most of their
fighting capacity. “Arab” tribes increasingly supported the central government’s efforts
to defeat the south in the civil war and to support Libya’s efforts in Chad, while
“African” tribes like the Zaghawa and Salamat fighting in the Chadian civil war turned
against the Fur, who in turn began to organize their own militia. Further incursions by
the Chadian army into Darfur in 1987 and 1988 only increased these tensions.
The role of Arab identity has been prominent feature in the Darfur conflict. The
conflict between Pan-Arab versus Pan-African affiliation from the 1960s was felt in the
reigion; the civil war in Chad and the long presence of the Libyan military in the region
also contributed to polarization of ethnic identity. This was even further exaggerated
with conflicts among different tribes over land and water rights follows desertification
and the rise of the el-Beshir regime beginning in 1989. The central government
continued to favor the “Arab” tribes, eventually recruiting a number of them for the
268

ibid., 56-57

126

Janajaweed (more below), while neglecting and eventually attacking “Africans” in the
region. Despite this forced attempt to impose identity on the different tribes in the
region, as noted earlier, the ethnic make-up of each tribe is different. Some tribes speak
Arabic as their main language, while others do not; many of the tribes are Muslims,
despite being considered “African;” and there is a mix of both settled agriculture and
nomadic herding among both “Arab” and “African” tribes. All peoples in the region are
dark-skinned, and because of centuries of immigration and inter-marriage, physical
features are not indicators of identity. Yet, the idea of a distinct “Arab” identity remains
an active belief.
In 1988, all of these problems came to head when there was another drought in
Sudan, and the Nile River flooded Khartoum, disrupting communications and
transportation and leading to another famine throughout the country. There was mass
starvation, particularly in the south, and there were refugee movements to the north in
search of food, where over three million people settled into the slums of Khartoum.269
By this time, the Darfur region was in chaos, with the Libyan government in de facto
control, and members of the government and the military were pressing al-Mahdi to
accept some sort of peace agreement with the forces of the SPLM in the south, yet this
was opposed by members of the National Islamic Front, later known as the National
Congress Party. Finally, in June 1989, a group of pro-NIF army officers led by Col.
Omar al-Beshir overthrew the al-Mahdi’s government.
A key concept to understanding many of the problems that would follow in Sudan
is the use of the Islamic term jihad. The central government, now controlled by the
National Congress Party, sought to turn Sudan into an Islamic state and to impose
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shariah law throughout Sudan, first after 1983 and again after the 1989 coup. In the
1990s, the government began lending support to various Islamic terrorist organizations
regionally and throughout the world in the name of the Islamic struggle (jihad). This was
influenced in part by the successes of Gadaafi’s coup in Libya and the Shi’ite revolution
in Iran as well as by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian group whose
own influence has been extremely far-reaching throughout the Sunni Muslim world since
the 1920s. Sudan, because of its proximity to Egypt, has had close connection with the
Muslim Brotherhood, but the group’s ideas did not gain in popularity until the late 1970s,
with the rise of Hassan al-Turabi and his National Islamic Front party. Within the
ideology of this group, modernity and its political institutions, in the form of the secular
state, are viewed as a source of evil and disconnection from the will of Allah. It is
believed that the devout Muslim will bring back a kind of “natural” order to the world by
taking over the reigns of the state and reestablishing the centrality of sharia law
throughout the land. Al-Turabi pursued this course through a “top-down” approach while
in office, seeking to place sympathetic believers in top political positions and change
institutions through the power they gain. Al-Turabi was regarded by the government as
“Guide” of this Islamization of Sudan until his arrest in 2003.
Prior to the coup, local tribal leaders in Darfur began to consult with one another
and initiate their own peace process in the region. All parties were exhausted by the
conflict, and many were aware that much of the fighting was being engineered by Libya
for its involvement in Chad. By the summer of 1989, the situation in the region had
largely, if not precariously, settled down. At the same time, the new Sudanese
government sought help from Libya to carry on its war against the south; in return, Libya
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wanted to remain in Darfur to carry on its war against Chad. By September 1989,
conflict was reignited in Darfur as Idriss Deby, former supporter of Hissen Habre, fled to
Sudan and later formed the Patriotic Salvation Movement (with Libyan backing), which
would eventually overthrow the Habre regime in 1990, all the while bringing the Chadian
civil war into Darfur once again.
The Sudanese government under al-Beshir continued the country’s movement
toward “Arabization” and “Islamization,” under the guidance of Hassan al-Turabi and his
National Islamic Front. Throughout the 1990s, more and more strict regulations were
introduced throughout the country, and the use of Arabic was required in government and
education, while the cultures of non-Arabic peoples were denigrated.270 Any dissent was
quashed, people could be detained without trial, and a number of secret prisons were set
up where torture and rape were used to extract confessions.271 A militia was created, the
People’s Defense Force, used to suppress civilian demonstrations and later to supply
manpower to the war effort in the south.272 The central government also undertook
efforts to reorganize the federalist structure of the country, creating twenty-six states out
of the existing nine and re-establishing tribal administration in each of them; this was
done in order to increase support for the NIF among tribal chiefs and to undermine the
local electoral influence of the Umma and Union Parties.273 During this time, Sudan also
became a supporter of Islamist militant activity around the world against what it saw as
American imperialism following the 1991 Iraq War; this included giving aid and comfort
to individuals such as Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Osama bin
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Laden, as well as offering to recruit and train mujahideen for involvement in Islamic
conflicts around the world.
The situation in Darfur began to “settle” once again. Another drought in 1990
had led to food shortages for the following year, but this had been met only with a
lackluster response from the central government. John Garag of the SPLM in southern
Sudan had attempted to link his group with the dissatisfaction of peoples in Darfur with
the central government, culminating in an attempted insurrection in 1991-92, but this
ended in failure.

The conflict between Chad and Libya had now come to an end, and

the Libyan presence in Darfur was slowly disappearing. “[Nothing] had been solved in
depth, but on the surface things had slowed down. It was not exactly peace, but it was no
longer open war – just a state of diffuse insecurity where villages would be attacked once
in a while, where trucks traveling to and from the markets were liable to get ambushed
but where long periods of calm would give the impression that things were basically all
right and that all this was simply an expression of some kind of ‘traditional’ or ‘tribal’
violence.”274
The civil war in southern Sudan continued throughout the 1990s, now as a
“regional jihad” by the central government. It sought to exploit growing factionalism
within the SPLM by offering Riek Machar, an opponent of John Garang within the
SPLM, a separate peace agreement in 1997 as well as hinting at a share in future oil
revenues.275 The latter became a reality with the creation of the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company in 1997 and the opening of the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline in 1999,
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and Riek’s forces, as well as Baggara militias, were employed to secure the oil fields and
pipelines by driving out the local populations of Nuer and Dinka peoples.
In August 1998, the United States government responded to a series of al-Qaedalinked car bombings of its embassies in Africa by a cruise missile attack on a
pharmaceutical plant north of Khartoum, suspected at the time of producing chemical
weapons. “The combination of Sudan’s record of supporting international terrorism, its
savage conduct of the war in the south and its repression of all opposition had made
Bashir’s government one of the most reviled in the world.”276 The central government
also began dealing with internal pressures. Low-level guerrilla activity by the Masalit
tribe in northwestern Darfur against the government took place from 1996 to 1999 and
ended with government forces occupying Dar Masalit, killing thousands and sending tens
of thousands fleeing as refugees.277 The relationship between Hassan al-Turabi and
Omar el-Beshir was growing strained as well. International pressures to curb support for
terrorism, to reach a settlement in the south, and the government’s desire to increase
international investment in the burgeoning oil industry led el-Beshir to distance himself
from al-Turabi and the more extreme Islamist policies of the NIF.278 In December 1999,
al-Turabi was ousted from his position as President of the Parliament, and in 2000,
Parliament was dissolved, the offices of the National Congress Party were closed, and a
state of national emergency was declared.
That same year, a xeroxed book was anonymously published and publicly
distributed, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan; a second part
was published the following year. The book described how Sudanese political life had
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been dominated since independence by northerners, to the detriment of peoples from
other regions.279 In February 2001, al-Turabi’s breakaway political party, the Popular
National Congress, signed a cooperation agreement with the SPLM, and al-Turabi was
subsequently arrested (though released several months later). Finally, in the summer of
2001, the SPLM launched an offensive from Bahr el-Ghazal province into southern
Darfur, in order to link up with discontent created following the Dar Masalit uprising, but
the central government unleashed a counter-offensive later in the year that began
targeting civilians, using both aerial attacks and the local Murahaleen milita.
Given these growing internal divisions within the country and continued
international pressure following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September
2001, el-Beshir sought to further distance himself from radical Islamic politics by
publicly denouncing terrorism and vowing the cooperate with the United States in
measures aimed at al-Qaeda. The United States, through Senator John Danforth, was
instrumental in brokering an end to the war in the south, culminating in the signing of the
Naivasha Agreement in January 2005.
While the rest of the world focused on the peace process to end the war in the
south, the situation in Darfur was once again deteriorating. From November 2002 to
February 2003, a low level of conflict broke out against government and police targets,
seemingly of no different character than other localized conflicts in the region in recent
years; the government referred to them as nothing more than attacks by “bandits.”280
However, these attacks had been undertaken by members of the Sudanese Liberation
Movement (SLM), an organization created from the remnants of Fur self-defense militias
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in the late 1980s, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Khalil Ibrahim,
former Minister of Education for Darfur in the 1990s and reputed author of the Black
Book. The insurgency launched an offensive that lasted throughout the summer of 2003.
In response, the central government reorganized the administration of the Darfur region
and began to recruit militias, which came to be known as the Janjaweed, to carry on the
fighting on the ground.281 In the mid-summer, the government began carrying out a
pattern of attacking civilian targets, under the guise of fighting a counter-insurgency,
using bombers and helicopters to attack villages from the air, then unleashing the
Janjaweed (sometimes with army assistance), who would loot homes and steal livestock,
rape girls and women, and kill anyone who did not flee. This created hundreds of
thousands of refugees in the region in a few weeks, who often moved toward the cities or
over the border into Chad. Often, the Janjaweed would harass the refugees, stealing
from them and continuing to capture and rape girls and women who ventured outside safe
areas for water and firewood.282 By early 2004, a million people had fled their homes,
and at least thirty-thousand had died.283 The government also began arresting hundreds
of people in the region that it suspected of having connections with the rebel group,
holding them in prisons and in many cases torturing them.
As news began to leak out of Sudan about the conflict in Darfur later in 2003, the
al-Beshir government denied that a rebellion was taking place; by early 2004, it changed
its position and said that the rebellion would soon be under control. It blocked access to
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the region to outside observers, and it took control of food aid coming into the country
slated for Darfur. The government launched another offensive in the region in early
2004, using ten of thousand of regular army troops.284 Fighting also increased along the
border with Chad; this eventually led to instability inside of Chad and a coup attempt
against President Idris Deby by members of the Zaghawa tribe, who wished to force him
to drop his support of the Sudanese government’s policies. By the spring of 2004, a
humanitarian presence was beginning to grow in the region, but the rainy season, lack of
security, and government interference kept many of the food convoys from reaching the
camps where aid was most needed. The Chadian government brokered a ceasefire
agreement in April between the rebel groups and the government, and the African Union
sent observers to monitor the ceasefire, but attacks continued. In July, the U.S. Congress
passed a resolution calling the killings a genocide, and the UN Security Council placed
an arms embargo on Darfur region; this was followed in September 2004 by statements
from both the European Parliament and American Secretary of State Colin Powell
supporting claims of genocide, but neither committed themselves to take action beyond
providing relief supplies. At the same time, the United Nations opened a Commission of
Inquiry to investigate whether a genocide was in fact taking place in the region.285
Shaky negotiations had been ongoing between the rebel forces and the
government, but rifts were beginning to emerge between the rebel groups. At the time of
the ceasefire agreement, The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)
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broke away from the JEM because it felt that its demands were not focused enough on the
needs of the Fur people. The JEM had a strong Islamist agenda and was allied with alTurabi’s Popular National Congress, while the SLM was more regional and secular and
had allied itself with the Northern Democratic Alliance, a northern group opposed to the
el-Beshir regime and the NIF, and also allied with the SPLM in the south. Fighting broke
out between these two main rebel groups in Darfur in November 2004.
The massive amount of violence had led to a point where the society had
almost ceased to function. Communities were not only at each other’s throats, but
they were quickly becoming incapable of regulating themselves on a day-to-day
basis. The whole of Darfur was turning into a lawless refugee camp where social
patterns were under severe strain. The Janjaweed had been delinquents and
socially marginal people from the start, but the guerrillas were now increasingly
losing control of themselves and bandit groups were quickly springing up.286
Another government offensive began in December 2004, just prior to the signing
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the SPLA in the south, aimed at “clearing”
the roads in Darfur. The UN Security Council referred the Darfur case to the
International Criminal Court in March 2005. By the summer of 2005, the provisions of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement took effect, and a government of national unity was
created, making SPLM leader John Garang First Vice-President of the Sudanese
government, but he was killed in helicopter crash on July 30, shortly after taking office.
Following a brief lull in the summer months, reports of government air attacks against
civilian targets in Darfur began to increase beginning in September 2005. 287
Despite media worldwide media attention and international outcry over the events
in Darfur, attacks on civilians continued to take place, and access to humanitarian relief
supplies continued to be limited in the region. In May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement
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was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, by breakaway SLM leader Minni Minawi; this agreement
laid out changes in the governance of the Darfur region as well as increased participation
in the central government; it also established the Transitional Darfur Region Authority,
which was to be implemented the following April.288 The other rebel groups, including
the JEM and the remaining faction of the SLM, opposed the peace agreement and joined
together as the National Redemption Front, headed by long-time Darfurian leader Ahmed
Diraige. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1706 in August,
creating a mandate for a peace-keeping force in the region;289 this received support from
both the SLM and the Chadian government.
Conflict on the border between Sudan and Chad continued throughout 2006. By
January 2007, Chad had taken some 200,000 refugees from Darfur,290 and on more than
one occasion, Chad accused the Sudanese government of lending support to antigovernment rebels in its own country and had closed its own consulate in Darfur. These
conflicts seemed indicative that the Sudanese government was not honoring the peace
agreement it had signed in May; in fact, observers noted that in the latter half of 2006,
attacks against civilian targets continued unabated.291 This pattern continued into 2007,
culminating in an attack on African Union peacekeepers in April.
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In February 2007, the International Criminal Court handed down indictments,
against Ahmed Haroun, former interior minister for Darfur in 2003 and 2004, and against
Ali Khushayb, a Janjaweed leader.292 El-Beshir and President Idris Deby of Chad signed
a peace agreement in May, attempting to ease tension between the countries as fighting
continued along the border region; the agreement, brokered by Saudi Arabia, stated that
the governments of either country were forbidden to support rebel groups aimed at
destabilizing the others’ country. In the same month, Amnesty International released a
report stating that Russia and China were supplying military equipment to Sudan in
defiance of the UN arms embargo that was being using in the Darfur conflict.293 The UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1769 in July, which approved the creation of a hybrid
UN/AU peace-keeping force which was set to merge with the existing African Union
force by December; its deployment began in October 2007.
Cooperation among the different rebels groups was sought during a conference
held in Arusha, Tanzania, in August, in order to smooth out difference among themselves
and to allow the peace agreement to be put into place more effectively. During peace
negotiations with the government sponsored by the UN and AU in subsequent months,
there were still disagreements among the rebel groups, and this delayed progress in
discussions. Finally, in November 2007, six of the groups signed a Charter of
Unification and agreed to take on the SLM name.294 Throughout 2007, unity among the
tribes making up the Janjaweed was weakening, as fighting broke out between the
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Terjem and Mariah tribes, the Habbaniya and Salamat tribes, and the Habbaniya and
Falata tribes, all in southern Darfur; most of the fighting took place over water, land,
livestock, and the ability to tax travel through certain trade routes.295
The UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) officially began its mission
in January 2008. Although peace talks between the rebels in Darfur and the Sudanese
government were still ongoing, in February 2008, the government began another
offensive along the border with Chad, leaving between 8000 and 10,000 refugees trapped
between the army and Chadian border.296 In April, John Holmes, UN undersecretary for
humanitarian affairs, announced to the Security Council that according to new estimates,
the number of dead in the Darfur conflict is close to 300,000 people.297 Much attention
was brought upon China throughout early 2008, which was hosting the Summer
Olympics in August, regarding its role in the Darfur conflict.298 In May, the JEM militia
advanced to the city of Obdurman, across the Nile River from Khartoum; government
forces managed to re-secure the area in a few days. Conflicts also began again on the
border between northern and southern Sudan between rival milita groups later in May.
Also, as of May 2008, the UNAMID deployment remained only at 9500, short of its
authorized strength of 19,000 troops. In July 2008, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor for
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the International Criminal Court, announced that the court was seeking an arrest warrant
for Omar el-Behsir for crimes against humanity committed during the Darfur conflict.299

Conclusions

Now that I have explored these five cases of crimes against humanity, I want to
mention a few caveats. In writing the chronological narratives, I have sought to focus on
the major political, social, and economic events that led up to the incidents of crimes
against humanity against a certain segment of each country’s population, and to note the
international community’s response, if any, to these crimes; and in making the analytic
distinction between political culture and sovereignty, I wanted to draw attention to the
relative influence that each concept contributed to the situations in which crimes against
humanity occurred. One of the things that stands out in each case, and across all five
cases, is the great complexity involved in attempting to articulate each concept and the
weakness of relating contemporaneous historical events. Political culture is a concept
borrowed from the field of comparative politics, and my efforts to apply the rigorous
standards and practices of that field, I am certain, will fall short of what is expected. The
analysis of sovereignty has a number of dimensions which I have not attempted to
explore or have touched upon only slightly in these case studies, such as the role of the
census in constructing social and ethnic identity, the physical construction and control of
a country’s infrastructure, and the role of print and electronic media in state
legitimization. Finally, as I write this, events in Sudan are still unfolding, and
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prosecutions for the various crimes committed in Argentina, Cambodia, Rwanda, and the
former Yugoslavia are ongoing, so new information is still being added to the historical
record. Thus, my efforts, of necessity, will remain incomplete.
That said, I want to now turn to a number of conclusions that may be drawn with
the information and the concepts that I had available.

Political Culture and Identity

As the reader might have noticed throughout these case studies, the line between a
country’s political culture and the place of identity within sovereignty is not clear-cut. In
fact, it is extremely difficult to separate the role of sovereignty in the enforcement of a
country’s national identity and the sense of identity that political culture creates. As I
stated in an earlier chapter, sovereignty includes both a sense of belonging as well as the
means of policing and defending the boundaries of belonging. It might be said that
sovereignty is the “container” of political culture in most countries; this holds true for
both long-established countries and former colonies. To use two examples, Cambodia’s
government in 1975 was controlled by a Communist regime which set out to eliminate
“subversives”, while in 1976 Argentina was controlled by a right-wing military junta that
also wanted to eliminate “subversives;” their enemies largely came from the same sectors
of the population: students, union members, the professional classes, intellectuals, and
political opponents. Cambodia had a new revolutionary government that set out to
defend itself from a set of class enemies and enforce a sense of identity and belonging in
the process. The Argentinean tradition of military juntas in times of crisis allowed a
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process to unfold in which the “essence” of national identity was perceived as threatened
by leftist and Peronist enemies, creating the necessity for extreme measures.
At other times, crimes against humanity have occurred because of the failure or
weakness of the nation’s existing political culture, followed by the rise of an alternative
sense (or senses) of belonging in its place. This can be seen most clearly in Yugoslavia
and to a lesser extent in Sudan. The political culture created by Tito in the former
Yugoslavia (“brotherhood and unity”) sought to forge a national identity based on
communist ideas of class that transcended the ethnic identities that made up the different
regions of the country. After Tito’s death, the central government was no longer able to
actively suppress expressions of ethnic identity. At the same time, Serbian nationalists
began to see saw themselves as the successors and guarantors of the Yugoslavian nation.
When the different republics began to demand their own independence from Serbian
domination, civil war erupted in the region, which then degenerated into mutual instances
of ethnic cleansing and mass murder. Sudan is a more ambiguous case, but traces of this
problem can be seen there as well. The secular aims of the Nimiery regime began to
weaken during the late 1970s and early 1980s; until that time, military coups were largely
secular affairs, seeking to restore order and stability to a country with one of the most
ethnically diverse populations on Earth. Islamist activists pressured the government, and
by 1983, religious changes were taking place throughout the country in an effort to make
Sudan into an Islamic state. This reignited the civil conflict with the southern region of
the country, which resisted the sectarian state, and more deeply involved Sudan in
ongoing wars with its neighbors Chad and Libya, which in turn destabilized the entire
Darfur region.
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Rwanda remains an interesting case in that categories of ethnicity dominated the
politics of the post-colonial period (as they had during the colonial period, particularly
under Belgian rule). The “Hutu Revolution” of 1960 was framed in the country as a
triumph of majority rule, but one in which the minority Tutsi population was politically
disenfranchised. The country’s weak economy lead to dependency on development aid,
which in turn fostered patronage-client networks throughout the country. By the late
1980s, the economy of Rwanda was once again weak, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic
Front was ready to attack from Uganda, and there was pressure from the international
community for democratization. This combination of social instability, civil war, and the
growth of Hutu Power political parties contributed to renewed demonization of the Tutsi
population and to the eventual genocide carried out against them.
In this light, political culture becomes a useful analytic tool for drawing attention
to the ways in which a national identity is formed and to the institutions which sustain it.
Political ideology drove the governments of Argentina and Cambodia to carry out crimes
against humanity, but it is questionable whether these would have happened on a massive
scale if the proponents of these ideologies did not have the means of state power at their
disposal; if not, they might have remained vocal political movements carrying out
isolated acts of violence, but nothing on the level of what actually happened in those
countries. The initial tacit support of the people of Argentina for the junta in 1976 soon
gave way to terror as they learned that the new government was engaged in mass arrests
of neighbors and co-workers and encouraged people to spy on one another and to act as
informants. The Khmer Rouge did, in fact, begin its regimentation of public and social
life a few years before it seized governmental power in Cambodia in the regions of the
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countryside under its control; communal living was enforced, and the people of these area
became known as the “base people;” this would distinguish them from the “new people”
who came under Khmer Rouge control only after central power was seized. “New
people” were held to a higher standard of scrutiny, and in many cases, this led to their
eventual murders. But until the Khmer Rouge actually gained control of most of the
population, such murders were not common, even the midst of ongoing civil war against
the government. Had the Argentinean junta remained only a plot in the minds of its
instigators, had the plans of the Khmer Rouge remained only half-carried out within
Cambodia, it does not seem as if we would have seen the high levels of torture and
murder committed in these countries.
Ethnicity is a much more complex element of a country’s political culture. In the
cases of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Sudan, ethnicity was a driving factor in the violence
committed, but one can also see periods in the histories of those countries when ethnicity
did not play a major role or was not considered a dominant factor in political life. Tito
spent most of his life attempting to restrain expressions of ethnic identity within
Yugoslavia, often in a brutal fashion, in the years following Tito’s death, ethnic conflict
would prove to be Yugoslavia’s undoing as a unified country. Both in Rwanda and
Sudan, the legacy of colonial rule left deep socio-economic and ethnic divisions within
those countries, where one or more ethnic groups had been favored or had been ruled
over separately. The subsequent histories of both countries have been largely defined by
coming to terms with those divisions, largely through conflict. In these cases, ethnicity
was the immediate cause of the atrocities committed, and the control of state sovereignty
was both an object of conflict as well as the means of carrying out that conflict.
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Sovereignty, Stability, and Civil War

Civil wars are, for the most part, fought within a country in order to either
determine who will control the central government or to achieve autonomy for some
group within the country; on the one hand, they are fight over sovereign control of the
entire country, and on the other, they are attempts to gain some stake in the sovereign
government or to achieve a measure of autonomous sovereign control for a group.
Cambodia is an example of the former aspect of civil war, in which a faction within a
country fights to gain control of the central government; the other countries are examples
of the latter aspects. Leftists in Argentina sought to gain representation within the central
government, and being barred from it by both the Peronist party and by the military, they
turned to armed struggle. The republics of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo
sought to establish independence from the dominance of Yugoslavian politics by Serbia.
Tutsis born in exile created a military force in Uganda and invaded Rwanda, hoping to
return to their homeland, to gain a measure of representation in the Rwandan
government, and to topple the Hutu-dominated regime. Native tribes of the Darfur region
rose up against the central government of Sudan in order to draw attention to how the
region was being ignored.
In all of these cases, crimes against humanity were carried within a context of
civil war: in Argentina, a number of leftist organizations were targeted as well as those
suspected of being involved in anti-government activities, by the ruling military junta; in
Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge acted to eliminate enemies of the their regime once they
took control of the capital city; in Yugoslavia, the break-away republics of Croatia and
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Bosnia-Herzegovina fought with one another and with Serbia in order to establish their
independence from the central government, and later, a group in Kosovo began an armed
campaign for independence from Serbia; in Rwanda, the Hutu-controlled government set
out to kill members of the Tutsi tribe, following a peace agreement which brought a halt
to the civil conflict; and in Sudan, the government began employing air warfare and tribal
militias to destroy tribal villages in the wake of an insurrection.
In three of these five cases, stability in the post-colonial period of independence
was an issue: Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sudan. Deep social divisions and economic
inequalities continued to exist within these countries following independence, eventually
leading to political instability and civil war. Cambodia was largely rural and
agricultural, and divisions existed between the majority of people living in villages in the
countryside, wealthier merchants living in the cities, and the extravagant lifestyles of the
monarch and his entourage; the Khmer Rouge was able to effectively exploit these
divisions through both political and military struggle. For many decades in Rwanda, the
Belgians favored the Tutsis over the Hutus; following independence, the “Hutu
Revolution” reversed this at the political level, practically barring Tutsis from political
participation, while Tutsis remained economically dominant. In Sudan, there remains the
persistent control of the central government by peoples living in the northern sections of
the country, to the exclusion of those living in the south and the west. In none of the
cases did the former colonial masters attempt to right the economic and social
inequalities before granting independence, nor did they attempt to intervene or mediate
once problems began because of these issues. In fact, in these three cases, the colonial
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masters contributed greatly to the exaggeration of these differences and divisions during
the period of their rule.
The cases of Argentina and Yugoslavia take place outside of the post-colonial
context. Both countries had been independent for most of the 20th century (with the
exception of Yugoslavia prior to the First World War and during the Second World War,
when it was under proxy control by Nazi Germany). Beginning in the 1930s, Argentina
had developed the practice of allowing the military to seize control of the government
during periods of political and social unrest, so the establishment of the junta in 1976,
while not welcome by most citizens, was not an unusual occurrence. Yugoslavia
experienced one-party, Stalinist-style rule after the Second World War while it remained
relatively open to the rest of the world, unlike other communist nations with a similar
form of government. The central governments in each of these case responded to civil
and political unrest with extreme levels of violence; in the case of Yugoslavia, groups
within the break-away republics also carried out a great part of the crimes against
humanity.
The extreme measures taken to resolve the civil conflicts examined in these case
studies point to a deep sense of insecurity and urgency on the parts of those who control
the central governments. The rules of war no longer now no longer seemed to apply,
since it was not two sovereign states fighting against one another, but rather two or more
groups within a sovereign state vying for control of that state. The stakes were both
political power and what political power enforces, the identity of the state itself. Civil
wars are threats to the existence of a given central government’s identity and existence,
and this is why central governments have tended to respond with particular viciousness in
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these cases; the unitary identity of the sovereign state is drawn into doubt with the
existence of competing identities. As I showed in an earlier chapter, within modernity
sovereignty always assume the form of a unitary body and a singular will, without
exception; it is simply the nature of sovereign power to resist division within itself. Other
examples of this tendency include the Thirty Years’ War in early modern Europe, the
American Civil War, the Russian Civil War following the First World War, and the
presently ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Crimes against
humanity on a large scale in these cases are an extension of civil conflict within a
sovereign state.

Sovereignty and the Failure of Constitutional Order

In most Western nations, we take it for granted that a government will normally
act within its constitutional limits, even in times of crisis or emergency, simply because,
according to this line of thought, legitimate governments never violate their constitutions.
Yet, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this has become an important issue in all countries
with traditions of rights, limited government, and popular sovereignty, as governments
have often been pressed constitutional restrictions to the limit, and in some cases,
breaking those restrictions, in the pursuit of an elusive enemy. If we look back over the
history of the second half of the 20th century, we can see how this has generally been the
case – the Cold War, the war on drugs, and at present, the war on terror. These remained
essentially low-level crises, and in the minds of some within the central government, they
were authorized to do what was necessary in order to ensure that the threat, whatever it
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happened to be at the time, was contained. Considerations of national security may then
be used to override constitutional limits.300
What this situation in the West has in common with these case studies is the way
in which sovereign authority reacts in times of crisis, or when the sovereign authority
declares that a crisis exists and then responds to it. In both Argentina and Yugoslavia,
there was a great deal of political instability in the time periods under examination here,
without there being full-scale civil war at the beginning. Instead, dissident political
movements sought to either show up the weaknesses of the central government
(Argentina) or to secede from the country entirely (Yugoslavia). Within the theories of
sovereignty examined earlier, a common thread running through them all is that
governments exist primarily to provide security, to protect citizens from both internal and
external threats. Theories of popular sovereignty take this a step further and allows for
citizens to rebel against unjust governments. However, as I have also showed, neither set
of theories provides a clear set of conditions under which this might legitimately take
place. Resistance to unjust government remains under-theorized within the compass of
sovereignty, and this has allowed central governments to essentially categorize any armed
opposition, legitimate or not, as threats to the existence of the sovereign authority itself.
This same tendency within central governments also shows up in situations where
a group seizes power within the government, effectively suspending an existing
constitutional order and ruling by decree or creating another constitution for the state.
While the ruling group is in power, opposition and dissent are often silenced and, in the
cases examined here, they become the objects of violent repression and outright murder.
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This happened in Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge seized power and to a lesser extent
when the National Islamic Front carried out its coup in 1989 in Sudan. In Cambodia, the
Khmer Rouge banned all opposition parties, while in Sudan, popular elections were
eventually reinstated, though with substantial restrictions.
Rwanda and Yugoslavia are interesting cases because the mass murders
committed were tied to broader movements within those countries towards greater
democratization following the end of the Cold War. The prospects of greater popular
participation in the central government, the desire to oust oppressive political parties
from the past, and the international pressure to democratize the political process, were all
influential factors in this trend. The proliferation of political parties and popular
movements in these two countries after 1989 was in part based on the centrality of ethnic
identity in ongoing political debates. The divisiveness and win-lose mentality created by
this issue eventually led to the rise of parties in power that established the dominance of
one ethnic group (Hutus, Serbians) at the expense of others, effectively disenfranchising
those other ethnic groups that sought representation. In Rwanda, Tutsis were barred from
holding higher political office prior to the 1990s, but the invasion by the RPF and
eventual stalemate between the RPF and the Habyarimana government led to negotiations
which would have returned political rights to the Tutsi people. These events aided the
rise of the Hutu Power movement within the nascent democratic reforms within Rwanda,
and it eventually seized power by force and carried out the genocide against the Tutsi.
Slobodan Milosevic’s “anti-bureaucratic revolution” was presented as a popular
movement to ouster Communist Party apparatchiks from power after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, but its true intent was to allow the province of Serbia to have dominance
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within the rotating presidency of the country. When the republics of Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, and eventually Kosovo attempted to break away from Yugoslavia and
achieve independence, conflict between these republics and Serbia began. In the name of
holding together the “southern Slavic” nation, numerous acts of violence were carried out
by Serbian nationalists, both in the Serbian government and by Serbians within Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo; Croatian nationalists also committed atrocities against
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In both of these countries, ethnic identities were already writ large
into political life, and movements toward democracy exacerbated these conflicts to
extremely violent proportions. These were places that turned ethnic identity into a
distinct political interest group and in which political power was ultimately conceived of
as a zero-sum game that undermined the goals of democratic reforms and an orderly and
non-violent political process.
A final aspect of the failure of constitutional order to which I would like to draw
attention is the awareness of culpability on the part of those who committed crimes
against humanity. In all of these cases, various measures were taken to cover up
instances of rape, torture, and mass murder committed by the central authorities. Secret
prisons are a common way to hide this grim handiwork (Argentina, Cambodia, and
Sudan) as is the use of mass graves in uninhabited areas (Cambodia, Yugoslavia). In
conditions of civil conflict, central governments tend to assume control over the main
channels of the public media, or bars media access to areas of conflict; in many instances,
the conflict itself effectively bars members of the media from reporting the conditions on
the ground. Central governments also resort to using proxy armies and privatelycontrolled militias to carry out their handiwork, creating a veil of impunity. Average
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citizens, including children, were actively pressed into service for the Khmer Rouge.
Militias have been used to deadly effect in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, with the
advantage of allowing these central governments to maintain the appearance of noninvolvement.
Rwanda remains an interesting exception to this last point. Both within the
country and to outside observers, there was an awareness of a great deal of unrest within
the country, and the country’s only radio station was regularly using propaganda to turn
the population against the Tutsi people; while the genocide was being carried out, public
radio broadcasts became a source of coordination for members of the Interahamwe as
they went about their “work.” Once the genocide began, no effort was made to cover up
the murders that were being committed; bodies often lay on the roadsides for weeks
before being carried away.
It is this last point to which I want to draw the reader’s attention. The horrific
events that took place in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and that are ongoing in Sudan, all
happened in full view of the world. Newspaper and television reporters were on the
ground in these regions and gave day-to-day accounts of these events as they unfolded.
The advent of twenty-four hour-a-day television news has been a blessing and a curse, in
this respect. The world viewing public was able to witness atrocities being committed,
often first-hand, but as time passed, attention to and concern over what was happening in
these countries flagged. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia dragged on from 1991
to 1995, and again in 1999. The events in Rwanda took place over the course of a several
months in 1994. And the world has been aware of the atrocities being committed in the
Darfur region of Sudan since the summer of 2003. This is in direct contrast to the crimes
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against humanity that took place in Argentina, which at the time was viewed as just
another military coup, and in Cambodia, where the media was only allowed very limited
access; it was only in the early 1980s that the public became aware of what happened in
these two countries.
This raises some very difficult questions about sovereign authority and how to
deal with massive crimes against humanity committed by a central government. Within
Western theories of sovereignty, it is assumed that authorities are accountable (to natural
and divine law or to the people) and subject to the rule of law (members of government
are held responsible for their actions under their own legal system), but if one looks at the
history of sovereign authority, this assumption is not iron-clad; it may even be incorrect.
Who can holds murderous sovereign authorities accountable when they themselves hold a
monopoly on the means of violence? How may they be held accountable if they subvert
the political process and the very institutions of public life? Can a government have a
duly constituted authority if it does not respect basic human rights?
Oftentimes, citizens have been unable to act against their own governments when
that government is responsible for committing abuses of human rights, and it has fallen to
the international community to respond to these crimes. The rise of various human rights
regimes under the auspices of the United Nations and regional organizations points to
some level of commitment on the part of the international community that these violent
actions by governments can violate basic norms of treatment of human persons.
Although the idea of humanitarian intervention was already current by the early 1990s, in
large part due to the situation in Somalia, it gained greater currency after the mass
murders that took place in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, “NATO was acting upon
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a new premise that had emerged during the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. Military
intervention against sovereign states, so this embryonic doctrine proclaimed, is legitimate
if it prevents or halts the abuse of human rights by a state against its own citizens . . .
Humanitarian conditions alone justify war.”301 NATO’s willingness to act was also
emboldened by the criminal tribunals going on against the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda as well as the Spanish government’s attempt to bring former Chilean dictator
Auguste Pinochet to trial around the same time. Subsequently, this doctrine was further
developed into the form of “responsibility to protect,” which will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Impunity for crimes against humanity, under the concept of “sovereign
immunity,” has also been under legal assault through a number of venues around the
world. Ad hoc tribunals were created by the United Nations in the wake of the atrocities
committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. A quasi-international tribunal was also created to
deal with crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. Following a
change of government, a number of civil and criminal trials began in the late 1990s in
Argentina to deal with crimes committed during the 1976-1983 junta. By July 2002, the
International Criminal Court began to operate, and as of this writing, six cases are before
the court, dealing with situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the
Central African Republic, and Sudan; the Prosecutor has also recently asked for an arrest
warrant against the President of Sudan, Omar el-Beshir, and international debate has
ensued over its viability while peace negotiations are ongoing in the conflict in Darfur.
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Finally, in the years following the Cold War, international pressure for
democratization has grown. The demise of Soviet communism and its system of oneparty rule opened the way for the spread of Western-style democracy around the globe.
But as I have shown above, democratization contributed to the exacerbation of existing
political and ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Furthermore, the
imposition of the culturally-bound Western democratic institutions upon non-Western
contexts has some problems in its implementation. Democratization by force or by
external pressure may do more harm than good in the long run for the cause of
democracy around the world.
These three themes, humanitarian military intervention, the role of the
International Criminal Court, and the process of democratization will be explored in more
depth in the next chapter. These case studies have showed that, in the latter decades of
the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st century, crimes against humanity
remain an ever-present possibility, requiring the need for a range of effective
international responses. Sovereign authority, originally created to hold threats to a
population at bay, in all of these cases has been the greatest source of threat to a
population’s well-being and existence.
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CHAPTER 5
TAMING LEVIATHAN?

Introduction

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, sponsored by the Canadian government, issued its report entitled
Responsibility to Protect, which set out to reformulate the concept of state sovereignty
with an eye toward determining under what circumstances humanitarian intervention was
justified. In the contemporary world, sovereign authority is no longer synonymous with
mere “control” over a population and territory but rather exists to protect its population.
By becoming a signatory to the United Nations’ Charter, a state “accepts the
responsibilities of membership flowing from that signature.” The authors of the report go
on to define a state’s responsibility as three-fold: care for the security and well-being of
its citizens; an obligation to all the world’s citizens through UN membership; and
accountability to the international community of states for its actions.302 This redefinition
of sovereignty was incorporated into the United Nations’ human security agenda in the
2004 report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.303
This effort to re-craft the concept of sovereignty indicates the degree to which it is
perceived at the international level that the authority of the sovereign state remains a
problem in pursuing the goals of promoting human rights and development and providing
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for the security needs of people in areas of political instability and conflict. As I showed
in the above case studies, the major incidents of crimes against humanity in the 20th
century have occurred during civil conflicts within states and that the state authority itself
was complicit in those crimes. Are there ways in which the power and authority of a
sovereign state may be curbed which may prevent the further occurrence of large-scale
crimes against humanity?
This chapter will explore three possible solutions to this nagging problem of
sovereign authority: humanitarian military intervention; the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC); and the process of democratization. At this point in
history, humanitarian intervention, or military intervention for humanitarian purposes,
appears to be the world community’s primary instrument of dealing with ongoing crimes
against humanity. Despite the development of its legitimacy in the international
community, much controversy surrounds this principle of intervention. The
establishment of the ICC has been greeted by the majority of nations as a great
advancement in the ability to try crimes against humanity without ambiguity and undue
political influence, but many questions remain as to its efficacy, especially without the
support of the United States. Finally, the international promotion of democratization is a
more ambitious goal - the spread of democratic institutions of government around the
world in order to achieve a deep-rooted respect for human rights within states. This
seemingly worthy goal is not without its problems and criticisms: claims of imperialism;
a lack of respect for alternative modes of authority and cultural differences; the
difficulties of grafting Western political ideas onto non-Western political institutions; and
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the cost of democratic nation-building would be extremely prohibitive to the West and to
the entire community of nations.
Given these alternatives (by no means the only ones304), it would seem as if the
authority of the sovereign state might be brought into line with the rules established by
international law and human rights norms. However, in all of these solutions,
sovereignty remains the central organizing principle of action. Humanitarian military
intervention brings other sovereign states to the rescue of a given population, but then the
problem becomes how to insure that those people will be protected, once the other states
withdraw, indeed, if they are able to withdraw. The International Criminal Court has the
potential to hold leaders of states accountable for crimes against humanity committed
under their rule, but without enforcement powers beyond what is granted to it by the
United Nations or voluntarily by states party to the ICC statute, its rulings remain hollow.
And democratization seeks to spread the “blessings of freedom” throughout the world
while recreating the pole of popular sovereignty introduced in the first chapter of this
dissertation. In the end, sovereignty remains inherently paradoxical, absorbing all of
these solutions into its orbit without mitigation of its more troublesome aspects.

Humanitarian Intervention

While the term “intervention” covers a wide variety of meanings in the field of
international relations305, humanitarian military intervention can be defined as the use of
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armed force by a nation or nations to stop wide-spread human rights abuses within the
sovereign territory of another nation.306
On its face, the legality of military intervention into the domestic affairs of
another nation seems straightforward. The United Nations Charter specifically prohibits
such intervention - “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”307
This sentiment is subsequently reiterated in Chapter 2, Section 7, but with a single
proviso. “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter Vll.”308 Given the importance of the status of sovereign statehood to the U.N.
Charter, the centrality of non-interference is obvious. The domestic affairs of a member
state of the United Nations remain essentially under the authority of that state’s
government.
However, intervention remains an option under conditions of threats to
international peace and order. Chapter VII of the Charter lays out a process by which the
U. N. Security Council may authorize the use of force to resolve international conflicts.
“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
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inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.”309 Article 51 describes a nation’s right to selfdefense. “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”310
The issue of domestic crises, such as civil war, state failure, internal repression,
and crimes perpetrated by a government against its own citizens, thus remains outside of
the scope of the UN Charter. Subsequent international treaties have defined a general
opposition to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but the prevention and
punishment of these offenses remained elusive until the 1990s.
With the growing number of humanitarian crises in the 1990s and 200s, military
intervention was often cited as the most useful policy tool in preventing the further abuse
of human rights and loss of life.311 But the experience of the Western nations that bore
the brunt of these interventions was mixed. In a few instances, there was some success –
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Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone – but in others, there was a marked lack of success –
Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and some would say, Iraq after the 2003
invasion – for a variety of reasons, including a lack of commitment.
Growing out of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Millenium Report in
September 2000, the Canadian government sponsored a study of sovereignty and the role
of intervention in the 21st century and issued the above-mentioned report The
Responsibility to Protect in December 2001. This study reconceptualized state
sovereignty as a “responsibility to protect” the population under the state’s jurisdiction.
The committee that undertook the study also proposed criteria for determining when that
responsibility had lapsed and how and to what extent other nations may intervene, to
continue protecting that population once the state is unwilling or unable to do so.
While the doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) is now a part of the United
Nations’ approach in dealing with large-scale crimes against humanity, problems remain.
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq was partly justified on the grounds that President
Hussein was engaged in actively repressing and murdering his own citizens.312 Although
this aspect of the invasion was overshadowed by the alleged connection between
Hussein’s government and the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and Hussein’s alleged
possession of biological and chemical weapons, it has not ceased to be a justification for
the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The United Nations/African Union peace-keeping
mission in Darfur was the first such mission explicitly deployed under R2P,313 but as of
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September 2008, two years have passed, and the mission still remains undermanned and
under-equipped; even the peace-keepers themselves have come under attack from rebel
forces in the region. There is a marked lack of political and economic interest in the
Darfur region for most Western nations, while the opposite is true for Middle Eastern and
African nations and China. National political interest plays an enormous role in
determining where and how R2P is applied, which undermines its humanitarian intent.
Despite having a well-developed set of guidelines for determining in what situations to
intervene, the lack of political will or the willingness to misuse the R2P always exists.
R2P seeks to ultimately restore sovereignty to the afflicted country. The question
arises regarding the nature of sovereignty during intervention. “Intervention suspends
sovereignty claims to the extent that good governance – as well as peace and stability –
cannot be promoted or restored unless the intervener has authority over a territory. But
the suspension of the exercise of sovereignty is only de facto for the period of the
intervention and follow-up, and not de jure.”314 What is the purpose of de jure
sovereignty while a country is occupied by foreign military forces? And if a government
has sought to carry out large-scale murder and ethnic cleansing, how can it be trusted to
not do so once foreign military forces withdraw, especially if the doctrine states that
“[t]he objective overall is not to change constitutional arrangements, but to protect them
. . . military intervention means endeavouring to sustain forms of government
compatible with the sovereignty of the state in which the enforcement has occurred –
not undermining that sovereignty.”315 These statements reflect the underlying
assumption that sovereignty, or more specifically, sovereign power, lies in military and
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police force, and that questions of authority and legitimacy can be answered only after
security is established. Thus, sovereignty does not reside in what the state provides, but
what it is capable of doing, its potential for violence, or its enforcement ability. While
sovereign authority can be democratic and can be used for humanitarian ends, it is not in
itself democratic or humanitarian. A sword, a rifle, and a nuclear bomb are neither
democratic nor humanitarian.

The International Criminal Court

The idea of having an international court to try individuals for crimes that “shock
the conscience” of humanity emerged after the end of World War II, following the war
crimes tribunals in Germany and Tokyo and the adoption of the Genocide Convention in
1947. The UN General Assembly sought to go about creating a judicial institution to try
the crime of genocide, and the task was given to the International Law Commission.
From 1949 to 1954, this commission a number of draft statutes for an international
criminal court, but these were subsequently rejected as the Cold War took center stage.
In the mid 1980s, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested trying cases of
terrorism in front of an international court. In 1989, the country of Trinidad and Tobago
sent a request to the General Assembly to resume work on an international criminal court
which would have jurisdiction over drug trafficking. This, combined with the
establishment of ad hoc war crimes tribunal in the former Yugoslavia316 and the efforts of
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the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action317 (dealing with human rights issues),
led to further work by the ILC on a draft statute. Differences over the statute were ironed
out from 1994 until 1998. In July 1998, the Rome Statute was adopted by a vote of 120
to 7.318 It was ratified by the required 60 states in April 2002, and the statute entered into
force in July of the same year. As of this writing (2008), the International Criminal Court
(ICC) is investigating of four international situations: Uganda, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Sudan.
Under the Rome Statute, the court’s jurisdiction extends over four categories of
crime: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. The jurisdiction
of the court is specifically designed to be complementary, to allow national courts to try
cases concerning these crimes within their own legal systems, unless they are unable or
unwilling to do so.319 There are territorial limitations to the court’s jurisdiction; the
accused individual has to be a national of a state party to the statute, and the alleged
crime has to have been committed on the territory of a state party.320 Third, there are
temporal limitations to the court’s jurisdiction. It has jurisdiction only over crimes
committed after July 1, 2002, the date the Rome Statute took effect.321 Jurisdiction begins
to be exercised whenever a situation is referred to the office of the prosecutor of the court
by a state party or by the UN Security Council or is initiated by the office of the
prosecutor itself.322
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The trial process within the ICC proceeds through the office of the Prosecutor.
Once a situation has been referred to or taken up by the Prosecutor, the office undertakes
an evaluation of the matter, something along the lines of a fact-finding mission. Once the
Prosecutor thinks there is a reasonable basis for a case, the office then submits a request
for authorization of an investigation from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.323 The
Pre-Trial Chamber is one of the organs of the Court, composed of at least six judges, and
it acts to assist both the Prosecutor and defense in preparation for the case, authorizing
investigations for the Prosecutor, issuing arrest warrants and summons to appear, and
providing assistance to victims, witnesses and defendants.324 Actual trials are conducted
by the Trial Chamber (also a panel of not less than six judges), and crimes are tried at the
Hague (unless another location is chosen), and the accused must be present. The rights of
the accused are extensive, comparable with those of any Western nations and embedded
in many human rights treaties.325 Rules of evidence and procedure are already laid down
in agreements subsequent to the Rome Statute,326 and before a trial begins, relevant rules
are discussed by the Trial Chamber, Prosecutor and defense before they are implemented
in a given trial.327
How will the ICC affect state sovereignty? It is important to look back to past
international criminal trials, beginning with Nuremberg and Tokyo and the ongoing
tribunals in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. Eliminating the possibility
of impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity perhaps might act as a deterrent
323
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against the commission of future crimes. This is not like domestic crime, which is
commonplace and in which many factors play into its occurrence;328 these are widespread
and publicized crimes carried out by a government against people within its own borders.
This may force political leaders in the future contemplating committing such crimes to
temper their methods and perhaps their political objectives (or alternately, to better hide
their efforts).
Does the Rome Statute actually impugn upon state sovereignty? No and yes – it
is an international agreement, based upon voluntary participation, and it exists to try
crimes of an extraordinary nature, in situations where national governments are either
unable or unwilling to try them. It also provides a forum for cases which are within the
concern of the international community. Similar to R2P’s role as a supplement to a
nation’s own sovereign authority, the ICC’s jurisdiction augments that of national legal
systems. But, it does undermine sovereign authority by applying international law to
domestic situations and by holding a political and military leadership accountable for
crimes they commit.329 Further, it establishes a judicial process outside of an offending
state’s territory and holds nationals accountable to the community of states.
Countries with political cultures with a strong tradition of impunity for violence
perpetrated against their own citizens will reject the notion of the ICC and its jurisdiction
altogether, although the UN Security Council retains the power of referring situations to
the office of the Prosecutor which occur in nations which are not signatories to the
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treaty.330 Interestingly enough, one of the strongest and most vocal opponents of the ICC
has been the United States. Initially supportive of the idea of the ICC, the American
delegates to the conference on the Rome Statute eventually came to oppose the idea
altogether, though they remained involved in the negotiations in order to have a hand in
what the final shape of the court and its powers would be. Their resistance centered
around the fear that American, particularly soldiers, would be harassed and tried by the
court for frivolous causes. This resistance hardened after the 2000 election, turning into
outright defiance after the terror attacks in 2001. In May 2002, former UN Ambassador
John Bolton described the “un-signing” of the Rome Statute as “the happiest moment” of
his time at the State Department.331 Bolton accused the ICC of having “an unaccountable
prosecutor, possibly politically motivated, [and] posing grave risks for the United States
and its political and military leaders.”332 Afterwards, the United States began pursuing a
campaign to get other countries to sign bilateral agreements to not turn Americans over to
ICC custody, under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.333 Later that same year, the U.S.
Congress passed the American Servicemember Protection Act, which set up a number of
prohibitions regarding participation in the ICC and which threatened to cut military aid to
countries party to the Rome Statute unless they signed the Article 98 agreements.334
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The lengths to which the American government has gone to extricate itself from
the reach of the ICC are instructive. And in relation to this, it should also be noted that
neither Russia nor China are parties to the Rome Statute. The world’s superpowers do
not view themselves as being subject to the universal jurisdiction of the Rome Statute,
and by implication, to the community of states. Further research might look at the
historical record of how these nations have responded to international efforts at creating
and enforcing human rights and human security measures in the 20th century, but here, I
only want to note that their present actions seem to indicate that, because of their material
power, they simply view themselves as being “above the law” embodied in the Rome
Statute. This puts them in good company with Syria, Iran, Sudan, and North Korea,
nations which have been labeled by the United States as a part of the “Axis of Evil” and
which are also not signatories of the Statute. It remains to be seen how the ICC will be
able to operate effectively without some level of cooperation from prominent members of
the UN Security Council.

Democratization

The process of democratization is the transition from authoritarian forms of
government toward more democratic forms. Here, democracy is broadly defined as a
form of government in which people periodically elect their officials and are able to
enjoy protection of their human rights. In the contemporary world, democracy has come
to be synonymous with representative or parliamentary institutions as well as the
enjoyment of a range of political, civil, social, and economic rights. Throughout this
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dissertation, I have deliberately avoided using the term democracy to describe popular
sovereignty simply because its early modern proponents of popular sovereignty were
themselves not supporters of democratic government as they historically understood its
existence in ancient Greece. The value and shape of democracy has changed over time,
and it remains an evolving concept. “Democracy is an ephemeral phenomenon rather
than a settled system. We might think of it as protean and amorphous, embracing a wide
range of possible forms and mutations that are responsive to grievances on the part of
those who have no means of redress other than to risk collectivizing their small bits of
power.”335
Within the United Nations, a commitment to democratic forms of governance has
existed since its inception; Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
makes direct reference to the participation of people in their governments, the will of the
people as the basis for government’s authority, and the need for periodic elections to
insure that this will is genuinely expressed.336 This commitment has shown up time and
again, from the Covenant on Civil and Rights in 1966,337to the Millennium Declaration in
2000,338 Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s follow-up report to the 2005 Millennium
Summit,339and the establishment of the United Nation’s Democracy Fund, also in
2005.340
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Studies of democratization in recent years have shown that an increasing number
of nations have begun to adopt democratic institutions and practices, particularly since
the end of the Cold War. Samuel Huntington’s seminal The Third Wave (1991) identified
two “bursts” of democratization occurring after 1974, one following the democratization
of Portugal and Spain, and another following the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union.341 By 2008, some 94 countries could be
classified as democracies, prompting Marshall and Cole to remark that “for the first time
in human history, the world has become a predominantly democratic one, at the global
level.”342
It would seem intuitive that the growth of democratic institutions in a country
would inhibit the excesses of authoritarian governments, and for the most part, that seems
to be the case. However, in two of the case studies examined here, in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the attempt to build democratic institutions actually preceded
the occurrence of crimes against humanity. The removal of authoritarian constraints on
potential conflicts between ethnic differences in these two countries was one cause of the
rise of exclusionist policies on the part of political authorities. The attempts of Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo to secede from the former Yugoslavia led to civil
conflict with the Serbian-dominated central government. In Rwanda, pressure from the
international community was one of the factors which encouraged the rise of the Hutu
Power movement which had a central role in the genocide carried out against the Tutsi
people. Following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the establishment of a
341
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democratic constitution created conditions in which a number of militant groups took
advantage of more open public institutions to instigate terror and civil conflict throughout
the country. In late 2007 and early 2008, an outbreak of violence in Kenya during
contested national elections led to fears that the tribal loyalties of the two main political
parties would lead to large-scale ethnic conflict; swift diplomatic intervention by the
United Nations and the international community helped lead to the creation of a coalition
government and a defusing of violence.343 Democratic government, particularly
relatively young institutions, remains susceptible to this sort of violence.
The “third wave” of democratization describes cascades of transitions from
authoritarian regimes to democratic institutions following the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, but it does not touch upon the difficulties of encouraging democratic transitions in
countries with well-entrenched authoritarian governments. This is especially relevant in
considering the on-going conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan; the prospects of
encouraging more democratic reforms within that country do not seem promising at this
point in time. The same is true in countries with authoritarian governments such as
China, North Korea, Syria, and Zimbabwe. Democratization remains a contingent and
haphazard process, and the willingness of the international community to more firmly
encourage democratic reforms in deeply entrenched authoritarian governments seems
limited at this point in history.
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Conclusion

While humanitarian military intervention, the International Criminal Court, and
the process of democratization all place constraints on the exercise of sovereignty, they
do not affect sovereignty in substance. Most nations in the international community have
agreed to abide by human rights norms, and there are mechanisms in place for
enforcement, punishment, and the prevention of abuses, but these remain voluntary and
contingent upon state participation. Sovereign states remain in charge of the process.
Humanitarian intervention, now in the form of the Responsibility to Protect, and the
International Criminal Court has been legitimated by collective decision-making within
the international community.344 Democratization, although regarded as a worthy goal
upon by most nations, remains more ambiguous and problematic in its implications. And
rarely will all of these measures be implemented with pure motives; as long as sovereign
states make the policy, there will be considerations of national interest, strategic thinking,
and suspicion of the motives of other nations.
Prevention and prosecution of crimes against humanity are going to take a
commitment on the part of nations to priorities other than that of national self-interest,
which remains the basis of most foreign policy making. At the very least, it requires a
willingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of other nation-states. At another level, it
requires a willingness to put a nation’s own military in harm’s way in defense of a
population other than one’s own. Efforts to put a halt to situations such as ethnic
cleansing and large-scale instances of violence and mass murder would have to be
344
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undertaken quickly, without necessarily having recourse to past processes of international
debate in the UN General Assembly and Security, such as what occurred during the
Rwandan genocide and the present conflict in Sudan. The International Criminal Court
is still in the early years of its institutional life, and it remains to be seem if the indictment
handed down by the Prosecutor Ocampo against President El-Bashir of Sudan will have
any effect on the ongoing conflict in that country. Finally, while there is a great deal of
rhetorical commitment to democratization at the international level and some amount of
institutional support, the democratizing project remains ambitious and uncertain at this
point in world history. The question remains: will the world’s nations be able to sustain
these commitments in a consistent fashion over the coming decades? If so, then the
abuses of sovereign authority have a good chance of being curbed, but if not, then the
prospects for these abuses to continue remains.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The sovereign authority of the state remains intact in the first decade of the 21st
century. In this dissertation, I wanted to examine how sovereignty came to exist, both as
a concept and in historical practice. The idea of sovereignty emerged from the transition
from the feudal era of European history to modernity, as a characterization of the power
of the monarchical state. The constitutional revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries
transferred sovereign authority away from the king into the hands of the people. First
through colonial expansion, then through the creation of the United Nations and
decolonization in the 20th century, sovereign statehood became the dominant model of
political organization across the globe.
Despite practical, constitutional, and even metaphysical limits placed upon the
exercise of sovereign authority, all theories of sovereignty maintain that no one should be
able to limit the power of the sovereign authority in times of emergency or when facing a
threat to the existence of the country; accountability, whether in the form of adherence to
natural or divine law, or to the will of the people, is suspended for the purposes of quick
decision-making and the circumventing of laws and constitutional limits which would
prevent the necessary exercise of power. The locus of sovereignty suddenly moves away
from its original source to decision-makers within government. It is in through this
“loophole” that danger enters into the national community, because if none may resist, or
is able to resist, the demands of the sovereign authority in times of crisis, then no member
of the state remains safe from the government, and the protection of basic human rights
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and dignity cannot be guaranteed. In the case studies of Cambodia, Argentina,
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, I focused on the extent to which the power of the state’s
authority in each case was implicated in the large-scale crimes against humanity
committed in those countries. These crimes took place under the guise of civil conflicts
which began when people within those countries questioned the validity of the existing
political order and took armed action against it.
When I asked the question of how sovereign authority may be limited or curbed, I
looked at three institutions and practices: humanitarian military intervention, the
International Criminal Court, and the promotion of democratization. Each of these was
able to place certain limits on what sovereign authorities were able to do, but without the
political will and commitment of the international community, the effectiveness of these
efforts remains questionable. More importantly, each of these institutions and practices
reproduces the bases of sovereign authority in various ways and does not solve the
underlying problem of sovereign authority.
The war on Islamist terrorism initiated by the United States after September 2001
brought to the surface similar kinds of questions about state sovereignty in the United
States and its allies in Western Europe. In particular, questions have been raised about
the sovereignty authority of the state, in particular about the President’s powers in
wartime, and about human rights issues that people in the West have assumed were
settled matters, including the right to privacy, the use of torture to gain intelligence
information, and the legal status and treatment of individuals captured in this otherwise
unusual conflict.

174

I was initially reluctant to raise the issue of the war on terrorism because on its
face, it sounds absurd to compare the recent actions of the United States government with
the governments of Khmer Rouge Cambodia or present-day Sudan. The American
government is not engaged in the mass murder of its own civilians, nor has it drastically
curbed their civil and political rights. But the expansion of sovereign power within the
American government was taking place long before this present conflict, and its
implications are not about carrying out blatant offenses against human rights. Instead,
the expansion of sovereign power in the United States, and more broadly, in the Western
world, is a by-product of the Cold War era. The fear of the expansion of Soviet
Communism abroad and at home led the United States and the threat of nuclear conflict
altered the foundations of American political life. The McCarthy era was characterized
by the suppression of certain forms of political dissent in the United States, aided by the
development of an extensive domestic surveillance regime by the FBI under Herbert
Hoover. An undeclared war was fought in Vietnam, and the government under Richard
Nixon took this system of domestic surveillance even further in spying on his war
protesters, civil rights groups, and his political rivals. In the 1980s, the Reagan
administration continued the Cold War and, perhaps more pertinent here, declared a “war
on drugs” which in turn led to a further increase in domestic surveillance and the
explosive growth of the American prison population which has by now exceeded that of
every other nation on Earth. The present war on terrorism and the issues it raises about
sovereign power and human rights is just another phase of this continuing expansion of
the sovereign authority of the American government as it continues to protect its people
from threats both within and outside of the country’s borders.
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As I have noted before, there is something inherently wrong in this situation,
when protection against a threat means a greater and greater need for control over those
protected and the continual exercise of the means of violence against a country’s own
population. In the second half of the 20th century, the terms “war” and “enemy” have
come to encompass a realm of meaning that is less about foes faced in pitched battle than
shadowy presences seemingly never far away from one’s shores, borders, and even
neighborhoods. This is why I am inclined to agree with Giorgio Agamben’s statement
that “[s]overeign violence opens a zone of indistinction between law and nature, outside
and inside, violence and law. And yet the sovereign is precisely the one who maintains
the possibility of deciding on the two to the very degree that he renders them
indistinguishable from each other.”345 Sovereign authority, because of its monopoly on
the (not necessarily legitimate) use of the means of violence, is able to determine exactly
what the political community will be and who will belong. The legitimacy of the
political order becomes a moot point when a government undermines democracy and
human rights in the name of democracy and human rights. Another European observer,
German social theorist Theodor Adorno, made a similar observation in late 1960s.
[G]enocide, the eradication of humanity, and the concentration of people in a
totality in which everything is subsumed under the principle of self-preservation,
are the same thing; indeed . . . genocide is absolute integration. One might say
that the pure identity of all people with their concept is nothing other than their
death . . . . absolute self-assertion and the absolute negation of all that lives . . . are
the same thing.346
Sovereign authority, brought to its logical conclusion, keeps its charge, the people, safe
by the exclusion of all other peoples from their space. The implication that may be
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drawn from both Agamben and Adorno is that the sovereign is at this point in history the
ultimate arbiter of life and death, and the protection of human rights and dignity remains
a sideline. This threat remains an ever present possibility as long as sovereignty exists.
As the people of the United States and Western Europe settle into a more
politically complacent mindset at the beginning of the 21st century, taking the advantages
of established political sovereignty for granted, the rest of the world continues to struggle
with their own tasks of building and maintaining their own nations. For long-oppressed
peoples, whether formerly under colonial rule and having struggled with decades of civil
conflict, or having lived for decades under authoritarian governments, this freedom from
oppression and freedom to participate in the directions of their governments are the ones
that has been long denied. But the self-determination of peoples and nation-building at
the expense of other peoples is another matter entirely. When this happens, then the
concept of sovereignty begins to bare its dark side to the world. What makes nationalism
and statehood dangerous is not this desire for freedom, but the seemingly inevitable push
to exclusion that can appear within the practice of sovereign statehood. The institutions
of sovereign authority remain with us, for good or ill, and with the awareness of the
dangers inherent within the concept, it also remains for us to promote to good and to
reign in the bad as much as possible.
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